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The Lived Experiences of Professional Engineers
Over the Life-Cycle of a Technological Device

Abstract
One of the goals of this study was to pose the engineering role in a way that allows
engineers to understand the impact that professional requirements have on their career.
For engineers making medical devices, requirements come from three principal
sources, professional engineering, regulatory agencies, and their own organization.
Engineering requires an application of knowledge in technology, mathematics and
science; and the application of “gut judgment”. When knowledge and judgment come
together in their practice engineers achieve “artistry”. Regulatory requirements from
FDA or ISO must be fulfilled. Finally, organizational requirements must also be met, for
it is to the organization that engineers contract their labor to receive payment for their
work.
When fulfilling the requirements from all sources, engineers follow an honorable
way of making a living, and importantly they get to enact on a regular basis, within their
organization, the key points of what it is to be an engineer. This is how engineers gather
a “moral career”, a term conceptualized and described by Ervin Goffman. Additionally, I
used the term professional/reflective practice, as described by Donald Schön, to present
the salient features of engineering.
By posing the engineering profession in this manner, it will help engineers and
future engineers make better decisions about their career. It is important to do their “due
diligence” when contemplating working for an organization and ask about the life-cycle
stage on those products they will be working with. Engineers should be allowed to use
their judgement to make the difficult call on technical and science matters and it is
important to understand the organization’s commitment to this. By having this
knowledge, engineers learn how not to be a victim because in many organizations,
engineers are often “thrown to the dogs” because they are untrained on how to think as
the leaders of the organization do and become easy victims.
This study also shows a direct connection between a product’s life-cycle stage and
the conditions of the engineer’s practice. During the growth stage, great satisfaction and
autonomy prevail. However, with product maturity and decline, dissatisfaction and a
substantial curtailing of autonomy appeared.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
I am an engineer with a degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
Puerto Rico. My career spans over 35 years, most if it spent as an engineer in industry
and specializing in the manufacturing of medical devices. Before joining industry, I spent
many years on active military duty as a commissioned officer in the United States Army
in engineering and aviation. Later I joined the Army National Guard as an officer and
helicopter pilot; I completed 25 years of service of military service and retired with the
rank of Major.
My laboring in medical devices has taken me to numerous locations in the United
States, and with my family have lived in the Mid-West for the past 15 years. My
professional credentials include a professional engineer license from the state indicating
that I met the legal requirements of the licensing board for issuance of a license as
Professional Engineer. During my many years in the manufacturing of medical devices,
I have worked for many companies in Puerto Rico and the United Sates in various
capacities including line engineer, production engineer, supervisor, manager and
director. Additionally, I have worked as a quality engineer in numerous new product
development teams, including heart valves, cardio-pulmonary surgical equipment, and
blood management equipment. I have spent my last ten years in industry in the capacity
of a quality engineer and overall this represents about one-third of my career as a
professional engineer in industry.
A few years ago, I started to look closer at the recurring incidents of medical
devices causing patients harm, and at the same time realized that many other nonmedical products were also causing harm. In all of these cases, I wondered about the
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involvement of engineers, and that it was obvious from the facts that the harmful
incidents happened probably in spite of the prevention efforts put forth by engineers.
Because I have worked in manufacturing almost my entire career, it made sense to look
closer into the practices of engineers in manufacturing. In the back of my mind, I was
hoping to find the proverbial “smoking gun” but that was not to be, and I confirmed that
quickly after reading Herbert Simon and his “bounded rationality” theory. Simon simply
said that we never get all of the resources we want, that there are always restraints and
fortuitous events.
In my latest quality engineer position in industry, I had the opportunity to work with
a great team of workers and engineers dedicated to producing a quality X-ray imager.
The best seat in the house came my way and gave me the opportunity to observe first
hand a product in its last stages of existence. Products do not live as humans do, but
we often refer to their existence as a life. I lived with the imager for just a few years but I
was with others that had been with the imager for over 20 years. From them I learned
what the imager was like in its early stages of “life”.
In its life course the imager was created, went to market and after a few years, it
matured, and as with many objects dominated by technology, technological changes
forced its evolution. Although the imager had no organic life, the people that made it
happen did. I was one of those persons and I want other engineers to know through my
study about what I found out.
There was a breakthrough moment when I was able to make the connection
between the stages of life of the product and the erosion of working conditions for the
engineers and workers involved in the production processes. Many of the engineers that
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I worked with told me about their experiences with the imager in its earlier stages of life.
Resources, profits, systems and fun times abounded contrasting with the poor
conditions that happened once the product matured and volumes decreased. Since I
was there during the final stages, that part of the story I added with minimum
assistance.
My hope is that my study will serve as a reference to engineers interested in
reading about how their professional practice feels like when conditions at work include
the pursuit of profit over quality, and the disregard for complying with regulations. I
found that in my case my professional practice changed gradually until finding myself
almost powerless to avoid being corrupted. Many of the other engineers that I worked
with had as much pride as I about being engineers, and they all worked arduously
because they loved the imager and the good purpose that it served for the patients that
depended on it. It would be easy to blame the system and acquiesce for in most cases,
the power to change the system is beyond the pay grade of engineers. However,
professional engineers have a duty and honor to uphold and we must find a way to
meet our principal obligation of always putting the safety of those whom we serve first.
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Chapter 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
The accompanying literature review has two parts, the topical literature and the
relevant analytic literature. In Section 1, the topical literature starts with a summary of
literature on engineering mainly showing engineering’s evolutionary path. Next is
coverage of the engineering profession’s unique evolutionary path in the USA in order
to understand its contemporary make-up. This is followed by a review of professional
engineering ethics because engineering groups and societies constantly espouse the
high ethical standards engineers should embrace. Next is a review of the Quality
Engineering specialty, the role of regulations in medical devices and the quality systems
concept. I then introduce the explanation of the product life cycle. Lastly, I close the
section with a look at globalization, “skunk works”, and organizational structures.
Section 2 is the analytic literature that supports the perspective and sub-plots
found in the case data. First, I provide a review of capitalism that highlights some of its
history and shortcomings with reviews on the use of technology, and Weber’s “Iron
Cage”. Next is an exploration on globalization because of its impact on manufacturing
operations worldwide. Next is a review of some Donald Schön’s works to cover
reflective practice, “swampy lowlands”, elegant solution, and the relationship between
academic theory and professional engineering practices. Last is a review of the works of
Erving Goffman highlighting dramaturgy (“front stage and backstage”), moral career,
and primary and secondary adjustment. I also looked at Goffman’s studies of
interactions.
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Section 1: Topical Literature--A Review of Literature Specific to the Technical
Work of a Professional Quality Engineer
A. Brief history of engineering
The Latin expression “ingeniator” was used in early Roman times to suggest a
person with an ingenious attribute. This is the first documented evidence that suggests
the origin of what we call engineer or engineering (Harms, 2004). Ingenuity had long
been a human trait before it was labeled by the Romans, and has continued unabated
since. The term engineer was substituted for ingeniator about 400 hundred years ago,
and about 200 years ago, we find the start of the organized form of the engineering
profession. The movement towards a profession incorporated the characteristics we find
today, (1) emphasis on a public service function, (2) organized academic curricula, (3)
standardization of practice, and (4) sharing of technical knowledge (Harms, 2004).
Richard Shelton Kirby defines engineering, as the “the art of the practical application of
scientific and empirical knowledge to the design and production or accomplishment of
various sorts of constructive projects, machines and materials of use or value to man”
(Kirby, 1956). He continues, “By and large engineers are paid by society to work on
systems dealing with problems whose solutions are of interest to that society. These
systems seem to group conveniently into (1) systems for material handling, including
transformation of and conservation of raw and processed materials; (2) systems for
energy handling, including it transformation, transmission, and control; and, (3) systems
for data information handling, involving its collection, transmission, and possessing
(Kirby, 1956).”
Prior to 6000 BCE, engineers played no part in man’s existence. However, at
around 6000 BCE to 3000 BCE with the advent of human cultivation of plants and
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domestication of animals particularly in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates and of
the Nile Rivers came permanent dwellings. The solutions to the problems of
urbanization were engineering ones in the forms of structural, hydraulic, transportation,
and metallurgical. The development of the sciences continued and during the Roman
period showed great development especially in military operations. Medieval times
forged the beginnings of the uses of nonhuman power from water, wind, and animals.
Inventions at this time included many machines for grinding, pumping and sawing
(Kirby, 1956).
With the Renaissance came Leonardo da Vinci one of the most famous engineers.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries began the adoption of empirical
experimentation the foundation for modern science and engineering. The invention of
the steam engine in 1702 began the industrial revolution, which also stimulated
important improvements in transport in the form of roads, canals and later railroads
(Harms, 2004).
At the end of the 18th Century in England, many engineers were building new
canals, wharfs, and roads and started to be called civil or civilian engineers to
differentiate them from military engineers doing similar work. Initially civil engineering
included all fields but the invention of the steam power engine on 1702 led to the
mechanical engineering specialty with electrical engineering soon following (Gregory,
1971).
France, at The Ècole Polytechnique founded in 1795, originated technical training
for engineers. It was here and at many other European schools where the first
engineering theories that drive engineering design were developed. The European
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technical universities were at par with the liberal arts schools. The technical universities
included scientific training, theoretical engineering training, and training in design for
engineers. These schools also brought in outstanding and well-recognized practical
engineers from design and industry to help teach the budding engineers (Gregory,
1971). In Europe, the title of engineer is reserved only for academically trained
professional engineers. In England, and later in the United States, the training of
engineers was mainly through apprenticeship. This process served well as evidenced
by the rapid technological strides achieved during the Industrial Revolution and during
the entire 19th Century (Gregory, 1971).
Non-military engineering schools in the United States started with Rensselaer
College in 1823. Its initial curriculum centered on agricultural sciences, but by 1835 a
four-year degree program in civil engineering developed, the first of its kind in the U.S.
The first mechanical engineering program at U.S. schools was offered at the
Polytechnic College of Pennsylvania, an institution founded in 1853.
In the United States, the title of engineer designates individuals in the engineering
profession with formal university level education and individuals in an engineering field
of work with or without formal education. The most recognized areas of professional
engineering according to the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and
Surveying (NCEES, http://www.ncees.org/exams/professional/) are agricultural,
architectural, chemical, civil, control systems, electrical and computer, environmental,
fire protection, industrial, mechanical, metallurgical, mining and mineral, naval
architecture and marine, nuclear and petroleum. The most prominent groups of
engineers without university level education in engineering are the Brotherhood of
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Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen founded in 1863, and the International Union of
Operating Engineers founded in 1896 (http://www.ble.org/info/engineer.asp and
http://www.iuoe.org/stationary/stationaryfield.htm).
B. Engineering as a profession
Occupational groups that control abstract knowledge and apply this to particular
cases are recognized as belonging to a profession. Harold Wilensky writes, that any
occupation wishing to exercise professional authority must find a technical basis for it,
assert exclusive jurisdiction, link both skill and jurisdiction to standards of training, and
convince the public that its services are uniquely trustworthy (Wilensky, 1964).
According to Wilensky, the typical progression of a profession starts with formal
schooling, some form of apprenticeship, followed by forming an association. This
progression gets legal sanction for the practice and is followed by the creation of moral
norms for the members. Key to establishing the moral claim is the service ideal;
demonstrated through an impersonal and objective relationship. The purpose of which
is to show the professional as disallowing any favoritism or intent of fraternization, and
to work on the client’s issue avoiding emotion and wanting to create the most perfect
and logical solution. Yet, most professionals presently work in complex organizations
where the organization through management develops the controls, resulting in a
salaried professional who has neither exclusive control nor final responsibility for the
work performed (Wilensky, 1964).
Professions dominate the world and derive from medieval or in some cases
ancient origins; they are a story of successfully gaining autonomy over work among a
specific group of practitioners. “For others it is a sadder chronicle of monopoly and
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malfeasance, of unequal justice administered by servants of power (Abbott, 1988)”. In
order to achieve professional status the occupational group must first obtain a special
abstract skill, one that requires extensive training through education. Professions often
strive to develop exclusive control of an occupation by controlling techniques that
require specialized abstract knowledge. Abstraction is the differentiating quality. The
academic center is the custodian of the professional knowledge in its most abstract
form.
As noted above, engineering progresses through a series of experiments that
often result in failure. Engineers, as well as scientists in a number of physical and
biological sciences, accept those failures because they result in learning and
subsequent improvements. This engineering experimentation is expected to benefit
people but it may also result in increased risk to those involved. This is critically valid in
medical devices, especially the critical ones that keep patients alive.
For a discussion of the complex issues of risk, I looked at the writings of Mary
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. According to Douglas and Wildavsky, on the matter of
risk, we have yet to agree on what is risky, how risky it is, and what to do about it. A
comprehensive study of acceptable risk concluded that acceptability of risk is always a
political issue. The perception of risk is a social process and thus depends on varying
definitions of what is considered safe and dangerous according to the many aspects of
life in a technological society (Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A., 1982). No person can
know more than a fraction of the dangers that abound and all risk should be seen as a
joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the most desired
prospects. We treat the wrong problem when we address questions of acceptable risk
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without considering their social aspects. Dangers are selected for public concern
according to the strength and direction of social criticism, the particular kinds of danger
that are selected for attention and the choice of risks to worry about depend on the
social forms selected. People select their awareness for certain dangers to conform to a
specific way of life. Risk and acceptability are the key terms in the debate over
technology. Science and technology previously usually commonly associated with
safety have recently become identified with risk (Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A., 1982).
Most complex problems of management turn out to have solutions that are both
technological and institutional. However, effective performance that must incorporate
technological excellence needs optimal combinations of skills and resources; a
combination dependent on institutional structures (Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A.,
1982). It is management’s responsibility to define and establish the recruiting goals and
criteria used by the human resources persons hiring the workers, and it is management
that controls the budget resources to make it all possible.
From the standpoint of managing risk, the dilemma is posed by the polar
opposites of anticipation and resilience. Anticipation emphasizes uniformity; resilience
stresses variability. Instead of attempting to guard against every evil, only the most
likely or most dangerous would be covered, with the full expectation that whatever is
missed would be encountered as and after it occurred (Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A.,
1982). This applies to medical devices very well. In cases such as those of critical
devices, the patients’ health conditions vary so greatly that it becomes very difficult to
predict and to plan for all possible outcomes. This results in needing and expecting help
from doctors and other healthcare professional in the event of malfunctions.
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What do capitalist firms, particularly those that produce complicated
technological products, do about risk? Calculating where marginal cost would equal
marginal revenue is too expensive and inaccurate to justify the effort. The operational
rule of industrial firms that enables them to act is precisely to avoid knowing too much
about future consequences. Limiting data, not expanding them, is the safest choice for a
number of reasons, for example, to limit exposure in case of a malfunction resulting in a
lawsuit. Another would be to eliminate the costs involved in the investigation needed to
generate the additional data. Most possible alternatives and consequences are ignored.
Only a few ideas, those best known and closest to existing programs, are given
attention. Searching usually stops when something a bit better appears to turn up.
Indeed the first thing to go during economic declines is long term planning (Douglas, M.
and Wildavsky, A., 1982).
As concerns medical technology, quality engineers within the medical device
manufacturing organizations are tasked with using their technical skills and experience
to minimize this risk. Risk minimization is a multilayered endeavor, and it is the quality
system when used properly, that which provides the organization with the holistic
approach needed to insure safety and efficacy.
I looked at the work of Charles Perrow for a review of the multi-redundancy
concept. Multi-redundancy refers to having many layers of security to minimize the
failure due to human error or fortuity. Perrow introduced in his book Normal Accidents
that certain characteristics of high-risk technologies suggest that no matter how
effective conventional safety devices are, there is a form of accident that is inevitable
(Perrow, 1999). Put differently, technologically advanced mechanisms involve
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interactive complexity and tight coupling that often produce multiple and unexpected,
and often inevitable interactions of failures. Perrow’s analysis involves three categories
of high-risk systems: (1) those whose risks outweigh any reasonable benefits, (2) those
that are improvable and the expected benefits justify the expense, and (3) those
systems that are partially self-correcting and can benefit from modest improvement
efforts (Perrow, 1999).
Perrow recommends the application of the science of risk assessment be given
close scrutiny because in some cases systems considered highly risky such as those
involving nuclear devices have not proven to be as deleterious as the environmental
effects of the simpler fossil fuel technologies. Perrow continues with the
recommendation to review four general tasks. First, to examine the role of those
performing risk assessments to eliminate unacceptable and improper evaluations.
Second, to examine the field of decision making because the public is often poorly
equipped to make the decisions. Third, to evaluate the organizations’ dilemmas inherent
in high-risk system. Lastly, to match the findings of the analysis of system accidents
with system characteristics to reduce risks when decision makers mandate risky
actions. Ultimately, the issue is not risk, but power; the power to impose risks on the
many for the benefit of the few (Perrow, 1999).
Continuing with the view of the culture of engineering, especially as exemplified
in highly technological organizations, I looked at the work presented by Diane Vaughan
in The Challenger launch decision. Vaughan presented in her book the increasing
dependence on complex technologies and the existence of an organizational culture, “a
culture of production”, that had normalized deviance in NASA because the engineers
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incorrectly believed they could account for the irregularities found in the O-ring damage
that caused the space shuttle failure. Her study clearly shows that the decision to
launch made by the NASA bureaucrats was driven by financial and political pressures
over the last minute protests of the engineers. Vaughan exposes the limitations of
human decision making within complex technologies and how even rigorous internal
and external monitoring will not avert disaster. She showed that wrong decisions were
made not in spite, but because of, rules and procedures (Vaughan, 1996).
C. Professional engineering ethics
The social contract we generally refer to as ethics and morality originates with the
behavioral changes that occurred when humans started forming societies. This resulted
in the creation of some rules arrived at through bargaining and personal contact. Those
with Western religious beliefs say ethics and morality originate with God having
imparted a soul on humans. In Singer’s (1991) edited volume, in the opening essay,
Mary Midgley presented the view that man behaves much as animals have been
observed, e.g., cooperating in tending the young, coordinating prey hunting and even
the sharing of food with the sick or weak. Thus, ethics is a system of extensions
applicable to humans, of the system that works well in nature. In essence, it is based on
the simple principle of doing onto others as they do unto you for the group’s sake.
Ethics develop from customs and conventions that provide definition to acceptable
conduct for all members of a social group.
Western society’s development of formal ethics began with the ancient Greeks.
Greek ideas retain the power to shape and sharpen our contemporary reflections about
understanding the principles of human conduct (Singer, 1991). The origins of reflective
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ethics trace to Aristotle with his golden mean doctrine. Other doctrines appear through
time including the naturalistic doctrines, concerned with living in harmony with nature.
Ethics is the foundation that engineers use to decide what matters and what ought
to be done while maintaining values and duty in human conduct, says Murray Mantell in
Ethics and professionalism in engineering. The engineering endeavor deals in the
intersection of reality and of human knowledge and fits well in the philosophy field of
metaphysics. Engineers deal with that which is physically evident and measurable; it is
scientific thinking based on facts and laws of nature (Mantell, 1964). The achievements
in engineering are largely due to agreements on basic assumptions and the use of
common presuppositions. The engineer creates a design for future use based on facts
observed in the past. The design process starts with a purpose (for example, to satisfy a
customer’s demand) because engineering functions efficiently when the purpose has
been well defined. Mantell’s opinion is that engineers, in ethical and moral issues,
should have two or more methods for selecting the best solution for the particular
problem at hand. This approach is similar to using multiple solution methods for solving
technical problems (Mantell, 1964).
Of special interest here, are Mike W. Martin’s explanations of ethics in engineering,
which stresses the premise that engineering progresses through a series of miniexperiments. These experiments often result in failure, yet those failures result in
learning and subsequent improvements (Martin 2005). Martin also provides a view that
a part of the responsibility of the engineer is to concentrate on moral, causal, job, and
legal issues as well as technical ones. This ties in directly to the codes of ethics
espoused by the different engineering societies such as NSPE, the American Society of
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Civil Engineers (ASCE), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), among others. Each of these
engineering societies have ethics and code of conduct rules incorporated in their codes
of practice. This is readily available in each of the society web sites, such as, ASCE.org,
ASME.org, and IEEE.org.
American engineering ethics concentrate on the themes of safety, health and
welfare of the public, as well as competence, the qualities of honesty and objectivity,
avoidance of conflicts of interest, the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality, and
making decision which are fair and based on merit. The prime directive in American
engineering ethics is that engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare
of the public in the performance of their professional duties (National Society of
Professional Engineers Code of Ethics for Engineers, NSPE .Org). This means that the
main ethical duty of engineers is their responsibility to protect the public, a duty that
relies on the superior knowledge of engineers in regards to technical matters. It is also
that which gives engineering a sense of a higher calling of service to the public, which is
a primary mark of a bona fide profession. The directive requires that engineers put their
professional ethical duties ahead of other interests, potentially including the interests of
their employers or their own self-interest. It implies the notion of sacrifice for the sense
of duty.
D. The Quality Engineering Specialty
The “quality” component of the engineering profession can trace its origins to the
building of the pyramids in ancient Egyptian times. Throughout time, quality was
connected to craftsmanship, and each person controlled all the aspects of the products
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produced. Modern quality practices started in the early 1900s influenced by Frederick
Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management, with the practices of mass inspection
of products. The quality practices of the time were such that workers no longer checked
their own work but were required to turn it over to trained inspectors. In the 1930s,
Walter Shewhart invented the control chart and this was the start of the quality
engineering profession. The control chart is a statistics driven quality control system that
produces, when applied properly and enforced, uniformity of product, and resolution of
nonconforming issues (Borror, 2009).
A big push for quality products came during the World War II to reduce harm to
people from poor-quality or defective products. During this time, many quality
techniques, such as control charts and acceptance sampling, became mandatory.
Acceptance sampling refers to the process of checking for conformance of random
parts or product samples during or after production. This created the need for trained
professional quality engineers that would bring together the different disciplines of
statistics, engineering, and economics. After the war ended, quality experts such as
Deming and Juran worked with the Japanese introducing statistical quality control.
Among the concepts presented in Japan by Joseph Juran were that (1) quality control is
monitoring techniques to correct sporadic problems; (2) quality improvement is a
breakthrough sequence to solve chronic problems; and (3) quality planning is an annual
quality program to institutionalize managerial control and review (Borror, 2009).
The American Society for Quality (ASQ-based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin) was
founded in 1947 to unify various quality organizations into one national organization. In
1967, the ASQ created a certification program for quality engineers, and established a
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prescribed body of knowledge. This body of knowledge for quality engineers is
organized into six broad subject areas: (1) management and leadership; (2) the quality
system; (3) product and process design; (4) product and process control; (5) continuous
improvement; and (6) qualitative methods and tools (Borror, 2009).
Phillip Crosby in his groundbreaking book Quality is free, shook up the quality
world with his assertion that quality must be defined as “conformance to requirements”
(Crosby, 1979). He insisted that requirements must be clearly stated so that they cannot
be misunderstood, and that continuous monitoring of conformance to the requirements
was necessary. Detection of a nonconformance would then be equated to an absence
of quality. Crosby identified five erroneous assumptions about quality that had prompted
his now famous “conformance to requirements” definition. The first is that quality means
goodness or luxury. The second is that quality is intangible and therefore not
measurable. The third is that there is an economics to quality. The fourth is that quality
problems are originated by the workers. The fifth and final is that quality originates in the
quality department (Crosby, 1979). Another maxim promoted by Crosby was that doing
things right in the first place would avoid having to pay to fix them or having to do them
over.
E. The Role of Regulations in Medical Device Manufacturing
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates manufacturing of medical
devices in the United States. The FDA is currently part of the Health and Human
Services Department. The regulation used by the FDA to control medical device
manufacturing is known as the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP)
(Trautman, 1997). The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (the SMDA) is in Public Law
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101-629 enacted on November 28, 1990 (Trautman, 1997). The CGMPs provide the
FDA with authority to regulate the design, manufacturing and distribution of medical
devices. The following, Table 1, is a listing of the principal components of the CGMP.
Table 1. FDA CGMP Components Outline
Subpart A

Subpart B

Subpart C
Subpart D
Subpart E
Subpart F

Subpart G

Subpart H

Subpart I
Subpart J
Subpart K

Subpart L

Subpart M

Subpart N

CGMP Components-FDA Regulation
General Provisions
• Scope
• Definitions
Quality System Requirements
• Quality Systems
• Management Responsibility
• Quality Audit
• Personnel
Design Controls
• Design Controls
Document Controls
• Document Controls
Purchasing Controls
• Purchasing Controls
Identification and Traceability
• Identification
• Traceability
Production and Process Controls
• Production and Process Controls
• Inspection, Measuring, and Test Equipment
• Process Validation
Acceptance Activities
• Receiving, In-Process, and Finished Device Acceptance
• Acceptance Status
Nonconforming Product
• Nonconforming Product
Corrective and Preventive Action
• Corrective and Preventive Action
Labeling and Packaging Control
• Device Labeling
• Device Packaging
Handling, Storage, Distribution, and Installation
• Handling
• Storage
• Distribution
• Installation
Records
• General Requirements
• Device Master Record
• Device History Record
• Quality System Record
• Complaint Files
Servicing
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Subpart O

CGMP Components-FDA Regulation
• Servicing
Statistical Techniques
• Statistical Techniques

(Trautman, 1997).
The medical devices manufacturer’s requirements for Personnel are shown in
Subpart B under Personnel. The regulation states: Each manufacturer shall have
sufficient personnel with the necessary education, background, training, and experience
to assure that all activities required by this part are correctly performed (Trautman,
1997). In medical device firms, engineers are recruited and assigned to positions in
quality, design, production and others according to their education and experience.
As early as 1984, the FDA recognized the connection between the lack of design
controls during the design phase of medical devices and device recalls (Trautman,
1997). Since then it has been clear to everyone in the medical device industry that the
embedded quality of a device is established during the design phase. It is at this phase
of the nascent device, that all requirements are identified, and through the design
process materials are selected, the features are finalized, and preparations are made
for manufacturing of the device. The original FDA Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)
regulation did not include preproduction design controls, and the agency understood
that this provided less than adequate assurance for the safety and effectiveness of the
device. The US Congress enacted the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 on November
28, 1990, and this gave the FDA the authority to incorporate the design controls portion
to the GMP (Trautman, 1997).
Those who design medical devices must be aware of the design control
requirements in the regulation to comply with them. Unsafe and ineffective devices
are often the result of informal development that does not ensure proper
establishment and assessment of design requirements that are necessary to
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develop a medical device that is safe and effective for the intended use of the
device and that meets the needs of the user (Trautman, p. 52, 1997).
The FDA emphasis is for manufacturers to establish and follow quality systems to
help ensure that the medical devices consistently meet the established requirements
and specifications. Quality systems implementation and enforcement in industry is a
quality engineer specialty, and requires specialized technical knowledge of holistic
quality concepts.
Subpart C, Design Controls is further subdivided into the following: (a) General; (b)
Design and development planning; (c) Design input; (d) Design output; (e) Design
review; (f) Design verification; (g) Design validation; (h) Design transfer; (i) Design
changes; and (j) Design history file (DHF).
For each of the subdivisions of the Design Controls subpart, the medical device
manufacturer is required to create, establish, and maintain plans and procedures to
accomplish each of the listed requirements. For clarity, I am including the actual FDA
wording contained in subdivision (g) Design validation, it reads as follows:
(g) Design validation. Each manufacturer shall establish and maintain procedures
for validating device design. Design validation shall be performed under defined
operating conditions on initial production units, lots, or batches, or their
equivalents. Design validation shall ensure that devices conform to defined user
needs and intended uses and shall include testing of production units under actual
or simulated use conditions. Design validation shall include software validation and
risk analysis, where appropriate. The results of the design validation, including
identification of the design, method(s), the date, and the individual(s) performing
the validation, shall be documented in the DHF (Trautman, p. 66, 1997).
The medical devices industry and the regulatory bodies agree that products with
“design issues” are prone to having quality issues during use. Design issues come in
many forms and include among others, the improper selection of materials that can later
create problems with structural weakness, or an un-investigated toxicity. Other common
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design issues appear when the healthcare person during use breaks the product
because of mishandling. The FDA mandated in October 1996 that all manufacturers
involved in the design of medical devices had to abide by the rules of the CGMPs. This
compliance must include a section called “Design Control” that formalized the design
control steps and forces the manufacturers to keep a close coordination between
customers, designers, fabricators and healthcare providers. (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. FDA Design Control Waterfall

The FDA regulation does not prescribe
detailed practices because design controls
must apply to a wide variety of products and
processes. FDA creates a framework that
organizations must follow when developing
and implementing products. This way there is
great flexibility to develop design controls that
comply with the regulation and fits best within
their organizations.
(http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/comp/designgd.html:
FDA’s ”Design Control Guidance for Medical
Device Manufacturer’s,” March 11, 1997.)

Figure 1 shows the FDA process for developing new medical devices, and with
slight modifications, engineers use it for all types of projects in which they are involved.
The following are the highlights of the process. The needs and the requirements of the
customers must be identified and incorporated into the product. Customers are both
internal and external, and these may include distributors, users, and regulatory bodies.
All of the inputs drive the creation of the design requirements. The verification and
validation process confirms that the design outputs satisfy the design inputs. A general
rule is that effective design control “process gates” prevent a “throwing over the fence to
manufacturing” mindset. Eliminating this mindset should minimize product failures at the
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patient or customer. The need for multiple reviews during the process assures
continuous management team involvement. This process makes use of the concept of
gates between phases; these gates supposedly act as organizers to insure completion
of a phase before moving on through the model represented in Figure 1. Although the
model represented in Figure 1 depicts an ideal state between the manufacturing firm
and its engineers, in reality it often differs greatly from an engineer’s everyday
experience. In order to satisfy the needs of the bottom line, management often
manipulates the gates. In essence, the phases are completed to the degree that
management decides.
Industry is very aware of the wastefulness that ensues from an inchoate
transition from design to fabrication. Many quality-engineering initiatives address the
symptoms that appear when the design-fabrication transition falters. These show up as
delays, increased costs, defective products, and dissatisfied customers (Pyzdek, 1992).
Some of these quality-engineering initiatives are the following, Design for
Manufacturability (DFM), at times called Design for Six Sigma (DSS). Others include
“Lean and Six Sigma” and espouse the merits of DMAIC (define, measure, analyze,
implement, control). Lean is an efficiency initiative, often attributed to Toyota, that
pursues the elimination of waste from all operations, and Six Sigma is another efficiency
initiative, often attributed to Motorola, that relies on careful planning and execution. All
of these initiatives are in reality fancy solutions that only show what to do to avoid, how
to improve, and what to do to insure a smooth transition from design to fabrication. Sure
solutions that when consistently followed avoid virtually all of the potential problems a
technological product will eventually experience (George, 2002).
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Two more subparts of the CGMP merit further review, Subpart D Document
Controls and Subpart G Production and Process Controls. The table that follows lists
the subdivisions of both.

Table 2. CGMP Details: Subpart D and G
Subpart D
Document Controls

(a) Document approval and distribution
(b) Document changes

Subpart G
Production and Process
Controls

(a) General
(b) Production and process changes
(c) Environmental controls
(d) Personnel
(e) Contamination control
(f) Buildings
(g) Equipment
(h) Manufacturing material
(i) Automated processes

The CGMP regulation imposes strict rules upon the manufacturer for controlling
all the documents relevant to the firm’s quality system. It is the progression of creating
procedures and formally documenting them, and stresses that the members of the
organization should the instructions found in the procedures. In other words, specify
what and how something is to be done, then write it down, and then follow what was
written. However, often conditions vary, forcing changes to the documented processes.
The document control process is created with a way of implementing changes, and in
many firms, this process is referred to as the Engineering Change Order (ECO)
process. This coordinated and formal activity often includes an approver from each of
the departments affected by the change.
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The medical device manufacturers must meet the requirements specified in the
Production and Process Controls subpart. This is the portion of the CGMP that explains
to the firms the steps needed during the manufacturing of the devices. This subpart
covers the requirements for the facilities, ambient, materials and workers (Trautman,
1997).
F. Product life cycle
In addition to the original design and manufacturing processes, engineered
products often have their own life span once they hit the market. In Krajewski (1966),
we find that products, such as the laser imager, have life cycles. According to Krajewski,
a product’s life has five stages: (1) planning, (2) introduction, (3) growth, (4) maturity,
and (5) decline. The product life cycle is often mixed with that of owner firms. That is,
firms create entry and exit strategies for marketing their products. The entry-exit
strategies mentioned are the following, (1) enter early and exit late, (2) enter early and
exit early, and (3) enter late and exit late. Firms create their marketing strategies based
on the product’s maturity stage and market entry-exit plans (Krajewski, 1966).
G. Globalization’s effects on medical technology, standards and regulation
During the 1970s, after an approximately forty-year period following the Great
Depression, our economic system changed. During that forty-year period, the purely
free market approach to Western economies was tempered by government stimulus to
promote employment and economic security. During the 1970s, the economic policy in
the US and England shifted back to one of unregulated free markets (Epstein, 1993,
Gill, 1997).
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The switch was a direct result of the policies of Ronald Reagan (president of the
United States), and Margaret Thatcher (England’s prime minister). These policies had
their origins in the ideas of Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek and George Stigler, all
Nobel laureates in economics in 1976, 1974, and 1982 respectively. Friedman and
Stigler were associated with the Chicago School of Economics that promotes the
neoclassical price theory and free market libertarianism, and reject the Keynesian
concepts of business regulation in favor of laissez-faire (Gill, 1997).
Globalization resulted in the spread of the power of internationally mobile capital
involving primarily Anglo-American and neo-liberal set of ideas and practices.
Globalization has two main themes. The first is the marketization of the orientation of
the state, which is market friendly and oriented towards business. Second, states
compete for global capital by providing regulatory and political guarantees supplying
ready and cheap human capital, and providing frameworks of low taxes. The neo-liberal
theories are presented as ideologies that justify these trends and equate them with
progress and civilization (Gill, 1997).
Globalization contributes to the substantial decline in the power of organized labor
to counter the prerogatives of capital, particularly internationally mobile financial and
knowledge-intensive capital. There also appear new patterns of migration as workers
move to the locations of the jobs, as well as a “lowest common denominator” to paying
various types of professional workers, including engineers (Gill, 1997).
Of great interest for my study was Drori’s Chapter 6 titled The Making and
Expansion of International Management Standards: The Global Diffusion of ISO 9000
Quality Management Certificates. I will cover this chapter in more detail because it
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bears relevance to the Medical Device regulatory theme, and it shows the march to
increased standardization as an outcome of the search for rationality, and for increasing
efficiency and effectiveness (Drori, 2006).
The worldwide diffusion of the standards benefitted from the confluence of two
globalization movements, first the embracing of a global managerial culture, and
second, international standardization. The ISO 9000 Quality Management Standards
evolved from the quality systems implemented by Western military procurers during the
1960s. They rely on second party verification using periodic audits. The standards aim
to increase the rationalization of operations along a set of standard categories. The
standards aim to incorporate a logic for conceptualizing organizations as efficient and
progressive social actors and they emphasize compliance to desired outcomes, instead
of adherence to reform programs such as TQM or Continuous Quality Improvement
(Drori, 2006).
Drori points out the neo-liberal, free market overtones of the ISO 9000 diffusion as
analogous to religious “born again” rituals popular as self-improvement for individuals.
As in baptism, the second party auditor acting as the direct agent of a higher authority
anoints the actors into the community. The actors acquire the capacity and
responsibility for reasoned action and the ensuing diffusion throughout civil society
results in rational outcomes. In other words, the results of the outcomes produce
beneficial conditions for the actors. This is consistent with the “liberal action” focus
versus the “management driven innovation” focus that is seen as materialistic driven.
Yet, Drori points out, that that when managers are asked the reasons for adoption of the
standards, most mention the orders of superiors, keeping up with competitors, and
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marketing advantages but rarely mention direct customer or regulatory demands (Drori,
2006).
In firms involved in making medical devices, especially the critical Class III ones,
influential decision makers have the perception that adoption of the standards
eliminates some of the uncertainty inherent in the safety and efficacy of the devices.
Yet, adoption of the standards as a solution to uncertainty results in a false sense of
security because organizations rely on paid outside auditors to establish the general
perceptions of appropriateness on gauging uncertainty. In addition, for medical devices
the ISO Standards may or may not actually provide sufficient standardization depending
on the firm’s corporate control (Drori, 2006).
(1) Globalization’s downsides
Despite its inarguable economic benefits, globalization has significant downsides.
Just a few examples if its less benevolent outcomes are: (1) has the undesirable impact
of increasing inequalities of wealth within developed and less-developed societies; (2) it
raises the levels of discontent and international crime; (3) it increases pollution; and (4)
it exacerbates religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. In some instances, business
interests of large multinational corporations that drive the present form of globalization
are more powerful than many national governments. What is missing is a balance
between health, community, and society that is a better measure of quality of life than
only money (Dervitsiotis, 2001).
(2) Standardization and regulation
James G. Nell defines standardization as a system that boosts process
interoperability and allows technology development and technology insertion without
hindering the enterprise (Nell, 1997). Well-designed standards should force the
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enterprise to analyze and document what they do rather than setting specific limits to
everything. Nell refers to horizontal standardization as being applicable enterprise wide
such as the present strategies in quality, environmental, electronic data-interchange,
and safety. Standardization should promote the formation of alliances with fewer
barriers and allow commerce to be effective and competitive.
The premier world organization for standards and standardization is the
International Organization for Standardization with headquarters in Geneva,
Switzerland. International standardization began in the electrotechnical field: the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) was established in 1906. In 1946,
delegates from 25 countries met in London and decided to create a new international
organization, with the object "to facilitate the international coordination and unification of
industrial standards". The new organization, ISO, officially began operations on
February 23, 1947, and between 1947 and the present day, ISO has published more
than 16,000 International Standards. ISO's work program ranges from standards for
traditional activities, such as agriculture and construction, mechanical engineering,
medical devices, to the newest information technology developments, such as the
digital coding of audio-visual signals for multimedia applications (www.iso.org).
H. Engineering “skunk works”
The research conducted by Peters and Waterman and written about In Search of
Excellence discussed how large companies maintain their successful innovation
process. Peter and Waterman quote Harvard’s Theodore Levitt to explain what
differentiates creativity and innovation. According to Levitt, creativity is thinking up new
things and innovation is doing new things (Peters and Waterman, p.206, 2004). They
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write that a most discouraging fact of big corporate life is the loss of innovation. Yet
there are big companies that use “skunk works”, that is, groups of eight to ten “zealots”,
often found off in a corner with limited resources, which outperform product
development groups that number in the hundreds.
The big companies successful at innovation develop a tolerance for the high
number of failures, and allow some radical decentralization and messiness in order to
breed the entrepreneurial spirit represented by their “skunk works”. These “skunk
works” groups often operate within gaps or “leaks” in the firm’s systems. They
emphasize getting things done over existing systems and processes, and are
notoriously pragmatic. The groups tend to find simple common sense solutions to
product problems that are both innovative and highly effective (Peters and Waterman,
2004).
I. Organizational Structures
Firms set up organizational structures to coordinate their various functions of
production, accounting, engineering, human resources, quality/regulatory, and supply
chain to allow for idea sharing, workflow control, and resources management. (Hitt,
1999; Krajewski, 1996). Functional structures allow functional specialization but
because of the differences in orientation of the various groups, this can lead to difficulty
in communication and focus because of the tendency to focus on local versus overall
firm strategy, and the senior manager must pay attention to maintain control and focus
on the business goals (Hitt, 1999). Many firms divide into an operations group
(production, engineering) and a support group (HR, accounting, and supply chain) to
facilitate control.
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Section 2: Relevant Analytical Literature—A Review of Analytic Literature in
Support of Themes Identified Through Data Analysis
A. Capitalism
By the end of the 17th century, England and other European states had embraced
mercantilism, which focused on dominating trade with one’s colonies, and shunned
imports from foreigners. England had begun by the 1400s what became a thriving textile
industry focused on wool, and later cotton, and for the next centuries dominated other
commodities via exclusive monopolies such as that of sugar and tea. The advent of the
Industrial Revolution facilitated by the Newcomen invention of the steam engine in 1702
started a rapid series of inventions by engineers principally in the fields of structures,
machinery, metallurgy, and transportation. This brought unprecedented wealth to
England and happened with simultaneous sociological changes revolving around
individual freedoms (Collins, 1994; Gregory, 1971; and Muller, 1993).
(1) The benefits of a free market
Prompted by his belief that economic restrictions limited prosperity, Adam Smith in,
The Wealth of Nations of 1776 presented the economic laissez faire doctrine. Then in
England, internal trade was almost free but restricted workers and their ability to benefit
from the growing cities’ industrialization. Strong beliefs in the value of individual liberty
drove powerful dreams for political freedom and from economic restrictions (Gregory,
1971). Smith felt that persons pursuing their own interests promoted the welfare of all,
and that an obsolete system of restrictions was cramping political and industrial life and
that the laws of supply and demand would ensure that products would be offered at the
least cost and best quality in a competitive market, and that markets would increasingly
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grow richer when open, and with increased competition. The open market would be an
“Invisible Hand” that would dispose of everything for the best (Smith, 1994).
Smith did recommend some interference to prevent merchants from cheating, or to
prevent monopolies (Collins, 1994). Most important to Smith was his presentation that
the markets should be structured to maximize wide-spread opulence. This would be
accomplished by eliminating restrictions on labor, process, and supply. He believed that
the natural human desire would be towards self-interest and that this would bring about
the sale of products at the lowest price at all levels of involvement (Smith, 1994). Smith
insisted this would benefit the consumers in spite of the laborers, landlords, and
investors only looking after their own interests because the achievement of wide-spread
opulence would result (Muller, 1993).
Smith’s views were highly influential, and later strengthened by David Ricardo’s
writings; especially that of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage refers to the
higher relative efficiency in the production of a particular good in one country as
opposed to another. This concept rendered government control of economic activities
as mostly ineffective and unwise. Instead, uncontrolled competition would be the best
method of providing for the needs of people at the least cost (Gregory, 1971).
Unfortunately, for many of the collective needs, such as the protection of patients from
defective medical devices, the “Invisible Hand” can often prove inadequate.
Smith also discussed the concept of the division of labor by describing a pinmaking factory. In his pin-making example, he divided the functions among 10 workers,
and Smith claimed this would increase production 240 times (Smith, 1994). The division
of labor, according to Smith, would make the workers more proficient, and that the
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increased productivity would lead to “universal opulence”. A second advantage of the
division of labor would be that it would lead to the specialization, expertise, dexterity,
and machinery, thereby producing greater wealth (Smith, 1994). Smith claimed that the
division of labor would be made possible because the workers would exchange their
labor for personal gains. In Smith’s mind, this propensity for exchanging labor for gain
would satisfy the concept of promoting self-interest (Smith, 1994). Since then, his theory
has continued to evolve, and to it, we owe the creation of the different engineering
disciplines.
As noted, Smith’s arguments were very convincing; in part because his
presentation of “natural liberty” to reinforce his case against government restraints on
trade. The term refers to humans being entitled since times immemorial to the liberty to
pursue their own benefit without dependence to actions by government. Many continue
to use the concept improperly to further insist on freedom from government intervention
and into unfettered capitalism. However, Smith thought it essential to have government
in a commercial society provide for the common defense, for a legal system to protect
person and property, and for the infrastructure necessary for commerce (Muller, 1993).
Smith also recommended that government foster citizen education, and even nongovernmental institutions to develop character in the citizenry (Smith, 1994). However,
these recommendations regarding the continuing need for government to act as a
counterbalance were conveniently brushed-off by business interests in favor of
emphasizing his laissez-faire.

Chapter 1
33
(2) Critiques of capitalism
Capitalism is not without strong critics or those intent on modifying its deleterious
effects. One of those critics was Harry Braverman, who in his book, Labor and
Monopoly Capital, states at the beginning of Chapter 7: “The transformation of labor
from a basis of skill to a basis of science may thus be said to incorporate a content
supplied by a scientific and engineering revolution within a form supplied by the rigorous
division and subdivision of labor favored by capitalist management (Braverman, 1974).”
Braverman highlights that “…work has become increasingly subdivided into petty
operations that fail to sustain the interest or engage the capacities of humans with
current levels of education; that these petty operations demand ever less skill and
training; and that the modern trend of work by its mindlessness and bureaucratization is
alienating ever larger sections of the working population (Braverman, 1974).”
Braverman looked closely at The Principles of Scientific Management and
criticized Taylor’s intentions, and the pernicious effects created by its Principles.
According to Braverman, Taylor formalized the three main principles involved in the
control of complex labor processes. The first (1) principle is the need to disassociate the
labor process from the skills of the workers, in other words the labor process is to be
rendered independent of craft tradition and the worker’s knowledge (Braverman, 1974).
In summary, the labor process is to be made entirely dependent upon the practices of
management.
The second principle (2) is the separation of the conception of what is to be done
from the execution of work. The following points explain Braverman’s position:
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•

The systematic study of work was tailored to owners’ purposes because it
required significant resources and power over how workers’ conducted the
work.

•

The improvement of work methods by workers on their own brings few benefits
to management.

•

The purpose of the study of work was to cheapen the cost of workers by
decreasing their training and enlarging their output.

•

Conception and execution must be rendered separate spheres of work in order
to ensure management control and to cheapen the worker.

The third of Taylor’s principles is the idea that work must be divided into tasks.
Management plans the work of every worker, and each worker receives complete
written instructions describing: (a) task; (b) means to be used; (c) how the work is to be
done; and (d) the time allowed doing the work (Braverman, 1974).
Braverman refutes the orthodox view of work that emphasizes certain claims such
as: (1) industrialization has eliminated the negative aspects of capitalism; (2) new
technology requires ever rising levels of skill and responsibility; (3) enterprise managers
are effectively immune to the types of deskilling that characterized early capitalism. On
the contrary, Braverman argues that capitalists have manipulated the labor process for
their benefit. The worker has agreed to labor over a period of time versus just providing
an agreed amount of labor. This evolutionary change to the fundamental tendencies of
capitalist development turns workers into an artificially homogeneous grouping of
interchangeable parts, mere cogs to machines requiring little on-the-job training. The
workers surrender their interest in the labor process and become alienated from it
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allowing the passing of control of the labor process to the hands of the capitalists. In
other words, the process of production becomes management’s problem. This results in
the constant reduction of labor costs through systematic degradation of human labor,
and in Braverman’s words, this eventually becomes the underlying force governing all
forms of work in capital society, no matter in what setting or at what hierarchical level
(Braverman, 1974).
(3) Market effects on technology
Another aspect of production that is closely entwined with capitalism is the
development and application of technology. We get through the works of Andrew
Feenberg a view of how technology and engineering are manipulated by capitalist
management in order to transform them (Feenberg, 2002). Feenberg explains that
technology is a two-sided phenomenon that is both operator and object. Humans often
manipulate technology as an exercise of power over other humans. Feenberg also adds
that when the society is organized around technology, technological power is the
principle form of power in society (Feenberg, 2002). Feenberg further added that the
society projects the acquired power through actions that narrow the range of its citizens
and others, resulting in human suffering and environmental damage (Feenberg, 2002).
I found a clear example of this when researching the history of engineers. I found
that engineers in late 17th Century England were involved in solving the country’s
growing energy needs that were vital to their mercantile economic system. In England at
the time, deforestation was a growing concern that led to increased mining for coal. This
in turn led to an increased need for horses, fodder, and human caretakers to have water
removed as mining for coal went deeper in the ground. In 1702, Thomas Newcomen in
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response invented the first steam-powered water pumping system (Gregory, 1971;
Kirby 1956). This technological event changed the world. Now mines could produce
more coal, which supplied the energy to produce iron, which produced machines for
manufacturing goods, and the iron for railways, bridges and ships. This transformed
England and Europe in the 18th and 19th Centuries, and the ensuing environmental
damages are incalculable.
Feenberg strongly warned that management’s pursuit of efficiency orients technical
development towards disempowering workers by demanding unqualified control over
the labor process. Occasionally this managerial control results in “operational
autonomy”, that is the freedom of management to make independent decisions about
the business without regard for the views or interests of subordinates or the community.
Technocracy armors itself against public pressures, sacrifices values, and ignores
needs incompatible with its own reproduction and the perpetuation of its technical
traditions (Feenberg, 2002).
(4) Capitalism as “Iron Cage”
An important scholar who studied both the tremendous power and potential
downsides of capitalism was Max Weber (1864-1920). Weber explained that the
capitalist mentality is uniquely oriented towards economic activity with the purpose of
amassing wealth to the detriment of everything else. He compared the capitalist to the
ascetic monk that abandons all worldly pleasures to pursue a life of prayer, in other
words that the capitalist is just another ascetic. Weber claimed that the capitalist should
be seen as a rational miser; or to put it differently, a person devoted to the task of
creating wealth not to enjoy its fruits but to reinvest it to generate even more wealth
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(Kivisto, 2004). Weber presented his deep concern about the economic conditions in his
metaphor of the “Iron Cage”. He warned us that the modern industrial world posed a
great threat to individuality and freedom because the control of the capitalist economic
order was so powerful that it would be like being trapped in an inescapable “Iron Cage”
(Weber, 1947).
Another important Weberian theme was bureaucracy. Bureaucracy began well
before the industrial era but when combined with the logic of capitalism it became
central to the modern economy. Weber used the image of a machine to present his
views that, like cogs in a machine, people lose their sense of creativity, individuality, and
freedom. The typical bureaucracy intent on making decisions based on efficiency,
calculability, predictability and controls eliminates from official business, love, hatred,
and purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements, which escape calculation
(Kivisto, 2004). According to Weber, the great danger of bureaucracy is its need for
decision-making based on efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control.
Mechanization, such an important milieu to engineers, along with bureaucratization
combined to create an extraordinary productive economic system, yet these two
phenomena are also key to constructing the “Iron Cage”.
Weber found bureaucratization inescapable and mentioned bureaucracy to be
superior in knowledge, including both technical knowledge and knowledge of the
concrete fact within its own sphere of interest. Yet he mentioned that the capitalistic
entrepreneur is the only type who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity
from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge (Weber, 1947). I have
observed this of engineers in private practice that are able maintain personal control of
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their actions and products. It is engineers in cases where they practice professional
engineering in private practice who are able to maintain this type of control.
Unfortunately, engineers whose private practice becomes very successful turn over
control of their businesses to others as they grow, and become bureaucratized.
B. Globalization’s effects on engineers
Globalization is understood as contributing to the substantial decline in the power
of organized labor to countervail the prerogatives of capital, particularly internationally
mobile financial and knowledge-intensive capital. In large part, this is due to new
patterns of migration as workers move to the locations of the jobs, and we see a social
deepening and geographical extension of the process of commoditization in the political
economy. The global restructuring of production and power also promotes a deepening
and extension of the commoditization of engineering (Gill, 1997)
In the case of professional quality engineers the migration to follow the jobs results
in disruption of the professional networks that support engineering solidarity. This not
only affects the individuals but also the professional societies that rely on the members
for professional knowledge and economic support. In turn, disruptions to the
professional societies negatively affect engineers’ appreciation of, and appreciation for
retaining a strong ethical component in their work because engineers rely on them for
ethics advocacy (Gill, 1997). Engineers that temporarily or permanently relocate lose
their professional network of colleagues, school acquaintances and mentors that serve
as formal or informal guides. This is especially hard hitting when the relocation is to a
foreign country where language, culture, and even education systems differ from the
vernacular.
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Initially globalization was defined as the conducting of business in a truly global
manner, where large corporations and entities control (through the application of capital)
manufacturing activities anywhere on the planet. This was where modern multi-national
corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dominated the production
activities (Gill, 1997). More recent research often characterizes the relationship as
transactional interdependence. This is the result of a highly developed social awareness
of global interdependence; awareness that the logics and scripts that constitute modern
actors and action are global in scale and meaning (Drori, 2006). This latter frame is
believed to originate with the global expansion of organization resulting from the
prevalence of rationalization and empowerment. It is the confident rationalization of
organizational theory. We are in an era that shows a worldwide explosion in the number
of organizations and in the formal learning of how and why to organize. The created
organizations have become collective actors, not simply servants of some other
sovereign, such as the nation states.
The restructuring of global production and power also appear to have begun to
transform the basis for political authority, legitimacy and accountability away from
national governments. The move is towards transnational and global markets. The neoliberal forces promote two dimensions of change, the first to the marketization of the
state where it is market friendly and oriented to business. The second is that states
compete for global capital providing regulatory and political guarantees, a supply human
capital, and low tax frameworks (Gill, 1997).
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C. Schön on “Reflective Practice”
Throughout my career as a professional quality engineer, I faced very “messy”
situations where the application of the “Body of Knowledge” concepts taught in
engineering courses was impractical. The Donald Schön book, The Reflective
Practitioner, presented the need for the reorganization of the ways in which we think
about professional practice and the relationship of theory to practice (Munby and
Russell, 1989).
Schön explored “the relationship between the kinds of knowledge honored in
academia and the kinds of competence valued in professional practice” (Schön, 1983).
He explained that a higher status is assigned to theory, and to those who conduct
theory-building research; a description fitting those in academia. A lower status in the
professional hierarchy is assigned to those in practice. Schön explains the disparity in
status (in Western culture) between academics and practitioners, as resulting from the
rise of Positivism. Positivism, according to Schön, was the powerful philosophical
doctrine that spread in the 19th century as an account of the rise of science and
technology, and as a social movement aimed at applying the achievements of science
and technology to the well-being of humankind. Technical Rationality is the Positivist
epistemology of practice, and it became institutionalized in the modern university
(Schön, 1983). The term technical rationality harkens back to Marcuse’s Onedimensional man, 1964, where Marcuse used the term to explain a way of thinking and
a way of living in which the scientific-analytical mindset is emphasized. According to
Marcuse, modern culture is dominated by a scientific-technological mindset that seeks
to apprehend and control phenomena through reductive analysis and the belief in
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technological progress, engendered by the succession of technologies (Adams and
Ingersoll, 1990).
Today, academic institutions effectively operate as the owners of a profession’s
body of knowledge. It is in academia that we find the heart of scientific inquiry, which
consists in the use of crucial experiments to choose among competing theories of
explanation. In addition, academics perform the role of educators for professionals by
imparting them with the applicable field of knowledge. Schön explains that a
professional has claims to two primary exclusive attributes, (1) command of the
substantive field of knowledge of the profession, and (2) a claim to mastery of the
technique of production or application of the substantive knowledge.
Among the many discussions presented by Schön, two are of special use for this
study. The first is the issue that the divergence between research, theory and practice
exacerbates the practitioner’s dilemma which Schön calls “rigor or relevance” (Schön,
1983), and tempts the practitioner to force practice situations into molds derived from
research. Thus, an industrial engineer may simplify the actual arrangement of a
manufacturing system in order to make it easier to analyze using the standard theories
contained in the body of knowledge. The second discussion deals with the issue of
engineers in large companies who feel coerced by the directives of general managers
too ready to sacrifice product quality or safety for immediate commercial advantage
(Schön, 1983).
Schön explains that leading professionals write or speak about the mismatch of
traditional patterns of practice and knowledge. This is related to favoring school-learned
and downplaying the apprenticeship-learned. However, gifted engineers can display
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artistry in their practice that is largely content-dependent; such settings and this
importance are seized venues among engineers. Some engineers have become
especially skilled at reducing “messes” to manageable plans. The search to “find the
right problem” has become a conscious principle of action (Schön, 1983).
Unfortunately making sense of uncertainty, performing artistically, setting
problems, and choosing among competing professional paradigms seems relatively
unimportant in the light of the increasingly prevailing model of professional knowledge.
Such spheres of activity do not fit neatly into Positivist categories. Schön likens the
situation to one in which there is a high, hard ground where practitioners can make
effective use of research-based theory and practice; and another that approximates “a
swampy lowland” where situations are confusing messes incapable of technical solution
(Schön, 1983).
Schön introduces the concept of “reflection-in-action” to explain the “art”
demonstrated by practitioners when they sometimes deal with uncertainty, instability,
uniqueness, and value conflict. The “art” is the ability of the practitioner to recognize and
explore puzzling events encountered during their practice. Technical Rationality, Schön
explains, separates means from ends, research from practice, and knowing from doing.
According to the model of Technical Rationality –the view of professional
knowledge which most powerfully shaped both our thinking about the professional
and the institutional relations of research, education and practice –professional
activity consists in instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application
of scientific theory and technique (Schön, 1983).
By contrast, “reflection-in-action” unites them, and practice becomes a kind of
research, means and ends are framed separately, and inquiry is a transaction with the
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situation in which knowing and doing are joined (Schön, 1983). “Reflection-in-action”
addresses puzzles and uncertainties dialectically, not logically, and in action not after.
Schön addressed the dissatisfaction of many practitioners with” theory” by
unveiling the inability of theoretical statements and generalizations to recognize and
admit the existence of the inevitable and central aspects of their practice. This situation
is exemplified by the civil engineer that worries about what road to build rather than how
to build it, and in the process comes up against the whole economic, social and political
life of the region (Schön, 1983). The point that Schön makes is that there is no question
the civil engineers knows how to build the road or bridge. The question is that the real
dilemma is the consideration to be given to the many unintended consequences of the
selected design of the road or bridge. It is from the perspective of what type of road or
bridge to build that the engineer evaluates the impacts of the decision. Perhaps it is
thinking, for example, of the high costs, and that funds may be moved away from other
worthy projects; or that roads have a big footprint and use a lot of space, and
occasionally split urban neighborhoods resulting in serious consequences. However,
under the kinds of conditions described by Braverman and Feenberg, engineers often
now find themselves accountable for nothing more than the delivery of their stock of
techniques according to the measures of performance imposed on them, and do not
see themselves free to participate in setting objectives. This can remove some of the
most satisfying aspects of the work for an engineer in the field.
D. Engineering as a moral career
My study focused on the fine line that quality engineers walk when performing their
professional duties and I did the analysis using the theory of Erving Goffman.
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In using Goffman’s concepts that describe what he termed the dramaturgy of social
interactions, engineers can be described as “performers” within their own organizations.
Although in Asylums Goffman describes the “performances” of inmates and staff, his
explanations apply to actions that similarly occur in all hierarchical systems. Goffman
tells us about the way that inmates and staff perform their roles during visits by
outsiders. Each “dramaturgically” plays their parts according to their status and acquired
level of respect. In this manner, the actors within a system constantly and cyclically act
according to the systems’ social categories, also showing that some actors have
acquired higher levels of merit from hard work and greater levels of education (Goffman,
1959).
Goffman describes the individual as a performer living the moment, aware of his
performance, and at the same time thinking and dreaming of the performance, and his
impact on the “audience”. Goffman is also careful to add that the performer is capable of
pride and shame, and careful to avoid embarrassment (Goffman, 1959). This
dramaturgy concept is a good fit to describe quality engineers “front-stage”, where and
when they “perform” as technical experts. Yet, there is an invisible “back-stage”, with
insecurity present, where the quotidian confronts professional principles and issues of
ethics and morality (Goffman, 1959).
In addition to Goffman’s Theory of Dramaturgy, one of my core analytical concepts
is that of “moral career”, and it has its origin in Goffman’s Asylums. In Asylums, we find
the following:
The moral career of a person of a given social category involves a standard
sequence of changes in his way of conceiving selves, including, importantly his
own. These half-buried lines of development can be followed by studying his moral
experiences, that is, happenings which mark a turning point in the way in which the
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person views the world, although the particularities of this view may be difficult to
establish. And note can be taken of overt acts or strategies, that is, stands that he
effectively takes before specifiably others, whatever the hidden and variable nature
of his inward attachment to these presentations. By taking note of moral
experiences and overt personal stands, one can obtain a relatively objective
tracing of relatively subjective matters.
Each moral career, and behind this, each self, occurs within the confines of an
institutional system, whether a social establishment such as a mental hospital or a
complex of personal and professional relationships. The self, then, can be seen as
something that resides in the arrangements prevailing in a social system for its
members (Goffman, 1961).
I used Goffman’s “moral career”, as presented in Asylums, as a guide for my study
of the moral career of a professional quality engineer in order to develop a sociological
version of the structure of self. When Goffman used the term career, he broadened its
use to include not only a person’s rises within a profession, but also to refer to any
social “role” developed within a specific organization (Goffman, 1961).
Goffman explained that one advantage to the concept of moral career is that it has
two sides; one side is linked to internal self matters that are held closely and dearly
(such as the image of self and identity). The other side is part of a publically accessible
institutional complex that concerns official position, previous social relations, and
reputation (Goffman, 1961). It involves a network of other actors who have encountered
one’s “work”, as well as the idiosyncrasies, interpretive and historical decision points,
the individual has made (Goffman, 1961). Thus included among the larger context of
one’s moral career within one organization, and ultimately across many organizations
for the individual, are tacit rules that a firm becomes accustomed to winking at.
I did also have an interest in Goffman’s study of interactions. The study of the
interactions of quality engineers permits an effort at getting to the truths of close-up
human interactions; which represent cold, grim micropolitics as carefully staged as any

Chapter 1
46
in international diplomacy. What goes on in the interaction (an underlying Goffmanian
assumption) is governed usually by unstated rules or principles more or less implicitly
set by the character of some larger though perhaps invisible entity (Goffman, 1974).
In Asylums, Goffman presented two terms of interest, primary adjustments and
secondary adjustments. According to Goffman, an individual is said to have a primary
adjustment when cooperatively contributing required activity to an organization and
under required conditions. In our society this primary adjustment to the organization,
this becoming a co-operator, occurs with the following: (1) support of institutionalized
standards of welfare, (2) the drive supplied through incentives and joint values, and (3)
the promptings of designated penalties. The individual is aligned with the organization’s
goals and cultural assumptions of most activities, and is obliged to dwell in a world that
is in fact congenial. (Goffman, 1961). Put another way, an actor with a primary
adjustment to work and its organization setting feels a strong sense of membership.
Secondary adjustments are any habitual arrangement by which individuals employ
unauthorized means, obtain unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the
organization’s assumptions as to what they should do and get hence what they should
be. Secondary adjustments represent ways in which the individuals stand apart from the
role and the self that were taken for granted for them by the institution (Goffman, 1961).
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Chapter 2
METHODOLOGY AND STUDY DESIGN
In this chapter, I will provide details on the methodological tradition that I used to
support the analysis of data found in the chapters that follow. Included in this chapter
are also details on my data collection techniques, and a review of the validity and
generalizability of the study research. This is followed by details on the study’s issues of
ethics and confidentiality. Another set of items included that the reader may find useful
are tables listing the firms I served, including when and where; included also are the
names of the principal persons that participated in the study, and some information on
persons that through personal observation are herein mentioned.
My study looked at the role of a professional quality engineer in my own field of
manufacturing of medical devices and aimed to show the complexities of the moral
choices and of issues extending beyond the technical application of established
engineering principles. The dominant perspective shown by the data was the
connection between a product’s life history stages and the state of the work of
engineers involved in manufacturing operations of medical devices. Two sub-plots
appeared, (1) firm strategy and the increasing hegemony over engineering, (2) firm
strategy and its impact on the everyday work experiences of engineers

A. Core research traditions- Symbolic Interaction
I selected symbolic interaction as the methodology because it provides the lens
for data analysis and it provides a research tradition quite suitable for this study.
Symbolic interactionism is a sociological theory that shows how people make meanings
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of their lives. It allowed me to analyze the situations, institutions and groups of people
that interact with the professional quality engineer in the manufacturing of medical
devices. Symbolic interaction is a situational model with a flexibility that allowed looking
for and analyzing the interactions between people.
Symbolic interactionist tradition is one “that concerns the human subject and
builds the social world out of human consciousness and human agency (Collins, 1994)”.
It is a sociological tradition that looks at humanism to assert its fluidity and
meaningfulness and resists the stiff predictableness of science. It shows that through
language and the interactions with other persons, we construct our reality, and that
through our interactions and the use of language our ideas become dynamic and useful.
This tradition strongly supports a humanistic view.
Undoubtedly, I have a principal interest in medical devices because most of my
professional involvement has been in that practice field, yet I feel that the issues spill
over to other engineering disciplines. This will generate other interest because the
results of my study shed additional understanding on the conditions and situations
experienced by practicing professional engineers. Following Creswell’s (Creswell, 2007)
recommendations, I performed a holistic analysis and initially focused on salient issues,
such as engineering professionalism and the impact of profit upon safety. Subsequently
I was able to analyze the information and I was able to interpret the meaning of the
case. Again, following Creswell’s recommendations I was able to follow some of the
embedded issues that appeared.
I examined a quality engineer’s observable and learned patterns of behavior,
customs, and ways of life as exemplified by my own career, but also augmented by the
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accounts of other engineers. The first object of social analysis ought to be ordinary,
actual behavior, principally its structure and organization, especially because the
tendency is to take the framework of everyday for granted and comparative analysis is
one way to disrupt unselfconsciousness.
My research should provide hindsight into how the role of a professional quality
engineer is organized and how it is tested in practice. However, we have the capacity
and inclination to use concrete actual activity as a model upon which to work
transformations for whatever fancies us. So everyday life, real enough in itself, often
seems to be a laminated adumbration of a pattern or model that is itself a typification of
quite uncertain realm status (Goffman, 1961).
Any everyday activity contains differently framed episodes, these having different
realm statuses. These lively shadow events are geared into the on-going world but not
quite the close way that is true of ordinary, literal activity. My study took this into
account, and by doing so presents, to the extent possible, valid and useful analysis.
B. Max Weber’s ideal type—The application of Max Weber’s “Ideal Type” to the
analysis of the work of engineers
According to Weber (Weber, 1947), sociology is an empirical science of action
and through its use we can arrive at a causal explanation of cause and effects. “In
action is included all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual
attaches a subjective meaning to it (Weber, 1947).” Weber’s methodological theory
predicated that: “In order to give pure meaning… it is necessary for the sociologist to
formulate pure “ideal types” of corresponding forms of action which in each case involve
the highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue of their complete adequacy
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on the level of meaning. Ideal types may be rational or irrational but in any case are
always constructed with a view to adequacy on the level of meaning (Weber, 1947). By
this he means the “types” selected should closely approximate how the core issues to
be analyzed can be constructed in a typology. Weber mentions that sociology strives to
find the highest possible degree of adequacy on the level of meaning, including
examination of what appears to be irrational phenomena. For Weber meaning included
two kinds: (1) actual existing meaning in the given concrete case; (2) a theoretical
conceived pure type (ideal type) attributed to the hypothetical actor in a given type of
action. He added that a meaningful action is one that has a subjective meaning
attached to it and is not simply reactive.
In the introduction portion of The theory of social and economic organization,
Talcott Parsons provides the following interpretation of Weber’s meaning of an act being
rational. First, it is oriented to a clearly formulated unambiguous goal, or to a set of
values. Second, that the means chosen are, according to the best available knowledge,
adapted to the realization of the goal (Weber, 1947).
The use of Weber’s ideal type methodology theory proved very useful in the
analysis of data. I looked at my personal story, and the data generated during the
various interviews, and the data from observations of engineers. I found that Weber’s
theory offered a perspective for constructing a pure rational ideal type of engineer. From
there I was able to understand how actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all
sorts, such as emotions, errors, and organizationally imposed scripts (Weber, 1947).
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C. Case study research
Case study research explores a bounded system (a case) over time, through
detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information, and reports a
case description and case-based themes (Creswell, 2007). In Creswell’s Qualitative
Inquiry and Research Design, we find the five principal procedures for conducting a
case study. First, the researcher needs to determine that a case study approach is
appropriate by confirming that in-depth data is available for collection. Second, the
researcher must be able to identify the case clearly and succinctly. Third, the data
collection must draw from multiple sources of information. Fourth, the type of analysis
must be selected as holistic or embedded. Lastly, in the final interpretive phase the
researcher reports the meaning of the case (Creswell, 2007).
As noted, I organized the data collection around my own experiences as a
professional quality engineer, and dovetailed my experiences to focus also on one
engineered medical technology product. The product was an X-ray imager printer. It
served as a common denominator for collecting data from engineers and others that
were there during the time the incidents described in the analysis occurred. This study
should provide the opportunity to explain some of the reasons of the occurrence of the
incidents, in addition to providing the background, what happened, and why (Merriam,
2001). It should also be an opportunity to discuss and evaluate alternatives not chosen,
and lastly, to have an opportunity to evaluate, summarize, and conclude, thus
increasing the study’s potential applicability (Merriam, 2001).
Case studies are not without limitations, although they provide a powerful tool to
study complex social units consisting of multiple variables. Some of the limitations
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include the researcher’s bias, sensitivity and integrity, and in some cases, the
shortcoming related to the collection of data through interviews.
Validity and Generalizability
My study describes data that I gathered from my own experiences and a case
that allowed me to describe the experiences and activities of real working engineers
engaged in the manufacturing of medical devices. My expectation is that my study will
provide a view of professional quality engineers seldom presented. My study did not
intend to provide information to analyze other conditions and situations of engineers in
the numerous condition in which they operate.
D. Exemplar research
For me, of great use was Bruno Latour’s Aramis because it provides intrepid
insights and analysis on a complex technological transportation system in Paris. Latour
presents the conflicts as technology, politics and project clarity confluence resulting in
the belated cancellation of the project. The project endured in spite of its cost and lack
of a possible technological solution. In Aramis, Latour works to get inside the head of
actors while conceptualizing the larger system in which they work.
Another exemplar of engineering related case research was The Challenger
launch decision: Risky technology, culture and deviance at NASA (Vaughan, 1996). In
Challenger, Vaughan presented a detailed analysis of the way organizations make
decisions especially intersecting with a potentially dangerous technology. It is an
excellent presentation of our increasing dependence on complex technologies, and
what she names normalized organizational deviancy in a production driven culture
faced with new and unpredictable technologies.
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I also found very useful Dennis Sullivan’s (Sullivan, 2001) doctoral dissertation,
The moral career of the school business official, because it provides an excellent
template of a vey similar study to mine. He uses the concept of moral career to present
the activities of a school business official. I intend to do something very similar for a
professional quality engineer involved in the manufacturing of medical devices.
Finally, I looked at Howard Nelson’s (Nelson, 2002) doctoral dissertation, From
skilled craftsman to unskilled laborer: The impact of technological change on the world
of the twentieth century printer. Nelson presented a study concerning the changing
nature of work due to the changes in technology that occurred in the printing industry.
Nelson’s study specifically looks at the impact to the individuals, changes in the
workplace, and the effects of these changes.
E. Tables of firms and persons involved in the study
The table that follows is Table 3. Four Firms in the Life-Cycle of a Medical
Device. In it, I list the firms involved in the manufacturing and distribution of the imager
medical device. The time span covered was approximately from 1985 until 2010. In
addition, I have provided a brief description of the firms, and the years these were
involved in manufacturing the imager. The four firms were Inventorz, involved from 1985
until 1997; Majestytech, involved from 1997 until 2007; Desperamed, involved from
2007 until 2008; and lastly, Pouvremed, involved from 2008 until 2010. I used
pseudonyms for all names, for firms and persons both.
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Table 3. Firms: Inventorz, Majestytech, Desperamed and Pouvremed Descriptions

Firm: Inventorz/ Majestytech/ Desperamed/ Pouvremed 1985-2010
Note: This table covers the life cycle of the X-ray Imager Printer product in the US, as
well as the individual engineers involved. My involvement with the imager starts in 2007.

Inventorz (involved from 1985 until 1997)
Inventorz is US corporation headquartered in the Mid-West with revenue in the millions.
It is a world-renowned product innovator and its products serve many markets including
the medical device field. It created the dry-process for X-ray film development and
developed the mechanical and electrical systems that resulted in the X-ray imager
printer. For many products that it originates and produces it prefers the “enter early and
exit early” strategy for product marketing. It is well known as a firm that values its
engineers and scientists. It is known as a great firm for innovation.

Majestytech (involved from 1997 until 2007)
Majestytech is a US corporation headquartered in the Northeast with revenue in the
billions. It is a multinational firm with over 15,000 employees, and is well known for its
imaging and photographic material and equipment. It sold its medical business to a
Canadian conglomerate for cash. Since the invention of digital photography, its
importance has declined. Its operational strength was centered in its Supply Chain
toughness; it did not hesitate abusing suppliers if possible. It bought the X-ray imager
business from Inventorz Co. in the late 1990s. It had a reputation for good engineering,
and its quality system was strong but in decline. Made serious workforce reductions
during business downturn.

Desperamed (involved from 2007 until 2008)
Desperamed was born after its parent, a Canadian conglomerate, agreed to a
leveraged purchase of the medical business from Majestytech and created it. The
parent Canadian conglomerate is known as a private equity investment firm and holding
company specializing in buying high-cost manufacturing companies and turning these
into low cost contract suppliers. Desperamed’s lack of business history hampered its
dealings with suppliers because these were unwilling to extend short time credit. Its
quality system was hastily put together from documents left over from Majestytech.
Many of the computerized systems we had available while with Majestytech
disappeared with Desperamed. Engineering strength declined rapidly and numerous
experienced people left as soon as able.
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(table 3 continued)
Pouvremed (involved from 2008 until 2010)
Pouvremed is a small low cost manufacturing firm owned by the same Canadian
conglomerate that owns Desperamed. Pouvremed specializes in low cost and low
volume contract manufacturing in the electronics and printed circuit board business.
Desperamed transferred the X-ray imager assembly processes to Pouvremed as a way
of cutting cost. Pouvremed did not have a dependable quality system for medical
devices because it lacked the basic system and experience to handle the medical
device product needs. The engineering resources were very limited and what was
available was fragmented and disorganized.

Next is Table 4 Persons Interviewed. In this table, I give a description of those I
interviewed for the study. Of the seven persons that I interviewed two were women, five
were engineers; the two non-engineers were persons whose involvement provided key
insights of the on-going activities. Of the five engineers, one was a woman; the
engineering specialties represented included, mechanical, electrical, industrial and
manufacturing.
Table 4. Persons Interviewed
Firm: Inventorz/ Majestytech/ Desperamed/ Pouvremed 2007-2010
Name
Gender
Position or Role and Education
Andrea
F
Quality Documentation Specialist (no degree)
Andrea is a tall and thin middle-aged woman with dark curly hair; has a sharp wit and a
no-nonsense demeanor. She loves biking, hiking and climbing. She was my sounding
board for my ideas about trying to improve things. She was very aware of the missteps
taken by the managers in charge, and was never afraid to express her concern when
possible. She did her work as expected and helped me a lot.
Archie
M
Design Engineer, BS Mechanical Engineering
Archie is of average height and soft-spoken. He worked hard and had a high level of
intellect. He would avoid confrontations if at all possible. He did his best but lacked
experience and was blind to many of the repercussions his decisions had. He was
willing to follow his manager’s instructions and did not look into issues too deeply. He
felt strongly about providing a good future for his young children.
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Firm: Inventorz/ Majestytech/ Desperamed/ Pouvremed 2007-2010
Larry
M
Design Engineer, PE
Larry is a no-nonsense experienced engineer. He is middle-aged and of average height
and average build. He dressed in jeans and shirts, and his rough hands showed his
preference for “hands-on”. He showed his displeasure when forced to resolve his
manager’s issues instead of those that he thought mattered as engineering issues.
Peter
M
Regulatory Manager, Ph.D.
Peter is tall and athletic with a love for hockey that he still practices. He had recently
completed his PhD and felt that the firm did not appreciate the effort he had put into it.
He went along with many of the decisions made my senior management but I felt he
was uncomfortable doing it. The job was important to him because he has young
children to care for.
Sabrina
F
Quality Engineer, BS Industrial Engineering
Sabrina is young and very outspoken. She is very aware that engineers are often forced
to follow unreasonable instructions from managers concerned only for the bottom line.
She really tried very hard to work at improving the situation but felt powerless to make
changes.
Winston
M
Supplier Quality Engineer, BS Electrical Engineering
Winston is an avid outdoors person who loves hunting and fishing. He is middle-aged,
tall and soft-spoken, and gifted with great patience. He knew the product better than
anyone did since he had been part of the original development team. We spent a lot of
time working on supplier issues.
Yoshi
M
Manufacturing Engineer, BS Manufacturing Engineer
Yoshi is middle-aged with grey hair, and a thin taut physique. He is an avid bike rider
and enjoys the outdoors. He is close to retiring but says he has the perfect job and
wanted to keep on doing it. He told me that once he rode a motorcycle all the way to
Key West. He was a bit rigid with suppliers when components were nonconforming. The
line workers always relied on his expertise.

F. Data collection
My data collection sources included the case of the X-ray laser imager printer,
other documents, interviews, direct observations, participant observations and physical
artifacts. Some of the documents I used included printed and electronic media items
pertaining to the case and to engineering. Other documents included product
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information brochures and documents from various regulatory agencies such as FDA
and ISO.
I collected data from interviews with engineers and other informed actors. These
interviews were recorded and analyzed, and the transcripts were used for data
collection and coding. I interviewed nine persons that once worked with me. Seven of
them were engineers with college degrees and one person had a Ph. D.; and one did
not have a college degree. Of the engineers, one was a woman. All the persons
interviewed were recorded for at least 40 minutes, and some were interviewed more
than once.
Data collection also occurred from my own direct observations during
professional reunions and gatherings. It was an opportunity to observe and gather data
hands-on. In many cases, observations were made during continuing education
sessions required to fulfill my professional licensure requirements for the continuing
education mandate. Finally, I used photographs of some of the artifacts I have collected
throughout my career, and that allowed a hands-on review and clarification of the
issues.
G. Data analysis and interpretation
Data analysis is the systematic process of searching and arranging the gathered
data in order to accumulate the required findings for a study. Data interpretation is the
process of developing themes embedded in the findings and relating these to the
literature and to broader concerns and concepts (Bogdan, 2007). My process of
analysis included breaking down the data into manageable pieces and coding it to
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search for the enclosed patterns. This was the process used to identify the themes
presented in this study.
Of the four forms of data analysis and interpretation presented by Creswell I used
three, first, categorical aggregation, which is the search for a collection of instances
from the data expecting the emergence of meanings. Second, I looked for patterns for a
correspondence between two or more categories. Lastly, I developed naturalistic
generalizations from the analysis to learn from the case (Creswell, 2007).
H. Ethics and confidentiality
I received the St. Thomas University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
for my study, and my study meets all of its requirements. My research and subsequent
reporting of data was conducted to guarantee absolutely that no one is harmed. This
was a principal tenet under which I conducted this study. The names of persons and
organizations were changed to prevent their identification. The tape recordings of the
interviews were kept in my possession and safeguarded in a locked container with only
one key, with it in my possession at all times. The voice recordings will be destroyed
one year after my graduation.
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Chapter 3
A PROFESSIONAL QUALITY ENGINEER’S STORY
Section 1: Early Career
My undergraduate degree was in Mechanical Engineering from the University of
Puerto Rico. It, was bit removed from flying, my first love. All through high school, I had
good grades and I entered engineering school. No other close family members were
engineers.
Although Puerto Rico is not a state of the union, young men born and residents of
the island older than 18 years of age had to register with the draft board. As a full-time
college student I had an exemption, but I was required, as part of the mandatory
curriculum, to enroll in the ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) program for a
minimum of two years. I decided later to complete the full four years of ROTC because
the Viet Nam War was in full force. Therefore, it was that upon graduation, along with
my BSME (Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering), I also received a
commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. Finally, I had my chance to get
into aviation, and after passing the rigorous flight medical examination, I got into
helicopter flight school and Cobra gunship training. A few years later, with a one year
tour in Viet Nam in between, I left active service and joined the National Guard, where I
served as an engineer and pilot, and after completing over 30 years of service, I retired
as a Major receiving full retirement benefits.
After I left active military duty, I started to work as a manufacturing engineer in the
medical device industry in Puerto Rico. Most large American medical device and
pharmaceutical firms had subsidiaries operating on the island because a provision in
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the tax code allowed for federal tax exemptions, and this created quite a demand for
Puertorrican engineers. While in Puerto Rico, I had the opportunity to work for Galenus
Co., a top American medical device firm, and rose through the ranks to be the
engineering manager of a large manufacturing plant specializing in devices for use in
cardio-vascular surgeries. Our plant, located on the west side of the island, was a topnotch facility, producing Class III devices for worldwide use. The FDA uses three
classifications, I, II, and III, to designate medical devices; class III devices are
considered the most critical and potentially harmful to patients. A few years later, I was
offered a transfer, and with my family, relocated from Puerto Rico to the Mid-West area.
A. My second love
The things that I learned in college, especially in mechanical engineering, helped
me understand how and why, many of the things that we come in daily contact work. In
a very special way, my knowledge of engineering makes my life fun. When I use my
engineering knowledge and apply systematic inquiry for problem solving, solutions
come easy to issues that arise during the manufacturing of products and this gives me
great satisfaction. I have learned throughout the years to love engineering.
(1) The wire incident
While working in the Mid-West, I received training in the quality concepts of Phillip
Crosby. This was at a time in United States when Quality underwent revolutionary
change. Crosby advocated for defining quality as “meeting the requirements.” In his
interpretation, a product could claim being of quality if it met its requirements. This
purposeful definition intended to clarify in simple words what had always been a
nebulous concept. Crosby would later ascend to the presidency of the American Society
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for Quality (ASQ), the prestigious society headquartered in Wisconsin. Crosby insisted
that a product’s quality was not connected to its price. A graphite pencil or a mechanical
pencil (of much higher cost) could be of the same quality if both met their intended
requirements. The key to his definition was grasping the concept of “meeting the
requirements”. This revolutionary change in defining Quality was all part of the
American reaction to the demise of the quality of American products, and the surge in
quality of foreign products, especially Japanese cars exemplified by Toyota. The
automotive industry, long dominated by Detroit, was being upstaged by excellent quality
and similarly priced cars from Japan. Quality professionals were constantly asked about
the higher quality of Japanese cars, and American industry was forced to change their
approaches to product quality to compete.
Figure 2. Picture of Small Interdental Brushes
Crosby’s precepts
resonated with me and I recall a
particular incident that shows
this. The Crosby training
emphasized the need for having
clear product requirements
because without them
manufacturing would be trying to
meet unknown requirements.
Unknown requirements would lead to opinions (i.e., I think this no good) and
assumptions (i.e., they sent us some bad stuff), and this was simply unacceptable.
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We made very small interdental brushes used for cleaning the space between teeth.
The picture above shows two samples of the small brushes. This was a useful product
for those with orthodontic apparatus in their teeth because flossing is difficult, and the
small brushes help cleaning between the teeth where the use of floss is difficult. The
small brushes were very difficult to make, and we had dozens of automatic machines
dedicated to producing the brushes. One day the quality supervisor came to me asking
for help in dispositioning about a hundred spools of the wire used for making the
brushes.
Dispositioning is the subsequent activity after materials are found (correctly or
incorrectly) nonconforming. Once a part is marked as nonconforming, someone, usually
from the quality department, investigates to confirm the nonconformance, and initiates
the paperwork to return to vendor (RTV) for credit, scrap, use-as-is (UAI), or other. The
spools of wire had accumulated over about a six-month period, and she was processing
the wire for RTV for credit. The supplier had refused approving return of the wire without
getting from us a clear description of the problem because it was a large amount of
money. The quality supervisor had received only scant information on the rejections of
the wire from the machine technicians. She only knew that the brush machine
technicians had rejected the wire because it would not work in the machines.
At the time, a couple of technicians from the German factory that made the
machines were at the plant installing a new machine, and I asked them to try some of
the rejected wire. They confirmed the wire was unusable, and I asked them for a list of
requirements for good wire. They did not know, and told me that we should buy the wire
from a supplier capable of producing good wire. Overall, not much help, because the
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supplier they were recommending was in Switzerland. I called our wire supplier located
out East, and they were not much help because they produced wire for hundreds of
users and applications, and could not offer any recommendations for our specific
application. The wire supplier requested that we send them all of the information written
on each spool of wire that had been rejected. In turn, I asked the quality supervisor to
capture the information from each spool, including information from the receiving
documents for each shipment. I also asked her to get the same information from the
spools of wire in use, hoping to compare information from good versus rejected wire.
The wire in use would be considered good wire.
As soon as I looked at the data comparing the good versus the rejected wire, I
noticed a substantial variation in the elongation value for the wire. In college, one of my
favorite subjects had been metallurgy, and this helped get to the bottom of the wire
issue. The wire manufacturing process consisted of passing a larger diameter wire
through a die with a smaller diameter to produce the smaller diameter we required. This
is called drawing down. During the drawing down process, the wire heats up, and of
course deforms as it becomes smaller. The drawing process, in other words, stresses
the wire, and an annealing (heating) operation must be added to relieve the stresses. I
noticed that good wire needed to have better than 50% elongation, and that all wire with
55% or more elongation always worked well. I discussed this with the wire supplier, and
they told me annealing was part of their process, but since we had no requirement
defined for elongation, they sent us wire disregarding the elongation value. They said
they were willing to send us only 55% elongation wire to resolve our problem. Later we
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changed to a lower carbon stainless steel wire formulation to improve the annealing
effect, and substantially improve efficiency and process yield.
My Crosby quality training, focusing on knowing the requirements in order to meet
them, worked well in this case. I was able to put together a list of requirements for
procuring good wire and after that, we stopped having bad wire issues I felt great
satisfaction in solving the wire issue, it was like solving a complex puzzle.
(2) The noisy fan incident
One of the things I love most about engineering in a manufacturing environment is
the satisfaction I get when I am able to create a solution to problems that arise in
making medical devices. Take the example of the noisy cooling fans for X-ray imager
that we made. In the plant, two very experienced operators performed, in a separate
room, a mandatory machine final inspection prior to shipment. This room was quieter
than the manufacturing area and about two or three times a week, the inspectors would
call up the supplier quality engineers to notify them of noisy cooling fans. The noise was
a clanking noise and the feeling was that the noise was an early indicator of fan failure.
Generally, cooling fans tend to be noisy because of their confined space location. The
fan had to be replaced at the insistence of the inspectors, and the engineers acquiesced
to show support for the inspectors. Replacing the fan was not a big deal but it made the
process longer and extended the testing time.
Every time we had a noisy fan, we contacted the distributor of the fans, a local
company, and one that we had done business with for many years, and one that we had
a very good business relationship. The supplier did not feel comfortable accepting the
blame for the noisy fans because they assured me that the plant that manufactured the
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fans performed 100% noise testing before shipment. The manufacturing plant that
made the fans was in Mexico and I had the opportunity to speak to their engineers and
managers concerning the noisy fans, and since I know Spanish, our communication
was excellent.
We implemented a check at the first station of our production line to test the fans
prior to assembly but unfortunately, we still had noisy fans during the final inspection.
The inspectors could detect noise the production workers could not because they were
in a quieter room. I felt all along that the noisy fans were not an indicator of impending
failure but it was a simple case of demanding high quality out of an inexpensive fan; the
fans cost about $5. We were not willing to pay for the extra quality that would have
made them quieter. I had argued ineffectively to accept the noisy fans because our
customers used the machines in noisy areas and the fans could not really be heard.
Ferrol, one of our technicians, helped me put together a testing fixture to get
samples of noisy and quiet fans, with the ultimate goal of providing the manufacturing
plant in Mexico with samples of a quiet fan, a noisy fan, and a noisy but acceptable fan.
I knew that if we provided samples to the manufacturing plant in Mexico that they could
use these to test them against their production units this way eliminate any future
issues. Ferrol did an excellent job implementing the design that I put together, and he
created a small portable testing fixture for the fans. This testing fixture of was on cart
with wheels to take it anywhere in the facility.
After further conversations with the distributor, she was adamant about the
problem not being created by the distributor or the manufacturing plant in Mexico. She
further explained that the Mexico Plant did perform 100% testing of the fans before
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shipment. I told her that in order to prove her theory; her theory being that they were not
responsible for the noisy fans, we would have to do some statistical testing. I told her
that I would put together a testing plan to confirm or disprove the theory that the noisy
fans were coming from the supplier, and added that we would need at least 100
samples of each model. From those samples, we would test 59 samples for a 95/95
assurance and reliability test. This 59 sample with no failures is consistent with FDA
guidelines for what FDA refers to as a 95/95 reliability. The attribute data statistics
called for testing 59 samples and would pass if no failures, and fail with one noisy
sample. Our distributor’s name was Chrystal, and one day she called me to let me know
that she would bring the samples. She showed up at our plant without going through our
warehouse with the 200 samples, 100 of each of the two models. This was unorthodox
because all materials were always delivered to our warehouse building at a separate
location to maintain inventory control. I risked getting in trouble but I took a chance and
told her to deliver the fans to our manufacturing building. I wanted to make sure and
eliminate the variable of something happening at our warehouse. We got a small cart,
loaded up the 200 fans and we went to an empty section of the manufacturing floor
where we tested the fans using the fixture that Ferrol had built. We tested about 80
(more than what called for) of each of the types of fans without the single figure. The
statistical model gave us a better than a 95/95 assurance the fans were at that point
quiet, and confirmed Chrystal’s theory of the supplier not being responsible for the noisy
fans. I reported the findings of our experiment and concluded that the supplier was
correct in their assertion that they were not the source of noisy fans. This sent the
investigation in a different direction to determine the cause of the noisy fans.
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Soon after, we found it. The system that we used at the plant for handling all
materials was one that relied on the warehouse personnel handling all the materials and
putting them in tote bins that were delivered to the manufacturing floor for use the same
day they were needed for production. That kept all big packaging boxes in the
warehouse, speeded assembly, and kept the assembly area cleaner and better
organized. It was here that we found the source of the problem; it was here that we
found the root cause of the noisy fans. The warehouse personnel were not particularly
trained in handling all of the materials they were touching. On occasion, about two or
three times per week, a fan still in its individual box from the factory was accidently
dropped on the floor. This shocked the fan and created an imbalance in the blades, and
this was the source, the cause, all of the noise. Our own employees were causing the
noisy fans, and after training the warehouse personnel on the proper handling of
sensitive components, we never had to contact Chrystal again to report noisy fans. It
was fun working with the issue of the noisy fans because I was able to apply good
engineering techniques to solve an annoying and recurring problem. I felt my
experience helped our company and our supplier, it was a win-win situation overall.
B. Doubts and then Curatorismed
During my career, there were incidents that sparked doubt on my ability to fulfill my
engineering practice requirements. All was not contentment, especially represented by
the occasions were I was required to work side-by-side with a non-degreed person
doing some engineering functions. This is a despicable custom allowed in American
industry where non-degreed persons are allowed to usurp a title and perform duties, for
which they lack the qualifications and credentials. This common practice in industry, on
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occasion becomes the subject of cynical humor, such as that of calling cleaning workers
“sanitary engineers”. This even appears on some job descriptions. This is not a matter
of class differentiation leading to bigotry; the title belongs to those who have earned it,
and it is a way of insuring the safety of the public via the high standards that
professional engineers provide. I refuse to demean my professional engineer
colleagues and myself by addressing as engineers those that are unqualified.
My friend Gallo, whom I had worked with in Puerto Rico at Galenus Co., got me
interested in a position with him at Curatorismed, one of the most quality conscious
organizations in the medical device manufacturing field. Curatorismed had bought a
company in Western State making a pheresis device similar to one we had made in
Puerto Rico. At the time, I was very happy for the position of director because it
represented a promotion, and an opportunity to work with friends. I felt it was going to
be fun. However, just a couple of months after I relocated to Western State, my good
friend Gallo was re-hired by Galenus and moved away.
(1) The bowl incident
Pheresis (pronounced as fur-ee-sis) is a special kind of blood donation by which
specific components of the blood can be separated. It comes from a Greek word
meaning 'to take away' or 'separate'. By this method, the blood components like plasma,
erythrocytes and platelets separate. The pheresis is done using a machine called a cell
separator. The separation is based on density gradient centrifugation and the separated
components are collected in separate vials or specialized poly-bags in the machine.
Prior to the development of the minimally invasive technology, surgical procedures
involved extensive body wounds that generated a lot of blood.
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Major surgeries made use of cell saver medical devices that collected and recycled
the patient’s own blood to reduce patient trauma and

Figure 3. Picture of Blood Filter

minimize the danger of blood transfusions. The
collected patient’s blood went to a filter to remove
tissue and bone pieces; Figure 3 on the right shows a
picture of the blood filter. The markings show the
volume of blood in the device. Blood would enter from
the top and pass through the center of the core made
up of foam and cloth, and accumulated until ready to
be re-used. The red cap on the bottom is the drainage
port.

Figure 4. Picture of Pheresis Bowl
(on the left).
The blood then went to the pheresis
machine and separated in the bowl via
high-speed centrifugation to recover the
red blood cells. Figure 4 on the left
shows a picture of the disposable
plastic bowl. This product line had a
Class III medical device classification
assigned by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
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The separated red blood cells were then “washed” with sterile saline solution and
re-infused back to the patient. This procedure took place in the operating room under
the surgeon’s supervision. On multiple occasions due to the high centrifugation stresses
involved in the 6,000 revolution per minute process, the plastic bowl would shatter and
blood would spill out of the pheresis machine.
Resolving this quality issue became my responsibility as the Director of QA/RA.
Yet there was much more required for the resolution than the need to apply the proven
and common quality engineering best practices for product stability and improvement. In
time, I found out there were many unresolved technical and business issues that I would
be facing, and that I would get very little help from the quality engineering texts and
references with which I was familiar. These issues hinged mainly on prior technical and
business decisions made by the previous start-up company culture that was highly
entrepreneurial but less interested in following through medical devices quality systems
concepts.
I felt technically prepared for the job, but the job needed other skills and support for
which I was unprepared, and it took me a while to realize the position’s hazards. My
situation changed a lot after my friend Gallo left because I lost a very good ally and
information source, especially on the financial picture of our company. Additionally, the
General Manager decided to bring in some of his friends and acquaintances to work in
Western State and that aggravated my isolation. There were other traps to the position,
the principal one was that a contractor firm assembled the bowl in another city hundreds
of miles away, and it had an airtight exclusive contract for the manufacturing of the
bowls. It appeared, since it had control of the manufacturing process and systems, that
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the contracted firm was constantly changing items to fit its needs without regard to the
impact the changes were having on bowl performance.
This was very convenient and lucrative for the contractor because process
variations could not be detected until long after delivery of the bowls, and by then it was
too late. During the time that I spent in Western State, I suspected some impropriety in
the business arrangements carried over from the previous administration. Although I
have no conclusive evidence to substantiate this there were periodic rumors to this
effect. Overall, however, the bowls we had available for sales were of uneven quality.
A manager from the previous administrative team ran the bowl-testing laboratory at
our plant. He was at a very interesting character, and I thought for a while that he was
also highly educated. Later I found out, much to my confusion, that the individual did not
even have a college degree. He was a perfusionist. The job of a perfusionist in the
operating room is to monitor the operating room equipment used during open-heart
surgery. Perfusionists are responsible for making sure that all of the blood circulation
connections are in good order. The perfusionist’s work is under the supervision of the
head surgeon, and requires no degree or license. This quality control manager, whom I
will refer to as Dr. False, seemed to have a good reputation in the industry. I also heard
people addressing him as doctor on many different locations. He never showed any
sign of embarrassment, and relished the adulation. I knew he was not a medical doctor
but I assumed that he had the proper credentials from some type of doctorate degree.
In reality, the bulk of the quality assurance testing on the bowls was visual, and
checking of paperwork. However, little in the way of statistically based performance
stressing designed to detect structural flaws was going on. In reality, our customers
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were doing all the actual testing of the bowls, and many of them were shattering in the
operating rooms.
The quality problem with the bowls was serious enough that many hospitals
reported it to the FDA. This medical reporting of problems with medical devices is a very
serious issue. Shattered bowls sprinkled blood in the operating room during surgery,
which delayed the surgery, and required extensive cleaning of the operating room.
Worst of all, the growing distrust of the bowl’s robustness was resulting in increased
reliance on fresh blood transfusions, an additional hazard the cell savings process was
meant to eliminate. The bowl problems were adding a new degree of risk and more cost
to the patient.
As the director of quality, I went to visit the Denver office of the FDA on multiple
times to explain our efforts at eliminating the bowl problem. I was fortunate that one of
my principal assistants had retired from the FDA where he had been a medical device
inspector. I was also very fortunate to meet at the Denver office, a fellow graduate from
my high school class from Puerto Rico. A fortuitous event since there were only sixtytwo of us in our graduating class. I was very happy to get this lucky break. I had
prepared well for the meetings with the FDA; even rehearsed with my staff to help me
feel at ease. I presented pictures and I used samples, and included information on our
improvements plans. I used all the data I could my hands on to convince the FDA to let
us continue to distribute the product. It was my responsibility to convince the FDA that
we were aware of, and concerned about, the bowl quality problems; also that our efforts
were yielding improvements, albeit slowly. In other words, that our situation for the
moment was good enough.
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The FDA could have stopped us, and forced us into a “recall” situation. The FDA
has the authority to stop a manufacturer from distributing a product with quality
problems, in addition to ordering the manufacturer to “recall” the entire inventory of
product in the field. The FDA evaluates the danger and risk to patients of flawed
medical devices, and in our case, we were fortunate that none of the cases of shattered
bowls had resulted in direct harm to the patients. The cell saver equipment and process
was ancillary to the surgery with no direct contact with the patient, and the surgeon
could have elected not to use the cell saver process if so desired. Indeed a great
number of surgeons were doing so. The visits to the FDA were very stressful yet, at the
same time, productive and exciting. I understood from the feedback the FDA gave me,
that my explanations of very technical engineering concepts made it easy for them to
understand the issues. My efforts and ability to explain the issues carefully and in full
detail, kept us in business and for the moment achieving a state of “good enough”.
While out west, I was always the first point of contact for customers with problems.
I made every effort to explain our improvement plans and activities. I recall one instance
that exemplifies my commitment, and our business plight. One of our principal sales
representatives, Juanes, had a very disgruntled New Jersey customer that had plans of
stopping all purchases of our products. Juanes, one of our top sales producers, had
asked for my help in explaining to a customer what we were doing to improve product
quality. Juanes felt that a face-to-face meeting between the customer and myself (in my
role as the director of quality), might possibly turns things around for us.
Even though I had a terrible case of the flu, and felt weak and sick, we made the
long trip east. We met with the customer at one of the airline lounges at the airport, and
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presented about the same information we had presented to the FDA. We showed the
customer charts showing our bowl inspections and specifications, and our intent to
spare no effort to get the bowl quality under control. We asked our customer for a little
more time until our improvements took hold. Then we listened to his response, and we
could see, that although in control, he was obviously very irate. We put on our best face
and listened to his arguments. He said he was pleased with our improvement plans but
even out best efforts were not sufficient to convince him to change his mind. However,
he said he was happy to have met with us, and that it was important for him to tell us
first hand what he was going through. I sat there and listened with no immediate
solution to the bowl quality problem, something not “good enough” for our customer.
C. As good as it gets
I learned a lot from that incident, I learned that it is better to face your adversary,
and find out first hand about their problem. At the time, many had been telling him that
things were improving, but no one could explain it coherently. My explanations, as the
director of quality, and representing the company’s appropriate authority, demonstrated
out commitment. Nevertheless, unconvinced by our visit and presentation, he shifted his
business to our competitor. A few months later, after word got out that we had managed
some improvements that had reduced the numbers of shattering bowls; he called me to
let me know that he would again buy our products. He stressed that overall, we had
better pricing, and he felt that we had showed genuine concern for his problems.
I had come to grips some time earlier with my definition of “as good as it gets” after
completing a course for quality system auditing. There I learned that it is the
responsibility of the auditor to asses if there is compliance or not. The auditor looks at
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all the evidence presented and reviewed, and renders an opinion: it meets the
requirements, or not.
All the while, it is very important to maintain a sense of proportionality because
there are extenuating circumstances, such as, not enough time, and not enough
resources, and the fact that no organization is perfect. Then there is the variable about
the evaluators are themselves because they are of varying experience, backgrounds,
and talent, and their reactions will be different. All of this with the further complication of
dissonant and conflicting goals, such as “do the best you can” and “get it done fast”.
However, in the end it is the auditor’s responsibility to issue an opinion. The auditor has
to find and determine the degree of risk that the nonconformances will have on the
organization or product, and to expect perfection is not rational because perfection is
nonexistent.
Another experience also helped me come to grips with my definition of “as good as
it gets”. While at Curatorismed, I had the chance to work with a senior corporate auditor.
She came for a visit and after about a day, came over to me and commented that what I
needed was not some one telling me all that was wrong after digging into the books for
a week. What I need was someone to help us fix as many issues as possible in the four
days left of her visit. She switched hats and helped fix issues during the four days left of
her visit. After a few months, she came back a few more times to “evaluate” and “help”.
She knew that switching hats from auditor to quality system assistant would be more
productive.
These two experiences helped me learn that I have to decide if the results are
acceptable and if the requirements are met. If it is good enough, then move on, if not
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take the appropriate action. There must always be room for the engineering
professional to make a “gut” call.

Section 2: Mid-career and Beyond
A. An elegant imager
(1) What is an X-ray imager printer and how does it work?
The printer processes a sheet of plastic film with a chemical coating, which is
etched by a high precision laser and activated (developed) using heat to reveal the
picture. The completed film is an inexpensive and portable picture of a patient’s insidethe-body condition.

The imager was about 4ft
in height.
The gray trays store the
new film.

Figure 5. X-ray Printer Imager Rendition
The imager machine is a combination of mechanical components to position and
move the film, electrical and electronic components to receive and process the digital
electronic signal, and precision optical components to process the laser imaging. The
use of the film by healthcare professionals makes the machine a medical device. An X-
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ray image is used as a diagnostic tool to look inside the human body without surgical
intervention, and without the X-rays, it would be impossible to detect many anomalies
inside the human body at a low cost. The picture is printed by an imager. The X-ray
imager printer machine has had a long and proud history, and is a favorite of healthcare
professionals around the world. The purpose of the machine is to print high-resolution
images on thin plastic film and used by doctors and nurses to peer inside the body. The
printed X-ray image appears in grey and light shades that serve as indicators of mass
density inside the body. Bones and muscle appear darker than soft tissue, and trained
healthcare professionals interpret the image’s darker-to-lighter contrast. In simple
cases, broken bones could be detected; in more complicated ones, cancerous masses
in female breast tissue could be detected.
The film used by the imager is chemically coated on one side and reveals the
image after exposure to heat. The imager had an advanced optical sub-assembly that
transferred the X-ray generated digital image into minute and gradual etchings on the
coated side of the film. Prior to the invention of digital photography systems, regular
photographic film was used because of its sensitivity to X-rays. Once exposed to Xrays, the photographic film would be “developed” with chemicals to reveal the X-ray
generated image. The etching process used a focused laser to execute the digital
image transfer on to the coating on the film. In very simple terms, the entire process
started with an X-ray generating machine, typically at a hospital or doctor’s office,
generating X-rays, a form of energy. This energy, controlled and focused, passed
through the body; and with an energy detector capturing the passed energy, a digital
picture is generated and stored. X-rays are invisible but can be detected with a special
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sensor. At this point, the image is sent to a computer monitor for viewing, or sent to an
imager for printing on film. Inside the imager, a heated rubber coated drum touched the
film activating the chemical coating and the heat “developed” the image.
(2) Changes due to digital
The X-ray film central to the imager’s design and function was analog technology.
Analog refers to the film’s characteristic of rendering the image using physical features.
The film exists as a real item expressed in a hard physical format, in other words it is an
image on celluloid, not an image on a computer screen. The film is expensive to
produce and requires special storage conditions before use. The new technology is
digital, it mimics the change in photography technology from film pictures to digital
images. The new digital X-ray image is produced electronically and stored in electronic
mass media. In developed countries, it is transmitted electronically, much like any other
digital picture; X-ray images involve large amounts of digital data. The transmission of
the data requires considerable infrastructure because of the large size of the files. In
developed countries, the data is transmitted over the Internet and displayed on any high
definition TV screen anywhere in a healthcare facility. This is a very convenient new
technology. In many cases, the image is produced in one part of the world, then sent
electronically via the Internet, and diagnosed by health care professionals in another
part of the world facilitating a rapid diagnosis for the patient.
Put differently, X-ray film is old technology but for patients other than in first world
countries it is the only source of X-ray imagery. There are also portable machines that
can be carried anywhere and use film. The trend when using film is for a less expensive
tabletop model. The trend in the United States and in Europe is to use only digital. For
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example in many contemporary dentists’ offices, there is only the digital option. The use
of film boils down to the training the individual doctors receives: if they train with digital
equipment, they will choose digital; if they are trained using X-ray film, they will use film.
Presently, the majority of the doctors train in digital.
Majestytech was aware of the changes in photographic technology and elected to
get out of the medical imager business. It did the same with the camera film business
for general picture taking. Majestytech commercialized photography and profited from it
for nearly a century but its end began with the advent of digital photos. It effectively
missed out on the printers, software, file sharing, and third party applications,
developments that occurred in the field during the 20th Century. Since the late 1980s,
Majestytech tried to expand into pharmaceuticals, memory chips, healthcare imaging,
document management, and many other fields, but the magic never returned. The
photographic technological advances from analog processes to digital processes
changed X-ray imaging and processing. In advanced countries, most X-ray generated
images are no longer printed. They are digitally transmitted and viewed on a computer
screens. In regions of the world where a high capacity digital infrastructure is not
available, images on film are still used but the demand for X-ray images printed on film
is diminishing.
Similarly, the photographic technology changes from analog to digital were
revolutionary. The large photographic film companies did not adapt well to the change.
They were slow to realize that the images that were stored on negatives of photographic
film and transferred to photographic paper to be shared with friends and family, were
now being stored in electronic media. Photographic negatives and paper were no longer
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needed to store, display or share the images. The same change from analog to digital
affected the X-ray imagers, and the ubiquitous X-ray imager, large and small, was
replaced by the computer screen, and large digital memory storage devices.
The FDA classified the imagers that we built as Class II medical devices. We
were required to follow the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP) guidelines,
and each device had an extensive record commonly referred as the DHR (Device
History Record). This record included a history of every component, and process used
to build, test, and release the device. In addition, our device also carried the
Underwriter’s Laboratory (UL) approval. UL is an organization that tests and certifies
compliance to numerous standards such as electrical safety, radiation and
electromagnetic safety, and fire safety, and others. It is tough to get and maintain, and a
cherished distinction.
(3) Supplier quality engineer
Let me explain what I mean by supplier quality engineer. As mentioned before, the
quality engineering specialization involves the additional education and experience in
the skills related to quality. Generally, quality in manufacturing is looked at from two
points of view. The first is quality control, which means there is a focus on confirming,
through testing, or other means, that any product or component meets the design
conditions. This means for example, taking a length measurement to confirm a
characteristic. This is a passive or after the fact activity. The other point of view is
quality assurance, which are the active and preventive activities done to conform to
requirements and mostly focused on pre-validations and process control. All performed
to ensure conformance to the established customer requirements.
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In medical device manufacturing, quality engineering also involves the quality
system. Information about the quality system is included in Chapter 1. The FDA requires
the use of a quality system because a product’s quality depends very much on a holistic
approach; the FDA realizes that it is not sufficient to look only at manufacturing since
many other departments and many other functional groups contribute to the quality of
the product. Some of the other departments are the employee-training department,
human resources, supply chain, testing engineering and the facilities. This holistic
approach must be established and documented so that the manufacturer can
demonstrate and prove that all medical devices have been manufactured under this
quality system.
My role as quality engineer was further specialized and focused to work with the
over 200 suppliers that made the parts and components for the X-ray imager produced
by Majestytech. I worked hand in hand, every day, with the suppliers to help them
produce the quality products that we needed delivered on an uninterrupted basis. Some
of the suppliers were in the local area, others somewhere within the United States, and
many at international locations. My responsibility was to assist them in resolving any
technical issues they had and to make sure that we had the good parts that we needed
for assembly. I also maintained, as part of the quality system, a complete system for
tracking problems, and worked with suppliers on a daily basis giving them feedback on
the quality problems that arose. The imager had over 800 components and there were
always some problems. Some were minor, some were showstoppers, and the supplier
quality engineers always stepped in to help both Majestytech and the suppliers to insure
that the components were usable and arrived on time. Supplier quality engineers served
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as the principal links between the assembly facility and the supplier, and were required
to stay in constant contact with the suppliers. I worked for Majestytech but I was also a
strong advocate for our suppliers. This meant that I helped the suppliers in their
communications with the different groups at Majestytech. For example, I would help a
supplier with requests for model drawings or assist them in getting specification
changes approved by the engineering group, and I would expedite supplier requests
when they needed quality system documents.
(4) Majestytech imager assembly line
My position at Majestytech did not last long because the business was sold to
Desperamed. However, the time that I spent at Majestytech in the early months felt
good. The production processes at Majestytech were the best organized I had ever
been involved with. The product was assembled at seven in-line stations with a final
inspection in a separate room.
The seven assembly stations were located along a long straight wall well over 500
feet long and the imager being assembled, mounted on a wheeled base, would be
moved from station to station. The time between stations had been calculated to allow a
steady but comfortable pace for the operators to complete the assembly of their
assigned portion of the components.
All of the workers and engineers that participated in the assembly operated like a
symphonic orchestra. There were seven principal assemblers at each one of the
stations; trainers monitored their actions from close or afar. The ancillary stations had
between them dozens that would prepare the sub-assemblies to be fed to the different
stations and bolted to the imager. Another dozen material handlers would also be
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moving about delivering fresh new parts for the next assembly. The engineers would be
walking around evaluating all of the issues that would come up from the hundreds of
parts involved.
For clarity, below a graphic representation of the layout of the imager assembly
line at Majestytech.
Figure 6. Sketch of the imager assembly line
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Sometimes I would stand to the right of Station 1 and look down the line and in
awe admire the pure and smoothly acting orchestration as the assembly process took
place. It was exiting to watch; it was artistry happening. I was able to do this on a few
occasions and was always mesmerized by the artistry demonstrated by the workers. It
was fun to watch as every few minutes an imager would be moved out to final
inspection, and a new shiny empty chassis would be wheeled into Station 1. It was an
elegant sight, one that a trained observer could appreciate.
From the left side of the line the ancillary stations would be preparing the
subassemblies or readying the boards full of the small components: nuts, bolts, springs,
grommets, wires, and assembly tools. Each assembler followed a list of instructions, as
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if reading music from a sheet, turning the imager clockwise then counter-clockwise to
suit their individual needs. The lefties went one way the righties another. There was
hardly any talk, no music earphones, no outside distractions because everyone was
paying attention to their instructions and work. The cadence came from the large screen
up on the wall to the right of Station 1; everyone paid attention to the time as it wound
down towards the next rotation; readying the new imager for the next station.
My spot to stand, watch and listen was in between some of the larger carts full of
components for the next builds. I learned that watching the line was distracted me from
all that happened around me, and it was best to stay out of the way of the material
handlers. The handlers were constantly moving in carts full of parts for the line, and
moving out empty carts to the loading dock to go back to the warehouse building for
more new parts. The line constantly hummed softly, and every few seconds the hand
tools whining pitch would be heard as components were attached to the chassis. There
was no hammering because the parts had very tight tolerances to assure their mating
together. “Thor” a big orange-colored hammer was available but it was never used. The
noise of a hammer would have been too off-key, strident and inappropriate.
In the afternoons before quitting time a few minutes were set aside for cleaning
and tidying up. On the line they called it 5S time. The five S is a Lean manufacturing
term referring to sorting, straightening, sweeping, standardizing, and sustaining. It was
mostly sweeping and straightening but it also included draping plastic sheets over the
unfinished imagers to avoid dust on the machines from overnight or weekend.
After the 5S time all production workers, including material handlers met for about
5 minutes to review the day’s issues. Each of the station’s trainers and leads would
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comment on the day’s issues. By then everyone was usually tired and ready to go home
but occasionally excellent comments and suggestions would be mentioned. The
engineers seldom attended this short informal gathering and the first few times that I
was there some of the workers showed uneasiness about by presence.
After a while, because I was there almost every day, they got used to me being
there. I found that being there was useful because I could get a head start on solving
any parts problems that arose. The production line started at 6:00 AM, and the workers
left at 2:30 PM; the engineers started at 6:00 AM and we usually left between 3:00 to
3:30 PM. If I learned about a problem during afternoon meeting, there was enough time
to notify the appropriate supplier and to initiate a corrective action before the start of the
next day. This arrangement worked out well and there were a few times that overnight
shipments, arriving by 9:00AM the next day, would save us from longer production
delays the next day due to shortages or parts problems. I did not mind doing this and I
would notify any of the other engineers of issues or concerns in their areas that came
out of the afternoon meeting. I felt strongly that the hands-on approach worked out best
for supporting the production line. My duties, that included calls to suppliers and
spending time on the computer with emails and reports, I completed during the
mornings when the line usually ran best.
B. From elegance to corner cutting
There were gradual changes to my professional practice at Majestytech. I started
to become aware of a recurring and escalating feeling that my professional engineering
ethical comfort zone was eroding. Frequently, the resolution of issues demanded by
management could only be done by lowering my defenses against unprofessional or
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unethical behavior. In other words, I had to agree with the directives or points of view of
management even when I was not entirely sure I wanted to do that, or had not had
enough time to think about it or consult with the other engineers. In most cases, I found
the management directives to be unethical and this was because of the immense
pressure on the plant to produce the profits expected.
In the beginning, there were small things, such as management’s insistence that
we had to shift the costs of damaged parts to the suppliers even though the damage
had been caused by a Majestytech worker’s negligence. For a two-week period, I
insisted on collecting all of the parts for the junk heap intent on adding up the value and
really looking at the cost as a lump sum instead of piecemeal. The parts collected were
displayed on a few tables. To get workers interested and for fun, I was able to get the
plant manager’s approval that the person with the closest estimated guess of the total
value would be awarded a half-day off with pay. Everyone came around to view the
collection of junk parts as had been my purpose all along. The total amount was about
$3,000 or about $1500 per week, not a large amount but one that in all fairness was due
to Majestytech and not the suppliers. It was fun to do and I am sorry to say changed
nothing.
Another small incident was overlooking the quality system required supplier
periodic audits. According to an internal procedure, we were required to conduct
supplier quality audits at specified intervals. A shorter timeframe was required for high
volume suppliers and longer timeframes for lower volume suppliers. The audits seemed
to be stopped by a lack of a Majestytech current approved procedure because the staff
persons responsible for approval had been dismissed or left. It seemed to me that no
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one really cared that we were not following our own quality system. There were many
other incidents besides the ones I have mentioned.
Numerous employees left or were dismissed without being replaced and their
assigned tasks were ignored and this seriously affected our operations. It was more
than a lack of resources; it was a lack of leadership. As the moment of transfer from
Majestytech to Desperamed approached, this worsened and for me these were difficult
times. Pride in the job, pride in the profession; the high road we assumed we traveled
because we were making medical devices was becoming a farce.
When we became Desperamed, we lost our affiliation with a firm that although in
decline still had some pride left and some responsible leadership. This changed after
the Desperamed takeover and it really worsened when we went over to Pouvremed. All
this time unprofessional behavior was tolerated and often demanded. I felt constantly
assailed and my defenses against unethical behavior were weakening. The pressure to
act unethically was relentless, which I showed in the noisy fan incident. Determining the
root cause of the noisy fans was a fun activity, but one prompted by my ethical concern
of attributing fault to a supplier without adequate proof. I often wondered if it would have
been more appropriate to get employment elsewhere, yet an employment search is
difficult and prospective employers dislike job seekers that frequently change jobs.
C. An increasing intolerable situation
When I started to work with Majestytech, there was already talking about
Majestytech's intention of selling the business. This was openly discussed with all of the
employees, especially the many very long-term employees, many with over 15 years
previously with Inventorz Co., and later with Majestytech. There were few secretive
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meetings at Majestytech. This was not the case later with Desperamed or Pouvremed
because senior managers repeatedly lied or exaggerated the situation.
(1) The castings incident
At Pouvremed, it was worse, I had a few incidents where management decided to
withhold information or deceive some suppliers. I recall one particular case involving a
supplier in out East that produced high precision castings that were used in the optics
subassembly of the imager. The Majestytech purchasing group had selected the
supplier years earlier. The castings were made of aluminum, and subsequent
operations included precision machining, cleaning, plating, and finally painting. Painting
was done at a local metro area company. The castings were done at one company and
the machining at a different company. Desperamed management was of the opinion
that the castings were too expensive, and that they took too long to get prepared. On
many occasions, delivery and cost issues were discussed. I dealt with the suppliers
almost on a daily basis because of the importance and complexity of the parts, and we
had a good working relationship and trusted each other because it was a way of
guaranteeing our mutual success. I dealt with the technical, engineering, and
management representatives of the companies involved in producing the finished
castings, and we often discussed the need for improving the delivery times and for
reducing cost. They reported it was counterproductive that Desperamed corporate
purchasing was tenaciously insisting on the need for cost reductions disregarding the
complexity of the parts. Additionally, they mentioned that Desperamed was not willing to
give them a long- term commitment to purchasing the parts that would have allowed the
suppliers to commit to the substantial capital investments needed. Desperamed was
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unwilling to discuss their longer-term business plans, or to provide them with longerterm contracts that would have given these companies confirmation of Desperamed’s
commitment. These companies knew of the very shaky financial situation that
surrounded Desperamed and Pouvremed.
One day by my boss at Pouvremed told me that I had to participate in a team that
had been tasked with finding a lower cost supplier for the castings. I asked my boss
about the open secret revolving about the uncertain the future of our business with
Desperamed. Especially since only a few weeks before we had seen 15% of our
workforce escorted to the door in a surprise layoff. I also mentioned that the suppliers
had submitted many requests to discuss terms favorable to all parties, suppliers,
Desperamed and Pouvremed, and these had never happened. My boss told me that I
needed to travel to Canada to work with a proposed new supplier for the castings and
machining all under one roof. I do not remember exactly what happened, but I did not
want to go, because it would have entailed an immense amount of work.
I had an initial conversation with the engineering group that ran the company in
Canada, and I felt that from an engineering standpoint, and from a quality standpoint,
that this company was not at the same proficiency level or technical competence of the
company out East. I explained this in a series of memos and got no response. I was
unable to convince Desperamed to consider implementing basic of quality initiatives
during the new supplier evaluation process. These simple quality initiatives would have
given us a higher degree of assurance that the components from the new supplier
would work the first time, every time. What I was doing was trying to eliminate
preemptively many of the problems that we had gone through in the past. I knew that
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without many of the quality checks and processes, we would simply repeat the same
past mistakes. Desperamed decided to proceed without any of my recommendations,
and refused to have any discussions with the existing suppliers; their intention was to
move the business regardless. Desperamed was also unwilling to discuss
improvements with the existing suppliers to give them an opportunity for improving
delivery and cost. I felt this was unethical and unfriendly, and I did not feel at all
comfortable with this way of conducting business because the out East supplier had
been very good supplier for years, and they deserved better than what they got. I
wanted to distance myself from the project because it was fraught with errors and
headed towards disaster.
At the time I started at Pouvremed, there was very little medical device
manufacturing experience in the organization. They initially hired outside consultants to
establish the barest minimum in quality systems. Therefore, I had to do the quality
engineering, quality control, quality assurance, supplier coordination plus the quality
systems work related to medical devices. It became my responsibility to ensure
compliance to the product requirements but also compliance to the regulatory
requirements. Of course, the FDA registration meant maintaining the quality system.
During this time, Desperamed kept a small engineering design team that had to work
together with the future suppliers in China, and rapidly drive towards reducing product
costs. Desperamed’s goal was to reduce product cost to compete in the low cost market
and this cost reduction goal was very much in conflict with maintaining, even the barest
minimum quality system. It became my responsibility at Pouvremed to monitor the ongoing work to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
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(2) The lack of validation incident
An incident at Desperamed put me in a very difficult situation. Desperamed had
made plans to release a new low cost higher resolution printer imager, model C2009.
Most of the selected suppliers were from China to ensure low cost. However, they forgot
that the Pouvremed quality system had to be followed because it was a separate
company although owned by the same conglomerate. Desperamed wanted to hide its
improper actions behind the Pouvremed system, and decided to go without proper
validation for suppliers, parts, and components from China. Desperamed justified their
violation of the CGMPs on the fact that the model C2009 machine was 90% similar to
the previous B2009 model machine.
Desperamed design engineers often mentioned that there were few supplier
problems with the B2009 model parts, and that since there was a 90% similarity with the
previous model that this meant a smooth product release. This was incorrect because
the supplier quality responsibility had been transferred to Pouvremed and the
Desperamed design engineers were no longer “in the loop” of information for the supply
chain quality issues. I was surprised when I heard the Desperamed managers say there
were “few supplier problems” with the B2009 model parts because that was the
responsibility of the Pouvremed supplier quality engineers. The fact was we had
problem after problem with the B2009 that created frequent production line stoppages.
Conveniently, at the time, Desperamed managers blamed Pouvremed for the
stoppages, insinuating operations issues at Pouvremed. Desperamed blamed the
operators, inspectors, engineers, and everyone else at Pouvremed forgetting the fact
that we had been Desperamed’s employees just a few months earlier.
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Even before moving to Pouvremed we had not been close to the Desperamed
design engineers; they were too busy and we resented that they looked down on
manufacturing. A further aggravation was our now further physical separation because
they were in another city. In addition, to make it worse, manufacturing was at a
separate company with a separate business system and quality system.
Only 80 components were different between the B2009 and the C2009 models,
and I had determined that only 40 of those needed a substantial validation prior to the
launch of the C2009 product. Some items related to packaging, boxes, and cosmetics
would be OK with a cursory inspection. Others that dealt with the optics, film handling,
and processing of the digital signal needed a rigorous validation.
I have experienced this before, and I knew that only a rigorous validation saves us
from great future grief. It is the concept of “you pay me now or you will pay me much
more later.” I felt that management was ignoring such an easy maxim in favor of
expediency. The issue of course, put me in a controversial position. I often reflected on
my decisions and behavior because if management, who had the bottom line
responsibility, chose to lose money, to throw it away on a shoddy product, why should I
have cared? Desperamed insisted that it was Pouvremed’s responsibility to complete
the validation of those components.
Since we were having the problems with both model B2009 and model C2009
models, I asked the Regulatory Affairs manager at Desperamed about the 510k
submission for model C2009. The 510k submission is the name of the paperwork
submitted to get approval from the FDA for the new imager, model C2009. She told me
that Desperamed had elected to submit a new 510k for model C2009; she also told me
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that model B2009 had not been submitted via a 510k, but information about its launch
had been included in the annual letter sent to the FDA. I asked her about the
inconsistencies in the regulatory strategies and she responded that she was following
orders.
I wondered what information about the model C2009 imager’s validation and
verification Desperamed would submit to the FDA to get approval. By then, it was
obvious to me that bogus information would be submitted because Desperamed was
not planning to do the validation, and their plan was to hide behind Pouvremed, and
blame Pouvremed if the FDA found out. I felt it was just a matter of time before the FDA
found out about the lack of a proper validation.
I mentioned this lack validation plan or data to Pouvremed’s management, and I
said that if Pouvremed had to do the work that Desperamed had failed to do, it would
take additional resources and time. I knew we had neither. I knew that Desperamed did
not plan to have their engineers do the work because earlier I had talked to one of my
engineer friends at Desperamed and to my complete surprise, he told me there was no
data nor any plans to get data. I had called my friend to get his help in expediting my
request for a validation plan and copies of any available validation data. I wanted to get
the information to put it in the product file as spelled out in the Pouvremed quality
system. He told me there had been no validation done on the 40 parts (and suppliers) I
wanted information on, and in addition that they had no plans to get it done. He said the
Desperamed plan was to order the parts using the design prints, and information
gathered from the handful of prototype parts used to build the “prototype” machines.
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A handful of parts meant three or four parts, and in some cases, it was one
prototype part. It is not an acceptable CGMP practice to make final product release
decisions based on prototype parts because of the difference between a prototype part
and a production part. Prototype parts are made, most of the time, by hand to a designstage print, and this design print and part change a high percentage of the time before
the model is released for production. In addition, usually there is a high degree of
variation in prototype parts; in many cases, the production parts vary greatly from the
prototype parts because of the automation used to produce the lower cost production
parts.
At the time, I was unaware that the internal Pouvremed paperwork had started
circulating for approval to get the new model C2009 imager parts on order, and the
supplier quality engineer’s signature was one of the last ones needed for completing the
part ordering and purchasing process. This was not something I had done at
Majestytech or Desperamed because the design engineering teams at Majestytech and
Desperamed had an SQE in their team. However, at Pouvremed, it was one of the extra
duties that had fallen on my lap. The paperwork came to me for review and approval,
and I refused to approve it because there was no validation plan, no validation had been
done, and no data was available. In other words, there was no record to prove that the
Pouvremed quality system requirements had been met. My approval and signature on
the purchasing documents was my certification, as the responsible SQE, that the quality
system requirements had been met.
Let me add that I have no delusions of grandeur; I know I am not the most
important cog in the wheel, but I am not insignificant. When a document comes to me

Chapter 3
95
for approval it has to meet my personal standards for approval; I have to stand by the
information in the document before I approve it because when I approve it, it is the
same as if I had done the work myself. That is what approval means to me; it bears my
signature, and I am responsible for what it is that I am approving, and the final word is
mine. Approval is different from review because if I am asked to review the rigor is less.
In a review, I am asked to emit an opinion on what was presented, and the final word is
someone else’s responsibility.
Desperamed wanted to collect the data after the fact; which in some cases is
allowed by the FDA if it is shown there is a genuine oversight. This was not the case
here. Desperamed wanted a speedier and low cost option, and Pouvremed was being
set up as a willing but unaware accomplice. Most of the people that worked with the
Desperamed products at Pouvremed did not have enough experience or familiarity with
quality systems and regulations to understand what they were doing, but I did.
When word got out that I had refused to approve the purchasing paperwork, many
of my co-workers were mad at me for making their work more difficult and for delaying
the project. Winston and I were called to a meeting with the two cognizant directors
(Otto from operations and Rufus from supply chain) to explain the refusal. Winston, I
knew was not that familiar with FDA regulations and I told the two directors that Winston
had not been involved in my decision. In fact, Winston had been on vacation until the
day before the meeting. I said that if Winston was willing to sign he could, and the
paperwork would proceed, but Winston also refused, and we reached an impasse. The
directors were very unhappy. I mentioned that to approve without validation was a
violation of the quality system and most importantly an ethical violation. At this point
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Otto, who was the designated management representative (an FDA term), jumped up
out of his chair.
In very strong terms, he said that I was exaggerating. I replied that as the only
licensed professional engineer in the facility, no one else in the organization was in the
perilous situation of having to appear in front of the State Board of Professional Ethics
to respond to unethical behavior. It would have been an ethical violation to approve
such an inchoate plan and unethical engineers sometimes lose their license for
unprofessional behavior. I offered him the choice that I would sign as a “reviewer” not
approver. He could then take the responsibility and approve (sign) the paperwork
himself. That option was not selected. If it had, I would have “blown the whistle” by
paying the FDA a visit.
After the meeting, Winston and I agreed we had used up “a lot of lives”, thinking of
course of cats that are known to have multiple lives. I knew after we left the meeting that
I had to figure out a way to break the deadlock because we did not want Desperamed,
our customer, to suffer. I had accepted the position at Pouvremed with my eyes open
and well aware of the lousy situation surrounding us. I knew that my employer was not
very good, but I had no idea that Desperamed and Pouvremed were going to turn out
that unscrupulous.
We needed to find a way to around the validation issue to satisfy the customer and
the regulatory requirements. I thought about this for a while and I, came up with a list of
the requirements that would have been my responsibility as an SQE/QE if I had been
with the engineering development team. I had done that job with other companies, and
this made me familiar with the duties of a quality engineer in a product development
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team. I created a list of a dozen items that needed to be completed and these twelve
requirements were incorporated into all of the purchase orders for the 40 parts (and
suppliers) for model C2009 laser imager.
I met with all of the buyers and instructed them to incorporate the requirements into
the purchase orders. The validation process became part of the business contract, the
only sure way, available to me, to get the suppliers to comply, and they would not be
paid unless they complied. Most suppliers were good suppliers, and the validation work
would have been done as part of their own internal quality system. Pouvremed would
benefit by getting copies of the internal supplier generated data to meet the product
validation requirements. This is a common practice when there is a good relationship
with the suppliers that have their own robust internal quality systems. Yet, there is never
any substitute for a company to do their own validation to keep everyone honest; after
all, it is clearly stated in the regulation that the manufacturer is always ultimately
responsible.
We contacted all of the suppliers and explained to them what we were doing and
most them agreed to help. I had warned our management at Pouvremed that this
scheme would cost more because it shifted some of the responsibility to the suppliers.
Most of the suppliers indeed re-quoted their prices after receiving the purchase orders
and we ended paying more for the parts. This entire process took a lot of work and
about three months, and it did not go well with the management teams at Pouvremed or
Desperamed.
All domestic and international suppliers responded within the three months, and we
started to get the parts and the data, and the other necessary documentation. This gave
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us the opportunity to complete a simple validation, for which I wrote the plan, something
we should have gotten from Desperamed. All this time, every day I entered the building
where I worked, I felt I had a bulls-eye painted on my back, and that someone would be
aiming to finish me off.
This was the solution that I came up with. It was not a perfect solution, nor was it
nearly as robust a solution as I would have liked but it was as “good as I was going to
get”, in other words “good enough”.. We just got the barest of minimums for data as
required by our quality system and I felt very uncomfortable operating in this manner
because quality in medical devices needs to be multi-layer and redundant to account for
unforeseen incidents.
I acted in this manner because it was the only way to stay true to myself. However,
this forced me to see the situation in a way that I did not know what further steps to
take, or to know if I could do this role anymore. All because I did not understand exactly
what was happening and felt I had committed career suicide…
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Chapter 4
THE RISE AND FALL OF AN X-RAY IMAGER
In this chapter, I present details of the effects of the product life cycle on
engineers and firms. It covers the manufacturing years of an X-ray imager at Inventorz,
Co., and in detail the final years at Majestytech Co., Desperamed Co., and Pouvremed
Co. In a sense, a terminal disease infected the product that was the imager; as noted in
the previous chapter, a technology that I loved. The “pathogens” were unfettered
capitalism, globalization, and technology. The fate of the imager had been cast years
before my involvement with it started and I do not pine for it per se, after all, it was just
mostly metal and plastic. However, its history is a bit tragic to me. Moreover, its history
was closely connected to my engineer colleagues.

Section 1: The Product Life Cycle Across Four Firms
A. Introduction
The next table presents the imager manufacturing firms involved. It will be useful
to the reader for keeping track as the product was sold or transferred.
Table 5. Sequence of Firms Making the X-ray Imager

Name of the Firm
Inventorz (originator)
Majestytech
Desperamed
Pouvremed

Firms involved:
Year of Activity (approx.)
mid 1980s through 1996
1996 through 2007
formed in 2008
2009-2010, out of business in Mid-West State in 2010

My position was that of supplier quality engineer, and my principal responsibility
was to ensure an uninterrupted stream of parts and components for the assembly of a
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laser imager printer for processing X-ray film. I had the opportunity to witness first hand
the final demise of one of the finest manufacturing teams in the world. The end was
ugly, and portends the future of many more proud organizations. This chapter
documents what occurred in the words of some of the engineers who experienced it. It
includes the personal account of an engineer who personally experienced virtually all
the imager life cycle stages as depicted in Figure 7.
Krajewski, as covered in Chapter 1, shows that every product has a life cycle with
stages that start with development, then launch and ramp up, then maturity, and finally
a decline towards end of life. Krajewski presented a graph showing that revenue is
initially negative during development due to the lack of sales, and after launch, if the
product becomes successful, revenue increases until maturity where it peaks and starts
to decline as competitors enter the market, and reaches end-of-life as new technologies
appear.
I created Figure 7, it is an original chart based on a lookalike of the Krajewski
graph. It is a meta-depiction, where I have superimposed on the imager’s product life
cycle details of three components within the firms: engineering, corporate culture and
regulatory compliance. The three components give us a picture of the shape or manner
of work at those firms during the different stages of the imager’s product life cycle.
Figure 7 also shows the relationship of time and revenue from the time of development
at Inventorz until the closing of the Pouvremed facility.
Included in Figure 7, and not discussed by Krajewski, is the correlation between
the quality of the work conditions for the engineers within the firms and the imager’s life
cycle stages. At the start, engineers enjoyed high morale and recognition, in a “fun”
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work atmosphere. As the product matured, engineers experienced changes as they
were marginalized as mere cogs to machines and in the end became estranged from
their work and passed control of the labor process to management.
Figure 7. Chart of Imager Product Life Cycle (wide-view depiction)
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In addition, shown in Figure 7 is how corporate culture evolved for the worse along
with the profits. Firms were forced by the effects of unfettered capitalism to cut costs
relentlessly, and we saw the firms turn their backs on the same proud workforce that
produced their huge profits.
Finally, yet importantly, Figure 7 shows how at least in the firms analyzed effective
quality systems that meet or exceed the regulatory intent of providing patients safe and
effective devices is a goal that was met. However, later when competition intensified
and profits leaned, firms become all too ready to “race to the bottom” on safety. In other
words, regulatory compliance became secondary to profit.
If Figure 7 depicts the overall life cycle of the imager as it continued through
various owners, Figure 8 focuses on its first period.
B. The Inventorz era
The imager’s life started in the 1980s at Inventorz Co. I was not there at the time
but I do have an impression about how it was at Inventorz from Winston who was there
during the development of the imager printer.
Back in the 1980s, when I started with the development of the imager, it was fun
working at Inventorz. The engineers had the time and resources to do their work,
and the company recognized and appreciated our efforts. (Winston, Personal
Interview, 2010).
Figure 8 is concentrated on the early product life stage during which Inventorz
developed, launched and ramped up sales of the imager. During the initial stage from
the mid 1980s until the mid 1990s, the engineers were respected and listened to, and
were allowed the professional freedom to do their work. Inventorz made work fun and
morale was high.
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Figure 8. Inventorz Imager Life Cycle Stage (individual view)

As covered by Peters and Waterman, companies successful at innovation develop
a tolerance for the high number of failures, and allow some radical decentralization and
messiness in order to breed the entrepreneurial spirit represented by their “skunk
works”.
We would try out some things and wondered if they would work. We did many
different trials to try to get it right; we certainly missed getting it right lot’s of times
(Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
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These “skunk works” groups often operate within gaps or “leaks” in the firm’s
systems to get things done, and are notoriously pragmatic. The groups tend to find
simple common sense solutions to product problems.
I pressed Winston to tell me about the company (Inventorz) culture at that time
and he added:
It seemed that sometimes it would take us months-- sometimes 18 months-- to
complete portions of the design and parts that we were going to use. No one was
after us because of the basic rule of management.
I will read it to you from my notes so that you understand. “As our business grows,
it becomes increasingly necessary to delegate responsibility and encourage men
and women to exercise their initiative. This requires considerable tolerance. Those
men and women, to whom we delegate authority and responsibility, if they are
good people, are going to want to do their jobs in their own way. Mistakes will be
made. But if a person is essentially right, the mistakes he or she makes are not
serious in the long run as the mistakes management will make if it undertakes to
tell those in authority exactly how they must do their jobs. Management that is
destructively critical when mistakes are made kills initiative. And, it’s essential that
we have as many people with initiative if we are to continue to grow.” This is how
we operated in those days (Winston, Personal interview, 2010).

Inventorz Co. originated the imager and its dry process and for many years was
an industry leader in the X-ray imager business. However, its business model was
based on “early entry and early exit”. As explained by Krajewski, firms know that sales
will decline if they periodically fail to introduce new products. This is because sales and
profits from existing products decrease with time. In addition, innovative firms such as
Inventorz, favor a market strategy where they enter the market with a cutting edge
product and gain rapid competitive advantage. However, once the product reaches
maturity and profits peak, they drop it. In this strategy, the firm maintains a flexible
production system adaptable to introducing and switching to new products. As the
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technology changed, the market also started changing and Inventorz sold the business
and moved on.
Inventorz presently continues to be recognized as leader in innovation, albeit not
with X-ray imagers. It is especially important to go back to the origins of the imager to
explain Inventorz corporate culture because organizationally the early stages of the
imager show very different approaches to handling quality and engineering than was
true of its later years.
I covered in Chapter 1 that firms set up organizational structures to coordinate
their various functions and allow for idea sharing, workflow control, and resources
management. (Hitt, 1999; Krajewski, 1996). Invertorz was broadly organized into two
principal groups: operations and support. The operations group was the stronger of the
two and enjoyed good backing and communication with the senior managers. Engineers
were well regarded and recognized for their innovations, and they were provided with
excellent resources to do their jobs. The quality system was strong and well supported
by the senior managers. The following table shows a chart of the organization and I
present it to explain in broad terms the different corporate roles.
Table 6. Corporate Organization (typical)

President or CEO, and Senior Managers
Operations
Support
Development
Finance
Engineering
Human Resources
Quality and Regulatory
Supply Chain (purchasing)
Production
Marketing (product service, support)

In Table 6, I placed the principal functions into two groups: operations and support.
In the operations group I placed development, engineering, quality and regulatory, and
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production because this is what is typically found in manufacturing firms. This
arrangement puts the functions responsible for designing and making the product
together. In the support group, I placed finance, human resources, supply chain, and
marketing. Again, this is what is typically found in industry, and joins those functions not
directly hands-on in making the product.
C. The Majestytech era
The Majestytech operation period of the imager (late nineties to 2007), for the most
part ran well prior to 2005. When Majestytech first got involved in the imager, business
was good but by 2005 it started to decrease as the imager aged. The imager business
started to fade fast, and then rapidly declined by 2007.
The Majestytech organization when I started to work there had a typical
hierarchical structure. There was a site general manager with direct reports in the
principal disciplines. Figure 9 shows the Majestytech organization chart, which at the
time struck me as a bit strange.
Figure 9. Majestytech Organization Chart
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Majestytech used three buildings (see table 7), Imager assembly, a warehouse
nearby, and another facility that housed administration, engineering, development, and
a testing laboratory. The buildings were not within walking distance and we had to ride
in a car to get from one building to the other.
The assembly plant had a typical organization where the plant manager had direct
reports in quality, production, finance and regulatory. The warehouse had a supply
chain manager, and the administrative building had a site general manager, with direct
reports in engineering, development, and regulatory.
Table 7. Majestytech Buildings
Building 1
Assembly Plant
• Production

Building 2
Warehouse
• Supply Chain
• Goods storage

Building 3
Administration
• Engineering
• Development
• Regulatory & Lab.

It struck me as odd when I started to work at Majestytech that there was a physical
separation of the engineering teams within the organization. The site engineering
manager had engineers scattered throughout with what seemed little central control or
direction. There were quality engineers at all three buildings but without central
coordination. This was different from what I had experienced before because usually the
QEs are involved in the quality system under centralized control.
As shown in Figure 10, Majestytech held control of the imager during the period
that profits and volumes had peaked and were starting to decline. The decline brought
with it changes to the organization and the working conditions of the engineers.
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Figure 10. Majestytech Imager Life Cycle Stage (individual view)
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Winston’s work at Majestytech included an important role as one of the original
engineers in the imager project. Winston had a history of over 20 years in the
development, manufacturing, and supplier quality engineering of the imager. His
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involvement with the imager started during its development while working at Inventorz
Co. A list of firms involved in making the imager is shown in Table 5, Sequence of Firms
Making the X-ray Imager on page 104. Later he transitioned to Majestytech,
Desperamed, and Pouvremed as the manufacturing of the imager moved.
When I started to work at Majestytech, the organization in the Mid-West had gone
through workforce reductions, lay-offs, and retirements. Most of the experienced
engineers and scientists were no longer there.
I (Yoshi) worked from 2000 to 2005 and I was laid off along with a number of
other people when production stopped for my two products. One went to China
and the other became obsolete when it reached end-of-life. They called me back
18 months later as the manufacturing engineer for a newer model. (Yoshi,
Personal interview, 2010)
Yoshi’s machine “end-of-life” comment refers to the phasing out of a model as new
models enter the market. This occurred frequently and it was an opportunity to
incorporate new technologies and features into the newer machine models.
Powerful forces attacked Majestytech, (1) maturity of their product, (2) digital
technology, and (3) globalization. The result for the defeated Majestytech was ugly and
terminal; there would be no escaping the mortal blows from those adversaries.
Majestytech was hierarchically organized as shown inTable 6, Corporate
Organization on page 110. Yet very different from Inventorz because it was the Support
Group that exerted more influence within the organization.
Within Majestytech, the Support Group (as shown in Table 6 Corporate
Organization, page 110) carried more importance and that was different from other
organizations where I had worked. This meant that at the manufacturing plant level
decisions were dominated by the Support Group. The balance of power within the
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organization was shifted to Support and away from Operations. This was most evident
in the Majestytech Support Group exigency that suppliers reduce their prices by ten
percent every year regardless. An unreasonable and pernicious directive that resulted in
constant quality issues, and the ridiculous goal of halving prices in about seven years.
Within industrialized firms, labor has been recognized since Adam Smith wrote The
Wealth of Nations, as the source of value within industry (Smith, 1994). The
manufacturing firms I had been involved with prior to Majestytech operated under the
maxim that “it is manufacturing that makes the money” and support people get to spend
it. It is part of an ideology that manufacturing gets the resources it needs before the
others. This was not the case at Majestytech. I believe the shift in power had not been a
random decision; it was the outcome of the push for lower costs forced by the market
and technology.
Good profits meant that plenty of resources were available before the product life
cycle peaked (see Figure 7). However after the competition toughened, within
Majestytech, the engineers and Engineering would not have available to them the
resources and importance they had under Inventorz. In very simple terms, quality took a
second place to cost.
From my standpoint, a lot of it was lawyers and business people making decisions
and they did not consult the engineers or they did not listen. I pointed out some
things but it did no good (Sabrina, Personal interview, 2009).
“Just-in-Time” philosophy drove our decisions and in my opinion put us in a corner
that I did not like. The plant manager wanted to keep the line going and so does
the design engineer but our perspectives were different (Archie, Personal
Interview, 2010).
The “Just-in-Time” that Archie mention was one of the major cost-cutting initiatives
that Majestytech had embraced for their manufacturing. It refers to a process of
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operating with very low inventories, and receiving parts and components just before
being needed. Under this cost cutting business initiative, inventory costs are lower
because the parts and components stay at the supplier, and are not delivered until
shortly before use. Payment for the parts and components is of course also deferred
until after the material is used. Archie alludes to one of the downsides, which is that the
production line will stop from a lack of materials when issues arise with nonconforming
materials. Under this cost cutting initiative, it is important to have good and responsive
suppliers.
From the perspective of the Support Group (as shown in Table 6 Corporate
Organization), in charge of managing the costly inventory, “Just-in-Time” reduces cost
of goods something upon which the group is evaluated. Yet from the perspective of the
Operations Group, in charge of managing the cost of labor, slow downs or shut downs
would increase labor costs, something upon which the Operations group is evaluated.
Production of course usually has the greater number of people, and these labor costs
can rise quickly. Organizational effectiveness relies on a balanced management of
costs but not on capricious favoring of one group’s interests over another.
The engineers were right in the middle of the fight as Majestytech struggled under
constant pressure to lower costs. It is appropriate to recall Braverman here because he
had written that industrialization changes would expand the ugly effects of capitalism.
The engineers were no longer pursuing the quality of the product; they were forced to
pursue assuring continuation of the profit margins. The engineers were ignored and
forced to pursue management’s focus on profit instead of product quality and the safety
of the patient.
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Braverman also advised us against the fallacy of believing that engineers would
see a rise in their level of responsibility. Instead, we heard from Archie on how he felt
shackled by the cost cutting initiatives he had to obey because cost cutting was more
important than anything else was. The engineers were no longer doing engineering;
they were doing management’s bidding (Braverman, 1974).
For imagers, the digital imaging technological breakthrough was used principally to
pursue improvements in efficiency. This use of technology, as explained by Feenberg,
becomes a tool used by management in disempowering the workers, and facilitates
management’s grasping unqualified control of the labor process. Management’s control,
according to Feenberg, allows it to make independent decisions without regard to the
views and interests of the workers (Feenberg, 2002).
Majestytech had a very aggressive program for outsourcing parts from China by
the time I started working there. It involved a full-time staff of about a dozen engineers,
technicians, and buyers. The site engineering manager at the administration building
was in charge of the team, and the manufacturing plant was not involved in the project,
something that for me later proved beneficial.
On a few occasions we met with some of the engineers involved in the China
transfer project, and mostly because of curiosity, we inquired about the project. After
listening to their comments, I felt concern because it meant that in the future we would
be operating with major suppliers thousands of miles away.
Distance was not my only concern; there were language, culture, quality systems,
the twelve time zones and the next day of the week situations. I had experienced long
distance business difficulties while working in Puerto Rico, and I knew it would be very
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difficult indeed to work with suppliers in China. At the time, I felt that Majestytech
believed it had no choice but to source parts from China because of cost.
The effects of globalization were changing business practices in the US, and it
seemed to everyone in business that having a presence China was the way to go. It
was not clearly explained to the manufacturing plant people how the sourcing changes
were to affect us. We were told to get passports and visas to be ready to visit the
suppliers in China because upon completion of the outsourcing project, the plant
personnel would take over day-to-day control away from the project team. I did not look
forward to that and I was not the only one concerned.
We were going to make it as cheap as possible, and that is it. I do not think the
decisions were necessarily made for the benefit of the product other that just to get
it done, get it from there (China), and I hope it works. Nobody cared what
happened to us (Winston, Personal interview, 2010).
The China outsourcing project would also be affecting the work of the
Development Group design engineers. Situations arose that affected the product but
because the outsourcing project was an Engineering Group project not a Development
project, the design engineers were left out in the dark. They had no one from their group
involved.
Majestytech’s decisions were based on how our products were marketed and sold.
At that point, we were not intertwined with China. I believed that some economic
policies paved that avenue and directed the import and export process (Archie,
Personal Interview, 2010).
One day we all learned that the China outsourcing team had all been summarily
dismissed, along with the Engineering Manager, for gross fiscal impropriety.
We found out later that the China outsourcing project was suspended by the
corporate headquarters because it had exceeded forty million dollars with little to show
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for it. The rumor was that the malfeasance involved luxury airline and hotel travel, and
improper use of corporate credit cards. I was glad that I was not involved with the
outsourcing team. No one would openly talk about this incident, and after a while, it
seemed as if it never happened. Yet it affected the work climate negatively.

I worked for the engineering manager; he was the one that got fired later for the
mess he did with the transfer project to China (Yoshi, Personal interview, 2010).
My review of globalization and its effects, as covered in Chapter 1, shows how
globalization affected Majestytech. According to Gill, first, we can see how China
enticed firms to establish business there by representing itself as friendly and supportive
of businesses. Majestytech was one of many firms that found the China allure
irresistible. The second effect is that the state, in this case China, provides global capital
regulatory and political guarantees, cheap human labor, and frameworks for low taxes
(Gill, 1997).
For China, this behavior makes good sense because China is a big country with a
large population, and businesses that establish there have the opportunity to reap huge
rewards. However, the effects are nefarious and pernicious, although presented as
meaningful ideologies to justify them. In addition, these are disingenuously equated to
progress and improvements to civilization.

D. The Desperamed era
Desperamed, a newly created company owned by a Canadian consortium, bought
the imaging business from Majestytech. The former Majestytech employees became the
founding employees of Desperamed.
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The freshness and my employment did not last long.
The imager’s low profit margins forced Desperamed to operate in a very
competitive low margin environment. As shown in Figure 11, Desperamed took control
of imager manufacturing in late 2007. By this time, the imager profits and volumes had
considerably decreased. In addition, due to the highly leveraged purchase, Desperamed
would be starting its corporate life heavily in debt.
I remember how I felt the day of the switchover to Desperamed. All of the
employees were told to huddle together in one of the large lunchrooms understandably
to celebrate the new beginning. Yet, I knew things would change only for the worst
because all of the previous managers were still there and no changes were planned to
the operational hierarchy.
Desperamed had to produce machines that were very inexpensive. The model
A2008 machines that we produced under Majestytech were about $40,000.00 each.
Fast development for inexpensive tabletop imagers came with Desperamed. The first
was model B2009 with a selling price of about $15,000. Desperamed had a business
model that included a move of their core operations to low-cost China. Its low-cost plan
also included doing all of the engineering and development in China. Figure 11 presents
the Desperamed organization chart. By the time, we became Desperamed the
manufacturing plant manager had moved to another company, and the supply chain
manager took on both the plant and supply chain manager’s responsibilities.
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Figure 11. Desperamed Imager Life Cycle Stage (individual view)
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My boss took on the additional responsibility of engineering manager in addition to
the quality manager’s role. This is shown in the organization chart (Figure 12) in the
“box” Engineering and Quality Manager; these functions had been separate under
Majestytech but were now under Desperamed were joined under the same person.
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Figure 12. Desperamed Organization Chart

The change from Majestytech to Desperamed meant that we no longer had access
to Majestytech’s electronic quality system for documentation and this made the
engineer’s job very difficult. Moreover, we found that Desperamed senior management’s
indifference towards sound design and manufacturing had changed for the worse.
Most of the senior managers transitioned from Majestytech over to Desperamed.
In other words, they did the same jobs as before but now under Desperamed. Much to
my amazement their knowledge of the quality system and interest in upholding the high
standards of ethics demanded by medical devices had suddenly been swept away
along with the Majestytech name.
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To make matters worse, at about the same time we became Desperamed came a
showstopper issue. The issue was designated as an “adverse effect”, and this meant
that the issue was serious enough to stop production until resolved.
The issue hinged on the surface finish of some of the sheet metal parts that
touched the film. The surface of the sheet metal was scratching the film and this
produced visible artifacts (marks on the film) that could be misinterpreted by healthcare
personnel when reading the X-ray film.
Radiologists diagnose as anomalies the “lighter-grayer-darker” aspects of the
developed film, and the medical treatment of the patient is set according to the anomaly
detected. The anomalies showing on the film were not real; the imager defects made
the metal scratch the film. This was very serious indeed, because this false positive
situation could have led to a medical misdiagnosis with potentially life threatening
actions.
In this case, Winston went to a local supplier and pleaded with them to make the
parts. We were fortunate they had some of the good material on-hand and we paid
dearly for the parts to get us back in production. Later we found out that Desperamed
had decided to give the China supplier US made material to avoid future problems.
The engineers at the Mid-West site had low morale and expectations because of
the constant stress. A confirmation of Braverman’s prediction of estrangement from the
job came from Archie, where he validates through his comments that he had in fact
given up, and transferred responsibility to management. He said:
My current job is design engineer and in our situation, there is a significant amount
of certainty but not one hundred percent. The ultimate decision lies with the people
in charge of the business. The financial people and business managers have the
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responsibility for the program, and I follow their instructions since it is really their
call (Archie, Personal Interview, 2010).
We were all forced to do more with less and most people in the organization tried
making Desperamed achieve its goals. At the time, many of the engineers were
concerned about their professional future and actively looked for positions elsewhere.
The cost reductions and cost containments had cut off any new recruitment. We had to
make do with what we had even if the work suffered. As I have mentioned before, nondegreed engineers occupied some positions that had engineer titles. Andrea, who
regularly dealt with documentation submissions, was in a unique position to evaluate
the differences between degreed engineers and non-degreed.
Two non-degreed engineers replaced a digital memory product engineer that left.
The non-degreed engineers lacked attention to detail on the documentation to the
degree that the documents were missing a lot of information. A lot of work went
into redoing the documentation to make it passable. The non-degreed engineers
did not check and double check the documentation, labels, and files for their
products (Andrea, Personal Interview, 2010).
This is what Yoshi told me about the time when one of the manufacturing
engineers in the optics assembly area left for another company:
When the optics engineer left, we were left hanging by upper management. After
he left, I started getting requests from the floor to review some issues in the
production of the optics assembly, for which I had no experience, but I would do
my best to help. I would actually work with Winston, who knew a lot about it, and it
got to be kind of a regular thing where I was spending more and more time in the
optics area.
I thought it seemed odd when my boss told me later that there would be no
replacement. It almost seemed like he has given up, my boss had given up. So he
must have known then something was on the horizon (Yoshi, Personal interview,
2010).
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The engineers all reacted differently to the situation we were in; some went along
blindly, others because they were more experienced raised their concerns. This is what
Larry had to say:
Those in charge had never actually designed anything, and when they heard a
mechanical engineer tell them one thing and then heard a manufacturing engineer
tell them another, they decided it was a difference of opinion. Then they would say,
"Well, we'll do both. Well we could not do both. I just did what I thought was best
(Larry, Personal Interview, 2010).
The manufacturing plant group of which I was a part and that included material
handlers, engineers, assemblers, buyers, and shippers were transferred from
Desperamed to Pouvremed.
E. The Pouvremed era
The Canadian consortium’s management intent on forcing cuts to expenses
mandated a transfer of manufacturing to another one its subsidiaries, and chose
Pouvremed.
This move was more an outsourcing of manufacturing than a sale. Figure 12 below
shows the imager life cycle stage at the point we started at Pouvremed. By then, the
imager business revenue continued in decline and the digital X-ray technology and
digital display systems were having profound effects on its future. We can see how the
three components (engineers, culture, and regulatory compliance) had considerably
deteriorated. Everyday life at work at Pouvremed had changed for the worst.
Desperamed wanted to retain the more lucrative film making and sales portions of the
business, and to outsource, as a cost cutting strategy, the manufacturing of the imagers
(film printers).
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Figure 13. Pouvremed Imager Life Cycle Stage (individual view)

Delays and cost overruns had plagued the development of new and low cost
imagers, and Desperamed in desperation looked for possible synergies with other
organizations to do the manufacturing. The parent Canada consortium owned
manufacturing facilities in China but these lacked sophistication in producing complex
mechanical, electronic, and optical machines, and importantly experience in medical
devices. Pouvremed also part of the same Canadian consortium was selected to
receive the imager production.
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Pouvremed, located in a city nearby to the Desperamed location was a low cost
producer of electronic board assemblies, including some testing. Pouvremed had an
FDA registration as a medical device manufacturing entity because they made a small
component used in medical device. This meant that Pouvremed had to maintain its own
quality system to comply with the FDA and ISO directives.
Pouvremed was unprepared for the complexity involved in manufacturing the
imager medical device.
The decision to have Desperamed come on board with Pouvremed was made in
Canada and once the decision was made, there were a lot of meetings, and a lot of
project management activities.
Desperamed’s build was big leap for us and if we take a step back and look at
what processes, procedures, and SOPs we had, we find that the Pouvremed
quality management system was arguably somewhat immature as compared to
what came over. Because of that immaturity, I think we took steps to strengthen
our system, and, the Desperamed folks who did come over were very instrumental
in bringing our overall system up, and making it more mature (Peter, Personal
interview, 2010).
At the time of the switchover to Pouvremed, most of the employees transferring
were told not to contact their new counterparts or co-workers to avoid confusion. This
resulted in that most of us transferring had little or no idea what Pouvremed was like. I
did not know how immature the Pouvremed quality system really was until I got there.
By then we were manufacturing under a quality system that we were simultaneously
creating.
Peter tried to explain the prevalent mentality that existed at Pouvremed to shed
light on the management’s decision-making process at the time.
Our culture was one with a can-do attitude. That’s one thing that’s a strength to
Pouvremed is to consider the perspective of when a rather insurmountable
problem is facing folks, then it’s not a question of ‘we can’t do this,’ it’s ‘what can
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we do to make this happen?’ So, people do roll up their sleeves and they get the
job done (Peter, Personal Interview, 2010).
The attitude described by Peter seems to be that of a “bottom feeder” where
regardless of the difficulties or impediments no stone is left unturned in the quest of the
goal. What Peter describes is a business attitude that confirms a “race to the bottom”
strategy. For some this may be an enticing condition because it affirms a “win at all
costs” condition regardless of the consequences. Yet, I feel this is for me an undesirable
condition incompatible with maintaining patient safety at the forefront.
I knew at the time that Pouvremed was way over their head when it committed to
the imager build. It did not take long to find out that many things were wrong with
Pouvremed, including the immature quality system Peter mentioned, yet most
importantly, there was a lack of familiarity with the type of advanced production system
needed by the imager. The Pouvremed managers in charge of directing the imager
build were unknowledgeable about the product, and inexperienced in managing its
complexity. The transfer from Desperamed to Pouvremed did include some of the
Desperamed managers but these all reported through the existing hierarchy of
Pouvremed, and had no say on the substantive decisions needed to run the imager
build. Important decisions were made by Pouvremed managers based on the
Pouvremed knowledge base and these were incorrect and at times harmful.
One in particular comes to mind. The Material Resources Planning (MRP) systems
at Pouvremed were appropriate for low volume and low complexity builds but the
imager was a high volume and high complexity build. The Pouvremed MRP system
needed considerable human intervention to make it work and this led to inventory
shortages and inventory errors with very high costs. We were constantly involved in
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manipulating the MRP system to get it to work and most decisions had to be approved
by incompetent Pouvremed managers that capriciously approved some, delayed some,
and rejected some.
As we continued to work at Pouvremed, many employees were forced to visit and
transfer their knowledge to establish the China operation. Many vehemently refused and
were chastised; and many left their employment with Pouvremed as soon as they were
able. Andrea, a former Desperamed worker, now at Pouvremed, had these comments
about the transition of work to China:
I was part of the Pouvremed China transition team and I remember that our quality
managers were very frustrated that their foreign counterparts responsible for the
medical product just “did not get it” as to the FDA requirements and absolute
necessity to meet certain rules and regulations.
We all agreed they were smart, had unlimited resources to muster and would get it
eventually but did not get it at that point. Many meetings were held with visiting
engineers with much discussion of FDA requirements, explanations of calibration
tools, process, inspection issues, and documentation requirements.
However, we felt they did not comprehend the criticality of process, and that the
FDA could shut production down if requirements not met in areas such as
incoming inspection, documentation, assembly, and labeling (Andrea, Personal
interview, 2010).
Cost control and cost cutting was the way of life at Pouvremed but it was not
organized as had been the case at Majestytech with its “Lean” and “Just-in-Time”
efficiency initiatives. At Pouvremed, it was worse because it was capricious and
abusive.
With the transition to Pouvremed, the engineer took full responsibility for all their
own paperwork because two engineering aids were eliminated as budget cuts and
the engineers had to pick up that load. I found I had extra time and my manager
asked me to help the engineers. I went to sift through the aides files and I found
unfiled and incomplete documents that affected the quality system and the work of
the engineers.
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I reported this and I was told to discard everything that way no one would know
what was missing. Secretly I saved everything and bit by bit, I worked on fixing and
filing the documents the best I could until the shutdown (Andrea, Personal
interview, 2010).
The imager production success relied on the Pouvremed and Desperamed
engineers working together as partners in a customer-supplier relationship where before
we had been equals in the same organization. The actions at Desperamed had a direct
effect on the activities of the Pouvremed engineers.
What is probably most challenging is our relationship. You know the engineers at
Pouvremed are pressed to do things, such as, getting parts just in time, and now
we do not worry about that. I think our team needs to do better at having people
working together. That is certainly not the case even within our company
(Desperamed) because not everyone is interested in working together for the
common good of producing good parts, good product (Archie, Personal Interview,
2010).
Our physical separation with Desperamed had taken its toll and as information on
the bleak future at Pouvremed disseminated engineers started to feel the effects of the
coming changes. The imager manufacturing business was all transferred to Asia and
the Pouvremed plant in the Mid-West closed in 2010. Intelligent and talented
engineers, and talented workers, about 500 were left without employment. It is easy to
study about the benefits and advantages of capitalism over all other economic systems.
It is also easy to read Schumpeter and to understand how beneficial “creative
destruction” is because the old opens the way for the new, except when it happens to
you and to your colleagues.
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Section 2: Engineering Quality Systems
A. Early and mid-cycle
Quality systems as discussed in Chapter 1, is a term that describes the
compendium of activities used by firms to control the manufacturing of medical devices.
The manner in which companies comply with the mandatory activity of maintaining an
effective quality system varies from firm to firm, and this is allowed by the FDA because
it would be impossible to be prescriptive in view of the great number and different types
of devices built. At Inventorz, during the growth portion of the imager’s life cycle, and
then at Majestytech during the imager’s maturity portion of its life cycle, the quality
system had wide support.
During the time that I was at Inventorz, we had dozens of engineers working on the
products. It was not easy because we had lots of issues with parts, and things
were changing all of the time, but I could always get the help that I needed to get
the issues resolved. We always followed the written procedures we had because
we were making a medical device and we knew it was regulated by the FDA.
Prints, assembly procedures, and change orders were all controlled by the quality
system, and we had no problem with that because everyone followed the rules.
Sometimes we did too much but I felt we had better support then. We had help
looking after the FDA requirements but we were always trained on what to do
during audits and visits (Winston, Personal Interview, 2011).
Later when Majestytech took over manufacturing of the imager, it also showed a
certain level of commitment to CGMP (Current Good Manufacturing Practices)
regulation compliance and for the most part regulatory compliance had management’s
support.
I had various jobs before Majestytech that were non-medical, and going from
manufacturing engineering of non-medical to medical was a major issue with me. It
was unexpected because prior to Majestytech, I made engineering decisions just
based on what I thought was good, and I didn’t have to get signoffs or anything. If
a change needed you did it because you said so. When I first got to Majestytech
around the year 2000, it was completely different because of the GMPs and the
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quality system. It was a team atmosphere, there were many signoffs required, and
I had to adapt to that (Yoshi, Personal interview, 2010).
Yoshi is telling us in his own words how different his manufacturing engineer job
turned out in the much-regulated industry of medical devices. He tells us that prior to
working with Majestytech in his other positions (non-medical devices), he would
evaluate changes, such as improvements or substitutions, and on his own cognizance,
and he approved or rejected the changes. At Majestytech, he could no longer operate
on his own, and he had to follow the quality system to make changes.
In a medical device manufacturer, quality and regulatory (QA &RA) are the
departments responsible for driving compliance to the FDA GMPs. As shown in Table 6,
QA & RA usually report to the Operations Manager. QA & RA must have their
manager’s support to accomplish their goal because without a doubt power within the
organization rests with the senior management group.
Quality control documentation was my responsibility at Majestytech and plant
management was very supportive of the GMPs. The engineers had to follow the
appropriate procedures if they needed to change work instructions or part
specifications (Andrea, Personal interview, 2010).
Support for compliance within Majestytech involved more than those in the quality
group.
In most situations, the engineers that I have worked with tried to do their best to
comply with the CGMPs. In part, it is a matter of knowing which quality system
portions apply, and knowing what the customer has in mind, and what they are
going to experience. Then it goes to the quality team to make sure that everything
is tested. I hope that there is a quality group that cares about fully testing the
design and provides plenty of feedback about the results of testing (Archie,
Personal interview, 2010).
Drori points that there has been a wide dissemination of the quality system
guidelines pointing to the perception by decision makers that compliance results in
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eliminating uncertainty related to safety and efficacy of medical devices (Drori, 2006).
Though Drori points out ISO 9000 specifically, worldwide quality system standards
include both the ISO and CGMP guidelines. At Majestytech, and before at Inventorz, the
medical device oriented quality system was appropriate because it was enforced and
supported by management.
B. Late cycle (late Majestytech, Desperamed and Pouvremed)
At the later stages of the imager life cycle, at the end of the Majestytech’s
ownership of it (between 2005 and 2007), the number of engineers had been greatly
reduced in the organization. Majestytech had a quality system in place with electronic
systems for quality control and quality assurance, and engineers were forced to rely
heavily on the electronic systems.
The reduced engineering staff levels show how management support for the
quality system at the time was waning at Majestytech.
Imager engineering support was on decline when I arrived in 2005 and regularly
lost staff. I watched one of the engineers work to get a product to production and
he was constantly frustrated with being “forced” to push things through although he
felt the product was not ready (Andrea, Personal interview, 2010).
The electronic quality systems supposedly allowed the engineers do more with
less but in reality, it was a forced-upon situation for the engineers because of the
reduced staff levels. Not the best of situations because the engineers were required to
spend a lot of time on their computers, and not enough time resolving the issues that
arose, such as helping the production process along.
The lack of support for the quality system had many repercussions; one was the
lack of response from the design engineers to issues on the production floor.The imager
was a device made up of hundreds of parts from hundreds of suppliers. Additionally, it
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was a highly complex machine melding mechanical, optical and electronic subsystems.
This overall high complexity relied on an engineering staff capable of quick issue
resolution to insure its success. The coordination of the engineering efforts was
orchestrated via the quality system through documented policies and procedures
carried out by trained and knowledgeable engineers.
Coordination within the engineering staff was of utmost importance. Unfortunately,
Majestytech had reduced the number of available engineers to a level that limited its
ability to apply effectively the policies and procedures contained within its quality
system.
They made their changes on their own through service issues or problems out in
the field, they identified issues and made changes on their own and I would have
to sign off on the ECO and implement the changes. However, there were cases
where there was no help and I had to take over myself. One of those cases
involved an electric motor that was attached to one of the subassemblies. For
some reason, during the assembly process, the assemblers were stripping the
threads on two or three of the motor mounting screws on a regular basis.
I remembered working on a similar problem prior to my working at Majestytech.
The Majestytech design engineer thought it was a problem with the motor and
changed the screw thread count but the problem persisted. I felt it would take more
analysis and I discovered the screw was short. The screws were not long enough
to have enough thread to hold it in position and it would strip the two or three
threads holding it when torqued. This actually damaged the motor and we were
returning them to the supplier as defective motors, something the supplier did not
like. I came up with an idea of doing a counter bore on the mounting bracket to
allow the thread to go deeper into the motor and I had the supplier of the mounting
bracket make some samples to my specifications. After discussing it with the
design engineer, I did some manufacturing tests, proved it out, and wrote the ECO
to get the change implemented. I was very proud of the fact that I found the
permanent solution for something that had been an issue for months (Yoshi,
Personal interview, 2010).
By way of clarification, I should note that as part of the “Lean” methodology, screw
lengths were standardized to just a few sizes and getting a longer screw was not an
option. In effect, there was a serious lack of coordination between manufacturing and
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design functions; the result was a weakening quality system in which often-serious
quality issues did not get resolved appropriately.
Generally, for the devices industry, I've found that it seems to come down to a
committee designing safety and depending on how interested management is in
safety, that committee gets weighted either for it or against it. They can rationalize
anything or stop anything, in other words inconsistency is the rule (Larry, Personal
interview, 2010).
Larry’s opinion above certainly sheds light on the state that he found himself in at
work at Majestytech at the time. His assertion that “inconsistency is the rule” shows a
serious lack of management control and confirmation of the deteriorated state of
Majestytech at the time.
The bulk of engineers at Majestytech were in the Engineering Group and
reported to the Engineering Manager. The manufacturing engineers that supported
production also reported to the Engineering Manager and issues that came up were
often resolved with the design engineers that were part of the Development Group. Yet,
as stated before many of the Engineering Group engineers were involved in the China
outsourcing project and not available to support production. I worked closely with the
manufacturing engineers at the manufacturing plant.
The work as configured by the Development Manager allowed the design
engineers little time to spend with their manufacturing counterparts. In this case,
compartmentalization had taken over at Majestytech with its ensuing negative effects.
The design engineers were told to stay in their cubicles and laboratory to increase their
“efficiency” but the overall effect was flawed designs that thwarted quality products. The
errors in the product not corrected during the design and development phase simply
festered until they got to manufacturing, and by then the issues could not be ignored
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any more. On occasion, the issue reached the customer and the service-engineering
group was forced to repair it. That is the reason Yoshi mentions that a “field service”
member was present at the weekly meetings.
This is what Braverman describes as the effects of the systematic degradation of
the labor process. The engineers are forced to operate in an environment of constant
reduction of labor costs until control of the process becomes the manager’s problem.
Sabrina provided her perspective as a quality engineer regarding the ill-effects of
the compartmentalization between the engineering groups.
What I did not like was Engineering’s containment methods when there were
problems. They just wanted to blame the operator or add another inspection; that
was their practice and it did not work. Therefore, I was not necessarily surprised
with the quality issues and how they dealt with correcting them. They hid some
things and said they had a product ready to go, and in reality they were nowhere
near ready or nowhere near the safety standard required. I think there was a lot of
that (Sabrina, Personal interview, 2010).
I asked Archie for his perspective.
I assume, I do not know this , I am guessing that a lot of their bonus’s or their pay
is tied to performance of the program, and that means getting products out to
market, and they have a different line of vision than a design engineer. Most
design engineers would tend to keep designing for a long time rather fix any minor
problems later (Archie, Personal interview, 2010).
The problems created by the weakness in the coordination of efforts were clear to
the manufacturing plant because we noticed the absence of engineers from the other
building. We lacked sufficient resources to resolve the quality issues that arose.
The relentless pressure for controlling and lowering costs was suffocating and
under Desperamed’s ownership (2007-2008), the desire for CGMP compliance had
seriously started to dissipate. One of the first major indications we had of CGMP laxity
came with a new product. The design control requirements were not being met in the
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rush for introducing the new product. At the time, Desperamed was a new company that
had senior managers intent on showing that they could produce profits rapidly, and
introducing a low cost tabletop imager for the developing world markets was a principal
strategy.
When at the final production design review for the new model B2008, I think that
the quality people said, "No, it's not ready" and "It has not performed like it should"
and I think the engineering group had some misgivings too and they said, "No, it's
not ready" and management said, "Yeah, it's ready. You're going to build it."
"You're going to make it work" and that is what management did (Larry, Personal
Interview, 2010).
The product they wanted to release was not manufacturable but they went ahead
anyway. They just ignored the quality system problems and quality issues. I knew
that it was going to be very costly in the future (Sabrina, Personal interview, 2010).
Quality is only as good as the individual directing it. If management support is
lacking or they lack the proper background or experience the outcome is likely to
be poor. The development manager and senior management were driving the
pressure on the optics engineer to approve. The engineer had late night
conference calls and worked his butt-off all day to get the production floor stuff
ready and the documentation. He was frustrated with the amount of work but more
importantly about not being able to fix the issues he was concerned with (Andrea,
Personal interview, 2010).
Larry, Sabrina and Andrea noted in their comments that they knew about the
quality system being ignored. The rest of us also knew this was happening because
everyone talked about it at the time. Unfortunately there was little we could do except
react when problems happened later.
I had a chance to talk to the Regulatory Affairs manager at the admin building.
Almost whispering because of her concern with being overheard, she told be of her
worry about Desperamed’s cavalier approach to the FDA and ISO regulations for the
new model B2009 launch. She was concerned with the lack of engineering resources to
complete many of the tasks that were pending.
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Later would happen very soon at Pouvremed, as we got ready to build the first test
units of the next Desperamed new model, the C2009 imager. No validation had been
performed on the components or the suppliers for the parts, a failure to follow the quality
system procedures at both organizations, Desperamed and Pouvremed. I covered this
incident in Chapter 3 but here are further accounts from Peter and Winston.
On the non-validation of the new model C2009 there was I guess a lot of wailing
and gnashing of teeth as far who owned the validation. A tremendous amount of
wailing and gnashing of teeth and going back to those product transfer actions that
were going on, there were people making decisions that did not understand the
ramifications of their decisions (Peter, Personal Interview, 2010).
One of the issues was that as Pouvremed, we were a contract manufacturer
(supplier for Desperamed) and we were on the outside looking in. We could work
with them and make some suggestions, but we were working for them through our
companies. Desperamed made the decisions and we were told to make the
product. Just accept it and not necessarily worry about the quality side of things.
We were just the instrument to get the parts into the door, make sure that they met
whatever they call as approval prints.
Unfortunately, in this case we didn’t have any prints to work with. We had
insufficient information. We had very little time to push back and say, ‘We don’t like
this design. The response was “‘we need it right now”. Just get the paperwork
approved so we can build the machines. That was our relationship and I know
Pouvremed did not like it one bit when we refused to sign the documents for the
new model C2009 (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
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Chapter 5
ENGINEERING AS A MORAL CAREER
This chapter presents a thematic summary of the issues raised in Chapters 3 and
4. The issues are reviewed through the lenses of Goffman’s moral career and Schön’s
reflective practice. The issues are those involved in the practice of engineering in the
manufacturing of medical devices.
I interviewed five engineers that are involved in medical device manufacturing.
They chose a profession that gives them an honorable way of making a living and that
on a regular basis allows them to enact within their organizations the key points of what
it is to be an engineer. The review begins by presenting through their own words how
their involvement with engineering started.
Archie: I am very proud of being an engineer. I feel it is an honest, noble
profession and I feel that I am contributing to the better good of society. I do not
think many people realize what goes into being an engineer. All the behind the
scenes work that you do just to get something out the door, it is a challenge. It is a
huge challenge.
I got into engineering because in high school I enjoyed math and science, and did
well in them. My uncle is an engineer working out West. I just watched him and
watched the way he thinks and talks and looks at things. It was very interesting to
me to see how things worked.
As I went through high school, I decided that engineering would be a good place to
go with science and math. I decided to go to the State University, which has one
of the best engineering programs in the state and in the country. I went there,
started in electrical engineering, and decided it was a little bit off for me, so I
switched to mechanical engineering, and it has been a good fit for me because you
really get your hands on things and figure out how things work (Archie, Personal
interview, 2010).
Larry: I always liked building things and designing things so when I got to college I
went into engineering at a State University. My brother had gone to the same
university four years before me.
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At the time I got out of high school, I was not really interested in going to college,
but there was a war on and going and college was better than being drafted and
having to go someplace much worse, so I went to college. I thought, well, I'll give
engineering a try (Larry, Personal interview, 2010).
Sabrina: My career choices were engineering, art, or veterinary medicine. In art,
you do not make any money until you are dead. I do not like putting down animals,
so engineering became the right choice. My dad is an engineer and my brother an
industrial designer. I have been in engineering about ten years. For the most part, I
have had more of a traditional industrial role. I did a lot of time studies, layouts, line
bounds, and things of that nature. Currently I am more in a quality role responsible
for box quality, and things making it to our customer and working after unpacking
(Sabrina, Personal interview, 2009).
Winston: I completed my degree in Electrical Engineering and after that started
working. As you know I went into quality because I felt it would open more doors,
more possibilities for me as my career progressed. In the future, it is in our best
interest to have one hundred percent quality. There is nothing that is going to kill a
product faster than bad quality.
I am very proud of being an engineer. Even with things that happen it is surprising
that things don’t happen more often just because of all the issues that go into
making our imager. I feel strongly that I can make a difference (Winston, Personal
interview, 2010).
Yoshi: I went to school for the first two years at the State University and the
second two years were at a different campus, where I enrolled in a manufacturing
engineering program. In manufacturing engineering, we get to determine for
example, the range of parts. Some engineers do not like to accept anything that is
outside of the drawings. However, I try to balance knowing what is good with
functionality and with the capabilities of the supplier and the machine. Many of
those things are sometimes in conflict with each other. I want to eliminate the
problem if possible, whether it is to change the drawing or change the specification
requirements or whatever to make sure that we have a good decision (Yoshi,
Personal interview, 2010).
The path to engineering as a “moral career” starts with the education received as a
student during university training. It continues throughout one’s professional life as the
role and what it means in practice evolves over time. These portrayals of professional
engineering include a sense of apportioned merit. Goffman in Asylums mentions this as
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a “moral division of labor” (Goffman, 1961). In industry, engineers merit nicer jobs,
greater authority, and higher pay, all earned through their hard work and brains.
Goffman explained that over time, for the persons involved in engineering, the role
takes a life of its own, and becomes a category useful for understanding any given
actor; it even becomes incorporated into the actor’s sense of identity. Additionally,
Goffman mentioned that the actor within such settings gathers together a “moral career”
(Goffman, 1961). In other words, “moral career” is the tangible pattern of actions and
interpretive rules of thumb that become second nature. Within industry, engineers that
labor through years of schooling and apprenticeship develop a series of skills that
satisfy the general requirements of their profession and organization. Meanwhile they
increasingly define themselves, in part, as a function of the pride (and other reasons)
they experience over time. As their practice advances, the engineers develop modes of
analysis that may become more than just artifacts of work. In some, this may turn up, for
example, in a difficulty by the engineer in “turning off” the commonly known
“engineereze”; the slangy term for speech heavily laden with technical babble.

Section 1: Primary Adjustments
The first presentation is a look at the engineers through the theme of primary
adjustments. This is the application of Goffman’s term to engineers to define what
happens when they cooperatively fulfill their professional duties. Fulfillment of duties for
engineers involved in medical devices has two principal aspects; first, to meet the
professional engineering codes; and, second, to meet their organization’s requirements.
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These primary adjustments to the profession and to the organization occur with the
following: (1) with support of institutionalized standards of wellbeing, (2) with the drive
supplied through incentives and joint values, and (3) with the encouragement of
designated penalties (Goffman, 1961).

Shown in Figure 14 is the connection between primary and secondary
adjustment and product life cycle. This original chart depicts the gradual move from
primary to secondary adjustment as the product moves along through its life stages.
During the introduction/growth stage and the early maturity stage, profits and morale are
high and the primary adjustment is strong. As the product moves from the maturity
stage to the decline stage, profits decline morale diminishes and the primary adjustment
weakens with a gradual strengthening of secondary adjustment.
The first aspect, i.e., the fulfillment of the professional engineering codes, is guided
by the National Society of Professional Engineers-(NSPE) Code of Ethics for Engineers.
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The following is an excerpt from the NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers:
Preamble. Engineering is an important and learned profession. As members of this
profession, engineers are expected to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and
integrity. Engineering has a direct and vital impact on the quality of life for all
people. Accordingly, the services provided by engineers require honesty,
impartiality, fairness, and equity, and must be dedicated to the protection of the
public health, safety, and welfare. Engineers must perform under a standard of
professional behavior that requires adherence to the highest principles of ethical
conduct. (http://www.nspe.org/Ethics/CodeofEthics/index.html)
Fundamental Canons
Engineers, in the fulfillment of their professional duties, shall:
1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
2. Perform services only in areas of their competence.
3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
4. Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees.
5. Avoid deceptive acts.
6. Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to
enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession.
(http://www.nspe.org/Ethics/CodeofEthics/index.html)
The second aspect of duty fulfillment is guided by their organization’s mission and
goals. For engineers making medical devices the fulfillment is complemented through
compliance to the regulatory requirements of the FDA and ISO.
A. The work or skilled reflective practice
The practice of engineering offers many opportunities to achieve great satisfaction.
There are moments when engineers apply their knowledge of technology and
mathematization to create innovative and life savings solutions. Schön refers to these
moments as being in the “groove” when the design, build and inspection of products
produces elegant results. Schön refers to this elegance as the moments when
engineers get to apply their professional knowledge in the hard sciences, materials, and
processes, and gathering other senses in soft knowledge apply them to achieve artistry
in their practice (Schön, 1983). Take for example the fine orchestration found in the
performance of the workers in the assembly of the imager. In my mind, I can still see the
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artistry of that production line. The production line was fine-tuned to a high degree of
perfection by the industrial engineers giving the groups and individuals a rhythm and
cadence that was beautiful to watch. I will miss it dearly.
Medical device design and manufacturing present to the engineers involved a
moral high road because devices save lives. This higher value to society results in an
alluring moral condition. Especially for quality engineers always in the middle of
establishing and implementing the quality system since this moral script represents a
higher value.
The cell saver process was a good example of a high moral value because it was
100% guaranteed to prevent blood donor infections. It reinfused the patient’s own blood
and eliminated transfusions and their potential danger of hepatitis and other blood
diseases. The cell saver process speeded patient recovery because the hard to replace
red blood cells were not wasted. The process reduced costs because of the speedier
post-operative recovery. It also eliminated donor blood transfusion costs. Hundreds of
thousands open-heart surgeries were performed yearly prior to the minimally invasive
surgery advances, and the cell saver process saved countless lives and substantial
costs. During the years that I have been involved in medical device manufacturing, I
have felt great satisfaction because my professional engineering efforts affect for the
better many lives every year. I have always felt I was upholding the highest possible
professional principles.
(1) Problem solving
Engineers achieve a high degree of satisfaction when involved in problem solving.
This satisfaction comes from many sources, to some it comes in finding solutions to
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problems encountered during product manufacturing. For other engineers it comes from
the satisfaction of creating a product through a design effort.
When I came up with the solution to the wire problem of the small dental brushes, I
felt very happy. Working on the wire problem had been tedious and intense but the
result was that I had been able to solve the puzzle. It almost felt as good as I had felt
when I found out that I had passed my final class needed for graduating with my
engineering degree. When I solved the wire problem, it validated all efforts I faced
during engineering school. I remember talking to others at the plant and to the wire
supplier engineers; and all wanted to know what I did to come up with elongation as the
key requirement. I told them that it was like solving a mystery; I looked at all of the clues
and reached the right conclusion.
I always had an interest in manufacturing engineering. It is the hands-on thing that
I like a lot (Yoshi, Personal Interview, 2011).
So I added supporting the optics area to my plate and I think I was successful in
learning what I needed to know about the optics assembly, and taking care of
those issues along with my normal other duties. It was a problem that needed
fixing and I had the chance to come up with a good solution. It made me feel very
good and the operators appreciated my extra effort (Yoshi, Personal Interview,
2010).
We sure had a lot of fun working with Crystal on the noisy fans. I think everyone
was surprised that the problem originated in our warehouse. I have always wanted
to do more problem solving because it was that way at Inventorz and it made the
days pass by faster (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
A few days after completing the noisy fan experiment and finishing the report of the
experiment, I had to go around explaining the statistics theory behind the conclusion.
Even after reading my report, there a few doubters still believing the supplier was at
fault. Soon after finding out that the dropping of fans was occurring in the warehouse, I
updated my report, and after that, there were no more doubters. I felt good that
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advanced statistics confirmed the hypothesis (it was not the supplier). Again, like a
puzzle with many parts it was fun to get to the solution.
We have to make sure the heat shield is effective, and that no one can get hurt
because the drum gets pretty hot. I did the work on the prop rod that we had to
reposition a bit when it became a problem. Those things make the imagers fun
engineering, and a fun product to work on (Larry, Personal Interview, 2010).
Firms have to allow a trained and proficient professional the opportunity to work in
an atmosphere that provides sufficient latitude for the engineer to practice. As I have
covered in Chapter 3, job descriptions and work rules for engineers must allow
considerable latitude to allow them the opportunity to excel in their work. Braverman
warned us that management uses Taylor’s “Scientific Principles” as a means of exerting
maximum control of the work process. Taylor’s “Scientific Principles” widely embraced
by industry often result in throttling the vital professional “judgment calls” that result in
the top performance of engineers.
Schön adds to this Reflective Practice, which to him is the process that allows the
professional engineer achieve elegance and artistry in the practice. Only engineers with
adequate latitude can be expected to employ all their talent and effort, and in the
process achieve excellence as an outcome.
In my quality engineer role, box quality was my responsibility. This is making sure
our machine is ready when it is unpacked at the customer site. It is the quality of
the machine right out of the packaging. Everything has to work, installation, startup, and printing. I get an out of box report and I will do a follow-up action if
something does not work as expected. If it happens again then we get the team
together to review the issues and come up with a corrective action.
The first thing to look at is who the is the customer because we have a particular
group who has a significantly higher standard than the rest of the world. They are
willing to accept a lot less, so that’s the first thing. The second is see the severity of
it, that is a dent versus a pickup not working is significant impact difference. Dents
do not affect the functionality and the pickup means it doesn't work. We try to give
all customers the same deal because we inspect everything before shipping, but in
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some cases we try harder for some of the very demanding customers (Sabrina,
Personal Interview, 2009).
The exigencies of the jobs presently done by engineers are complex,
technologically challenging, and needing versatile solutions. These jobs must be done
by persons not only trained in the sciences and mathematics, but also trained in
professional ethics. Ethics training is mandatory in all accredited engineering schools
because it is the foundation upon which the engineering profession relies upon to
maintain the public’s safety foremost. The best hope of looking after the public’s safety
is by insuring that qualified engineers occupy positions requiring such training, and that
the professionals are allowed sufficient latitude to practice. Achieving excellence in
professional practice takes knowledge and training.
Determining the “good enough” state or this is “as good as it gets” condition must
be done by those who have been trained and have achieved proficiency because
untrained personnel still believe in the old quality maxims, such as, “production makes
them and quality checks them”, and “let’s make extra because then we can still make
our quota even if some are no good”. Presently, the emphasis is on having the entire
organization embrace the quality system concept and due to this, the bar has been
raised. All this results in that it takes training to learn about the changes that have
occurred to the long-standing maxim, “as good as it gets”.
(2) Dramaturgy
Goffman explained that certain actions by persons within a group could be
considered performances. These actions, seemingly, like rites of the group, in this case
an engineer doing his duty, could be considered as dramaturgy. The function of these
performances would be to demonstrate, for example, that conditions within the
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organization are as expected. In other cases, the performances could indicate a
satisfactory state within the engineer’s professional situation. During these
performances, the engineer would “put their best face forward” to convey a sense of
stability and situational control. The performances would indicate to those inside the
organization, and in many cases to some outside the organization, that the situation is
as it should be within the organization.
I presented in Chapter 3, various incidents where dramaturgy was involved in my
role as quality engineer. My belief at the time was that I needed to reassure those inside
my organization, and some outsiders, that the situation was under control. In some
cases, it was to show respect and commitment to our many suppliers, in other cases, to
demonstrate to the internal actors that our cause was meritorious.
When I was involved in the issue of the shattering bowls, I felt it was very important
to let the FDA know of our commitment to quality by informing them of our
improvement-focused activities. My visits to the FDA were preceded by detailed
rehearsals and the preparation of reports, drawings and photos (the appropriate props)
for use during the presentation. I dressed in a business suit, including a well-pressed
white shirt, and elegant tie. I arrived on time, and I carried the reference materials in an
elegant briefcase. Everything I did was meant to project professionalism and proficiency
as a quality engineer. The oral portion of the presentations had been rehearsed
previously and these went on smoothly. During the rehearsals, I had insisted on having
my staff present questions as we went along. All this made my performance a success;
the FDA persons present later thanked me for the excellence of the presentations.
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There was another instance surrounding the shattering bowls, which involved
dramaturgical effort. It was a visit to a very disgruntled customer, one considered key to
our business on the eastern seaboard. As covered previously in Chapter 3, our goal
was to visit an important customer to convince him not to stop buying our products. Our
preparations included rehearsals, and making available colored copies of reports,
graphs, charts, and pictures (the appropriate props) to use as handouts for our
customer. We took an early flight headed east as a precaution in case of an unplanned
delay. In addition, we travelled in the first class section to insure we would be able to
rest during the flight, and to make sure we would have space available to hand carry our
materials. We both dressed in business suits with white long-sleeved shirts (these
would mask sweaty armpits due to nervousness better) and elegant ties. It was winter
and we both agreed not to use our top coats prior to meeting our customer to prevent
wrinkling our suits and shirts. We refrained from having coffee and used breath mints to
insure a pleasant smelling breath. Our presentation started with my co-worker
introducing me to our customer, and from there on he was silent to avoid confusing our
customer. After that, I did the technical presentation, including the review and
explanation of all of the material we had brought. My co-worker presented some product
special offers and product pricing adjustments to complement my presentation. Then we
asked the customer his input; he told us in strong terms that he was unconvinced and
would stop buying our products. This was an unpleasant outcome to our visit.
Sometimes the dramaturgy involved in my role as a quality engineer involves
performing without enjoying the role. This was in the case, which I covered previously in
Chapter 3 about changing the supplier for the castings. I did not enjoy lying to the
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existing suppliers about our business’s future, and I did not like having to pretend to
cooperate with our customer Desperamed in searching for a lower cost supplier for the
castings. In fact, I felt rotten about being a conspirator in all of the on-going back room
negotiations.
According to Goffman’s dramaturgy of social interaction, my role as quality
engineer and technical expert has a “front-stage”, which includes interactions with
workers, engineers and suppliers (Goffman, 1961). Yet, there is a “back-stage”
represented by my insecurity based on concerns of failure and the possibility of
dismissal from my position. Additionally, in this “back-stage” lurk my concerns for ethical
and moral behavior as I try to uphold high professional principles. During the time of my
involvement with the imager, the “back-stage” of my performance in the role of quality
engineer became difficult and ugly. My insecurities increased and along with this, it
became more difficult everyday to uphold my high professional principles.
Goffman wrote about roles crafted as in dramaturgy, and some engineers reflected
upon their degrees of actorhood.
When I perform as an engineer, my responsibility is first to our customer; it is to
that patient that needs a scan. When I go home my responsibility is to my family,
but I rest easy at night for I have worked on making a well-functioning imager. I feel
that we have a good imager and that we have made good decisions. We did the
best we could and represented ourselves well (Archie, Personal Interview, 2010).
B. The ideal technology product
On the outside, the imager had an appealing aesthetic quality comprising of
elegant lines and pleasing graphics. Industrial designers had taken their time, and the
effort resulted in the elegant visual presentation of the machine. The good looks were
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complemented by the important capability of saving lives; it was a nice looking machine,
and one that also saved lives.
When we were very successful, there was a good rapport between manufacturing
and design. Manufacturing engineers always had reasonable things to offer, and it
just was not done because design forced it upon everybody. We had trouble with
weld splatter and we worked with the manufacturing engineers and the vendors.
Some of them had better capabilities than others and we got through it. We knew
we had to involve them for a successful product. The products early on were pretty
reliable because they had good design concepts and we took our time (Larry,
Personal Interview, 2010).
Knowing that most people would never look inside the machine was disappointing
because a great deal of industriousness went into making and putting together imager
components. I wished others outside of manufacturing could see what the design,
manufacturing, and quality engineers had worked very hard to put together. I felt at the
time, that all the engineers had a great admiration for the imager, and that we all worked
very hard together to make them. I recall the great deal of attention that went into
setting up the production line, as a way of maximizing efficiency and minimizing the
assembly cost, and as a way of controlling the good quality of the imager. It was
through careful and precise assembly that all components would fit securely insuring
imager performance would last.
When I started at Majestytech in 2000, there was a lot of activity going on. The
building was running at 100 percent capacity. There was no dead space in there,
all the cubicles were filled up, and shortly after I started, they added more people.
They even had to add offices out in the production area (Yoshi, Personal Interview,
2010).
Considerable effort went into creating the assembly procedures that all the
operators used. Literally, everyone played from the same sheet of music, insuring as
much as possible, there would not be loose parts, broken or missing components, and
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no misdirected wires that would affect the critical path of the digital image to be printed.
We cared because the imager was built to perform as a device that saved lives.
All of the engineers I had the chance to interview cared about the imager. Here in
their own words are comments about the imager.
Yoshi: One of the imagers for which I was responsible was known throughout the
world as a low-cost, high-volume, probably considered low-feature unit. I am very
proud of the fact that I was involved in that.
I had a situation where my dad needed an X-ray scan, and I went back and looked
at the equipment, and sure enough, it was one of the ones I built. I was very proud
to be involved in those imager programs (Yoshi, Personal Interview, 2010).
Winston: In the early design stages, we had a lot of questions, fortunately enough,
I don’t think any became big issues. We thought we could overcome any problems
we had. The imagers turned out great, whether it was just because of luck or
whether it was because hard work their design was robust enough. I think it
worked out great (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Sabrina: Oh, I adore the imager absolutely, it is a gorgeous machine. You know I
am the last person to see them before they ship because I am responsible for the
final quality check. I also deal with any out-of-box issues with our field engineers
and they always comment on the good effect the new machines have with our
customers when they install them in the field. I am just a participant in the calls
dealing with out-of-box and I am involved with the field engineers and design
engineers, and they refer to me as the factory, and that makes me feel good
(Sabrina, Personal Interview, 2009).
Larry: The imagers are wonderful machines and my involvement has varied for
different models. For the latest ones, I have worked on the processor part of the
system and we have to make sure all things fit together to avoid any problems.
Before the imagers I worked on laundry machines and the imagers sure beat those
(Larry, Personal Interview, 2010).

Archie: Speaking from my own experience in product development, there are a
huge number of factors that go into building an imager and making them function
on a day-to-day basis. You know that many things could go wrong, such as
manufacturing, suppliers and components, but when things go well it is a beautiful
thing. The imagers we make are great products and they save lives every time
they are used (Archie, Personal Interview, 2010).
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Schön explains that engineers in their practice express a certain degree of artistry
and that it is present even though it cannot be explained well using the technical
language common to engineers (Schön, 1987).
The imager was a beautiful product and most importantly, it was capable of saving
lives. This was clear and uppermost in the engineers’ minds. We worked together to
produce an elegant solution, it was made up of metal and plastic and it melded many
processes that produced a very focused and precise picture of the invisible inside of the
body. Schön (1987) refers to the artistry of the professional as resulting in an elegance
that tells the story of the facts. It is an explanation that the outcome is economical,
functional, and beneficial, that it is indeed an elegant solution.

Section 2: How Secondary Adjustments Can Occur
As discussed in Chapter 1, secondary adjustments are any habitual arrangement
by which individuals employ unauthorized means, obtain unauthorized ends, or both,
thus getting around the organization’s assumptions as to what they should do and get
hence what they should be. Secondary adjustments represent ways in which the
individuals stand apart from the role and the self that were taken for granted for them by
the institution (Goffman, 1961).
In this section, I will review from three perspectives how firms and their employees
get on the path of secondary adjustments. The three perspectives are the following, (1)
corporate lying; (2) products distributed before being ready (pushed through); and (3)
constant regulatory (FDA and ISO) rule violations. These three perspectives appear
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most clearly in this case and show how both firms and individuals get involved in
deviant behavior. The shift from primary to secondary adjustment is shown Figure 14.
A. Corporate lying
In industry, and under certain situations, conflicts appear when job-descriptionengineers take over the duties of degreed and professional engineers. Management, as
evidenced by Braverman, turns the jobs of engineers into mindless positions in order to
exert full control of the process and reduce costs. A blind emphasis on the job
description strips away the autonomy of the professional engineer to find artistry, as
mentioned by Schön, in the course of practicing. There are organizations, as discussed
by Peters and Waterman, where “skunk works” exist and these firms maintain and
foment professional engineering practice and artistry, and the firms benefit greatly.
One of the changes I started to notice was the hierarchy among the engineers over
at the other building. Sometimes the engineers in the other building wanted to
appear better than the engineers at the plant. It is interesting that it is not hard to
tell who is pretending to be better. Just based on personality the manufacturing
and industrial engineers that were seen as being at the bottom; these were very
approachable, more personable, and more were people oriented. Whereas the
others think they do not need people. Designers are not as approachable; they feel
like you are bothering them when you bring a problem to them. It is an issue that I
brought up to the engineering manager and he said it was up to us to resolve it.
There is resentment between the engineers and the workers. Sometimes the
workers refers to the as “those from upstairs” and refuse to talk to them or help
them. My workplace changed and I did not like it (Sabrina, Personal interview,
2009).
In Chapter 3, I mentioned the despicable practice of American industry of
assigning the title of engineer to some uneducated and unqualified individuals. This is
often the case because it costs less to hire someone without formal education or
experience. Often it is also to reward a long-time technician with the title of engineer to
assign more responsibility or remuneration. This is a form of very serious lying by the
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firms that embrace this practice. The firm’s customers and its employees deserve to be
served by educated and qualified engineers with the proper credentials. Instead, they
are served by others only qualified through their title.
What is needed is for firms to respect the preferences of professional engineers for
accurate and specific titles and job descriptions. Firms need to show respect and regard
for the persons’ academic and licensing achievements by selecting and rewarding those
that have achieved a high degree of professional dedication and preparedness. As
covered in Chapter 3, I find fault when firms write job descriptions with the title of
engineer and fill them with non-degreed persons.
Positions with an engineer title should be filled by individuals educated in
engineering not by uneducated individuals. If a firm finds degreed individuals
overqualified or costly, a solution could be to find a different title for the uneducated
person. I believe this is a reasonable and rational rule to observe, one that protects the
public from charlatans and untrained practitioners.
Corporate lying takes on many forms such as that done by a subsidiary at a distant
location when hiding a weakness from a corporate headquarters. This lying may take
the form of exaggerating capabilities to appear well prepared when in fact that is not the
case.
During the Desperamed transfer, Pouvremed behaved following the “can do”
methodology once again, and shortcuts were taken. It was a rather poor way of
covering all the bases. Knowledge transfer should have been stronger because
Pouvremed lacked the appropriate procedures. We tried to adopt some of
Desperamed’s but it was too big a challenge. Our quality management system
used an application that was cumbersome and people tried to use it but it was too
difficult. Again, we were trying to drive to timeline rather than outcome and we had
to take shortcuts that did not work (Peter, Personal interview, 2010).
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Here Peter is explaining that he felt Pouvremed (local) misrepresented its
capabilities to its corporate headquarters. The local plant wanted the Desperamed
business and it told its headquarters that it had the capabilities, when in fact it did not.
In other cases, corporate lying is done to deceive persons or organizations on the
outside. This happens often when a corporation misrepresents its position or situation to
a customer or supplier.
There are many people in engineering that look at something and just adjust the
tolerances to make it seem to work. However, when it gets to manufacturing at a
supplier the tolerances may be off by a decimal place. This deceives the supplier
into thinking that it is their fault the subassembly’s fit if off. In fact, it is a sneaky
way of putting something in the drawing that has not been properly tested or
validated (Larry, Personal interview, 2010).
What Larry mentions happens when a firm’s engineering designers are told to
expedite their work and the design is approved by management for release knowing
that the validation did not happen.
Winston and I fielded questions daily from our US suppliers with whom I also
worked closely. Suppliers wanted to know what was going to happen. We did not have
the answers and in fact, we had been told by our manager, that for business matters
they should contact the supply chain manager. The SQEs (supplier quality engineers)
still maintained the authority to discuss part quality issues with them but we could not
discuss other business matters. In other words, we were to withhold information from
our suppliers that in many cases they were getting from other sources. This made us
look to them as if we were lying or withholding information from them. Many of them told
us this was how they felt, and it made our jobs harder than they already were.
In other cases still, corporate lying is done to mask improper or unethical behavior
from government regulators or enforcement officials.
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Knowledgeable people (in this case Guillermo) made the concern known about
CGMP violations and they were ignored, which was not a good thing. Once again
driving to timeline versus the intended outcome resulted in a lot of rework of
decisions (Peter, Personal interview, 2010).
Peter brings up the deceit involved in Pouvremed’s decision to release a product
without the proper validation, which is a violation of the CGMPs. This demonstrates a
willful malicious act not a harmless oversight. Profit was the motivator not responsible
behavior.
We had doubts about what we were asked to do for we had to approve parts that
we really knew nothing about. We were forced to do it because we needed to get
machines to the market in time No concern as to our capabilities. Just do it and we
will worry about it later (Archie, Personal Interview, 2010).
Archie refers to the common practice of the design group in the late stages of the
imager at Majestytech, Desperamed, and Pouvremed to cut corners by approving parts
without validation.
On many occasions, corporate lying took place to protect a senior official’s
personal interest. This is a most shameful behavior because it incriminates others in the
conspiracy.
I believe, I do not know this, but a lot of their bonuses or their pay is tied to
performance, and that means getting products out to market, and they have a
different line of vision than a design engineer (Archie, Personal interview, 2010).
Archie mentions that he was required to cut many corners because his bosses’
bonuses were on the line. There are many bad consequences to this behavior, among
them, that a bonus is more important than safety; and that unethical behavior is
acceptable.
The specification of the metal called for a finish imitating a mirror. The finish is put
on only one of the faces of the metal during processing and a cost reduction
project had been put together to change the surface finish specification to allow the
use of a less expensive sheet metal from China. The validation had apparently
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been done but the sheet metal used during the validation was a prototype and
differed from the production sheet metal. It took us quite a while to work through
this problem and to find a solution because the main supplier was in China. We
also found out that typical US standards such as those controlled by the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Society of Testing
Materials (ASTM) are not followed in China because to use them royalties would
have to be paid to the USA societies. China creates its own standards to avoid the
royalty payments.
Inexperienced design engineers and supply chain technicians are easily duped into
believing that cheaper materials are equal to materials procured from suppliers
operating in regulated systems. Unfortunately, later when they discover their
mistakes it is often too late (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Winston discussed some particulars about the ineffectiveness of the China transfer
project. Majestytech’s corporate headquarters had cut many corners to make the
outsourcing project a success.
The digital image technology and sourcing from China have started to change our
business in the past few years. I do not have all the details but that certainly
affected how our business ran, and how we developed our products, and to a great
deal the issues we faced. For instance, getting parts from China created many
problems, especially lead times in getting parts. Quality and quality feedback was
very affected by Majestytech policy. That affected jobs here and how business
worked as a whole (Archie, Personal interview, 2010).
One of the down sides of the cost cutting led to the selection of unqualified
materials. This was exacerbated by China’s, and its industry’s disregard for costly but
proven effective processes for managing the standardization of a material’s quality.
B. Products distributed before being ready (pushed through)
As discussed previously in Chapter 1, there is a clear connection between the
good performance of a medical device and the effectiveness of the development
process. When issues are not resolved during development these issues tend to appear
after distribution. For this reason, the regulatory bodies place considerable importance
in the Design Control portion of the medical device regulations.
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In all processes, there is variability and this variability can cause problems at any
time, and the reason the quality system approach is embraced by reputable companies
is that it works in keeping trouble away. Using military lingo it is described as having a
defense-in-depth against problems. In the quality engineering circles, this is referred as
redundancy of the systems, and we strive for having as many reasonably cost effective
redundant systems as possible.
A recurring critique of professional engineers is our determined and seemingly
endless pursuit of excellence. Engineers always seem to need just one more test, just
one more data point. It is possible engineers are imparted with this trait during
engineering school. Yet, we know that in real life, and especially now where there is a
constant push for lower costs, that there is never enough time or enough resources to
do everything we would like. This puts engineers in a constant state of conflict because
on the one hand their professional ethics demand first and foremost the safety and
protection of the public; and on the other hand, businesses demand a higher
productivity, and a faster throughput of work.
I had very little contact with the Majestytech design engineers in the development
group from the admin building, but on occasion, they stepped in to help because they
were familiar with the design concept and design intent. We met weekly during a brief
production meeting to review any pending issues, and two or three of them often made
the meetings, others showed up only when we had a serious stoppage. We knew who
they were but we did not have routine contact with them.
The design teams mostly worked on new products, and new ideas, and provided
ancillary support to the manufacturing group only on as needed basis. I resented that
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because the chasm that existed due to the physical separation was made worse due to
the lack of contact between the engineering groups. Additionally, it reinforced the belief,
and attitude, that manufacturing was weak and needed to be rescued when in trouble.
This notwithstanding the fact that the reasons the manufacturing process got in trouble
was in every instance due to design shortcomings.
This attitude seems common with design engineers and I had experienced it
before in other firms. As before, I was forced to resort to innovative measures to force
the design engineering teams to monitor closely the issues discovered by
manufacturing. I began to advocate for the use of a quality system official document of a
list of “don’ts” during the creation of the Product Requirements Specification (PRS) by
the design team. As noted in Chapter 1, medical device makers are required to meet
the design controls portion of the CGMPs. Device makers create the PRS document as
part of the design controls process and in it, they list all of the product requirements.
For example, the imager PRS had over 100 pages of information but many
requirements were unclear, such as those for blemishes, rollers, sheet metal, decals,
wiring, and machine noise. Manufacturing struggled with these issues constantly and
got only short-term resolutions.
It is also clear from Figure 7 that during the development stage of a product’s life
cycle the revenue stream is negative because during this time there are no sales. An
improper response to this burden is that organizations expedite the release of a product
before it is ready therefore jumpstarting the revenue stream from sales. This practice is
often identified by the use of a few common phrases such as, the product was “thrown
over the fence”, “busted right through the gate”, or “pushed through”. The gate is a
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reference to the various decision points identified in the Design Control portion of the
CGMP.
Conceptually the new product looked good on paper but when we actually started
making it there were some questions. Then we pushed back because we just didn’t
feel like there was enough research put into it to make sure that the product was
indeed robust enough to do what it was intended for (Peter, Personal Interview,
2011).
The development team came up with a design and they built some samples.
There were deadlines to meet and at some point, management decided it was
good for production. The gate process to them was a joke and they “threw it over
the fence” as ready for production. After that, we became responsible for the new
imager (Yoshi, Personal interview, 2010).
It is a challenging thing what we face because design engineers want to do a
thorough analysis, and management wants a decision made in a very short
amount of time to keep production rolling and product going out the door (Archie,
Personal interview, 2010).
I am thinking it goes back to the split from Majestytech. It was part of the program
and profitability of the new separate company, and I am guessing there were
bonuses and compensation tied to this at the upper levels of management. They
wanted this to work one way or another, and they just pushed it through, crossed
their fingers, and went ahead (Larry, Personal interview, 2010).
We crashed right through the important FDA CGMP design controls gates; it was
as if they did not exist. They released the product by going around the gate
because it was a business revenue situation. I think it was a matter of maintaining
a certain cash flow (Sabrina, Personal Interview, 2010).
This site was a low cost printed circuit board assembly. We did stuffing of boards,
which is putting components on boards. With the Desperamed product being the
imaging device, it really strayed away from the Pouvremed core competencies
within the site. Pouvremed had to rely very, very heavily on the skill-set of the
individuals that came over from Desperamed (Peter, Personal interview, 2010).

C. Constant regulatory (FDA and ISO) rule violations
Previously in Chapter 1, I covered that manufacturing of medical devices is
regulated by the FDA and ISO. The regulations have been enacted into law by most
countries because of importance is placed on the safe and effective performance of
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medical devices. This has been recognized as a matter meriting enforcement, which
relies on having rules of law.
Goffman identifies that secondary adjustments can include behavior that obtains
unauthorized ends. The following are some examples that appeared in the data I
collected.
The supplier quality engineer had to approve tooling and molds that made some
very complicated pieces of equipment. It was an opportunity for the SQE to review
prints, specifications and qualifications before committing funds. But, in this case,
the buyer just worked directly with the supplier to expedite the process without
involving the SQE. We never knew this had happened until the parts came into the
inspection facility and we were force to decide on the spot whether they were good
or bad. We had lots of problems but by that time, it was pretty much too late
because the money had already been spent on the tooling, and we had no chance
to give input (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Winston identifies numerous quality system violations that in this case resulted in
delays, increased costs, and product quality problems. The buyer in Winston’s example
probably believed coordination with others was cumbersome or unnecessary and
bypassed the required channels.
I think they felt that getting the job done was more important than follow-up on
documentation and paperwork or for that matter more important than going through
channels or getting approval. Maybe they did not sacrifice the quality of the
finished product but they definitively did not comply with the quality system
(Andrea, Personal interview, 2010).
Winston and I took up forcing the switching of parts and components to local
suppliers to make it easier for us to get good parts. This was an uphill endeavor
because in most cases the local suppliers had up to 30% higher costs. We were aware
of the higher cost yet we also knew that we could rely on the local suppliers to give
good parts from the start, that way minimizing the need for us to expend extra resources
doing many quality inspections.
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Frankly, incompetent people ran the engineering department. They were
politicians and they knew how to get people on their side, and they knew how to
kind of channel information around, but as far as knowing how to engineer they
were incompetent. At the time, the people at the top were not engineers (Larry,
Personal Interview, 2010).
From the perspective of medical devices, we had set up the quality system with an
outside consultant. Our systems were not as mature as Desperamed was
accustomed to, so there was a culture shock for the associates that came over. I
had a perception that the ex-Desperamed colleagues that came over believed they
had taken a step back of 5 years in the technology continuum. The comparison of
having to use a calculator with only addition and subtraction after being
accustomed to a scientific calculator capable of upper division physics. It was hard
for them to accomplish what they had to do because our computer systems were
not as robust as they needed to be to satisfy regulatory requirements (Peter,
Personal interview, 2010).
Goffman identifies that secondary adjustments can include behavior that employs
unauthorized means. The following are some examples that appeared in the data I
collected.
Generally, I felt we could work with the Desperamed engineers, and that we could
talk to them, but I think their hands were tied too. They were being forced by upper
management to get this thing processed, to get all the parts in, and to get the
machines built. A lot of the work that had to be done as in earlier projects was left
off the table on this one. I had strong doubts about the course we were following
but in general, I felt powerless to do anything about it (Winston, Personal Interview,
2010).
These violations resulted in product quality problems. This is another instance of
Winston’s frustration with quality system violations.
I found that the Pouvremed process on paper looked very, very good. As far as
adherence to it, I think there was, at times, some amount of shortcuts taken, and,
because of those shortcuts taken, the focus shifted on driving through the timeline
rather than the expected outcome. The outcome was set aside for driving timeline,
and then one of the things I think this organization is – they have a very high
tolerance for risk. Whereas, other organizations, they tend to try to minimize risk. It
was probably a culture shock for some of the Desperamed folks that did come over
(Peter, Personal Interview, 2010).
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I took on the role of overseeing the quality work of receiving inspectors because it
had been terribly disrupted by the lack of a computerized system of inspection
instructions. The parts came in to receiving inspection but the inspectors lacked the
appropriate inspection instructions to complete the inspection. I took printed copies of
the previously computerized instructions at Majestytech and manually modified them by
writing the instructions, and along with a date and my signature, we put together a
“manual” system for the inspection. The papers were filed away in folders with the
individual part numbers, and we started the inspection operation that way. It was an
elegant solution but a flawed one because of the high complexity of the imager for it had
hundreds of parts, and because it had no provision for reviews by other engineers
including those in manufacturing and design.

Section 3: Engineers and the Product Life Cycle (Winston’s Story)
In this section, Winston describes his engineering experiences throughout the
over 20 years of involvement with the imager build. He had the opportunity to use his
talent at working on a product that became very successful and a market leader. He
was there during the “fun times” of Inventorz and there at the ignominious end at
Pouvremed. This is an opportunity to learn about and make sense of the changes he
went through in his engineering career and the passing of the imager’s life stages.

A. Inventorz and early Majestytech
Inventorz with its “skunk works” style culture for new product development started
the early dry system X-ray film processing that resulted in the imager. As mentioned
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before, working at Inventorz was fun because its corporate culture prized and respected
the engineers. At their inception, the technological advancements and improvements in
the field of imaging due to instant photos, which Inventorz emulated to develop the
imager, were groundbreaking.
In the late 1980s when I started working on the X-ray imager printers, we
occupied the second floor on one of the buildings. I was working on the design of
some of the components. I remember working on the rubber-coated drum and
the rollers (Winston, Personal interview, 2010).
Inventorz is still a world leader in product innovation; Inventor’s entrepreneurial
spirit was embedded in its corporate culture. It realized that product innovation takes
time and that failures are frequent and normal during product development.
We were not worried because we could get all the time that we needed. We were
trying to come up with a film printing method similar to the instant photographs of
the time. We would get the film coated and then peel off the cover for it to develop.
This was a dry system; much different from the messy wet processing method for
photographic film prevalent at the time. That is what we were doing.
For all the time that has passed all these years, I am still pleasantly surprised that
it worked as well as it did (Winston, Personal interview, 2010).
Inventorz had a solid quality system that allowed it to maintain market domination
for a long time. The regulatory compliance effort translated into the distribution of a safe
and effective imager along with good profits.
For years at Inventorz, we continued coming up with new models and with cost
improvement projects and this stabilized the imager. I worked as a manufacturing
engineer for many years, and one of the things we did real well was the developing
quality local suppliers. It took years but we made some very good friends and had
a great time along the way. They always responded well because we treated them
with honesty and respect (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Support for engineering was excellent at Inventorz and within the organization, the
responsible teams provide the engineers with the help and services they needed.
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We got help from personnel because they always hired good people. We did not
have problems getting the resources we needed as we were growing and making
the imagers.
We also had good managers and they let us do our jobs without needless
interference. It was the same with the operators because we were always on the
floor ready to help them but we would not interfere unless they wanted us to. The
operators were always finding ways to improve things and solve problems for us.
We learned to back them up.
Before, we had a much closer relationship with our suppliers and with their design
and quality groups. We had more time to test, more input. I feel that we reacted
well to difficult situations that may have arisen. There were not that many but we
worked together as a team. On the various manufacturing issues we faced we
worked as a team, and made the necessary changes to try to solve the problems
with the support of many others (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Years later, after changes in the market and technology, the imager business
ended up with Majestytech in charge.
I did not like it at all when we went to Majestytech but we were not given much of a
choice, and by then I had too many years in to leave. I tried to stay at Inventorz but
it did not work out (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
The imagers changed when the imaging process went digital, and the business
was sold again, and again, and again. The competition from some international
companies had driven our business to the ground; the competition was very tough
(Winston, Personal interview, 2010).
B. Late Majestytech era and the time at Desperamed and Pouvremed
My name is Winston and I used to work with Guillermo at Majestytech,
Desperamed and Pouvremed. We both were quality supplier engineers working on
the imagers (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
With the end of Majestytech’s involvement in imager build, the printer A2009 model
was phased out. A new less expensive model B2009 was introduced to replace it.
Some of the decisions that were being made were probably not being made at our
site; they were probably being made by the headquarters that was a thousand
miles away. The decisions were made basically on cost (Winston, Personal
Interview, 2010).
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The sale of the business that occurred about the same time to Desperamed meant
that the new model B2009 would be released under the Desperamed brand.
The supplier quality engineer always had a good relationship with the design
engineer, the supplier, and the buyer. We (SQE) always had more input into the
launch process. This particular one, the imager model B2009, whether it was
because just the timeline had to get done, or whether it was totally by choice, there
just wasn’t the input that we had before with all the other machines that we made
(Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Winston was aware of the changes that had occurred around him, and he
mentions some of the corporate ones and those related to his engineering practice. He
better than anyone else was in the best position to compare how things had changed
from the way they had been.
Desperamed
The design team that stayed on with Desperamed certainly had experience. The
imager model C2009 was a knockoff of the imager model B2009 with a slightly
different and probably a little bit more complicated type of a process. The imager
model C2009 was a knockoff with some changes to the dynamics of how the
imager worked and how the film was actually processed. They went to plastic
instead of using sheet metal in a lot of places, and lots of the things were just very
questionable. It did not seem there was a lot or enough R & D put into it to make
sure that this worked the way it was intended (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
Here Winston tells us his perspective of how the engineering design process had
changed from how it had been in the earlier years. Gone were the trial and error tests
that allowed for mistakes and learning before releasing the product. Time was not
available to do those things.
I do not know what changed within the past few years but it seems that the number
of dollars spent on R & D is much less, than it used to be. Maybe that is just
remembering Inventorz Company, where they sunk ten percent of their profits into
R & D, but that is not happening at Desperamed (Winston, Personal Interview,
2010).
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The corporate culture under which he had worked before changed. Innovation and
product development resources had been reduced.
Pouvremed
It was an interesting experience working for Pouvremed, simply because we were
dealing with a different type of mentality. We were a contract manufacturer,
whereas in the other companies I had been with before were more into designing
and developing a product that they intended to sell themselves. Pouvremed was a
contract manufacturer working with several different customers to build a product,
which they would then sell it to their customers. Some of the things that we did
were not normal and some of the things we did they just didn’t seem like they were
kosher (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
The rate of change had accelerated for Winston. Where before he had worked in a
firm that had all of the business functions, such as development, engineering, quality,
and production together, now these were separate. The complexity of cross-function
coordination had greatly expanded.
When it came time for the initial build of the new C2009 imager, and there was no
qualification paperwork I knew something was very wrong. I didn’t like what was
going on but I didn’t see an option. We were working for them (Desperamed was
our customer). Desperamed was calling the shots and we were doing what they
told us to do. Both Desperamed and Pouvremed upper management supported
this. So the engineers had no choice. Then we went back to Pouvremed
management and said, ‘We don’t feel that this is right.’ There was some lip service
saying they would stop, and we were able to stop some of it for a while. At least
this made people think about it, and go back and get some approvals. But, it was
more or less just passed by us. Later I told the principal buyer to feel like we had at
least done something.
I think that had to do with the development of the tooling and the buyer working
directly with the supplier and not having any input from supplier quality. We didn’t
feel like we were involved in it. If there is a quality function, you want the quality
department and you want the quality engineers to be involved in some of these
decisions, but we were not. Peter might have known about it, but I don’t know how
involved. I think Peter got involved in it kind of after that whole thing. Then there
were some signs of some improvements, and management came back and said,
“Yeah, we agree that the signing is off.” Then they allowed us to involve the
suppliers (Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
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Support for the quality system changed very quickly. Emphasis on the quality
system waned because it lost support from the principal managers. Where before
Winston had been in a firm that was organized to follow its quality system, now he found
himself in a firm where confusion reigned.
There were some things that were assumed but what happened was just totally
against any quality structure that we had at previous places. It had to do with the
way that Pouvremed was set up as a contract manufacturer.
Desperamed was relying on Pouvremed to say, ‘Yeah, this is good; we will sign off
on everything, this is cool”, because Desperamed was the customer. The SQEs
were just figureheads in the role; we were there just because they said they
needed us. Later we found out we were not really necessary (Winston, Personal
interview, 2010).
The confusion continued and Winston’s engineering practice was relegated to
someone not required to apply any engineering knowledge. The end came very soon
afterwards and for all of those involved it was confusing and disappointing.
Later when we found out they were going to shut the plant down, there were a lot
people wondering what was going on, and what was going to happen to the plant.
The people wanted to know what was going to happen to them. There was
uncertainty but everyone knew we were being laid off. At that time there was lot of
people who threw their hands up in the air and said “this is ridiculous”. The idea of
quality and quality manufacturing took a hit from that time on. People were just
frustrated about what they were seeing and hearing.
It was a busy time for the C2009 because they originally wanted to get this thing to
the market early in the year. However, it kept being pushed back, and pushed
back, and pushed back, because of design issues. Things did not work the way
they were intended, so there was some modifications being done, and it finally did
get into production. It was in past mid-year when finally we built up 30 prototypes
and actually got them to different beta sites to be tested. It was a crazy time
because there were lots, and lots, and lots of parts coming in the building from all
the different Pouvremed suppliers (Winston, Personal interview, 2010).
I do not know how they are doing now. I do not know if the machines are even
functioning anymore, or if they have stopped design, or anything. The C2009
product went out to market. Shortly after that, Pouvremed closed its doors in the
United States and moved to the Far East and that was the final solution (Winston,
Personal Interview, 2010).
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If I were to compare all the companies that I worked for Pouvremed was the worst
(Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
I have been involved with imagers for over 20 years and always worked hard to
maintain good relations, and look at me now, not much left, what a shame
(Winston, Personal Interview, 2010).
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY, CORE PERSPECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary
When the end came, it was sad to hear the lament expressed by my engineer
colleagues involved in making the imager. Their pride and professionalism was very
strong and when we were together, I wished for a different outcome. However, the
moment for nostalgia is past, and all I can hope now is for a sliver of an opportunity that
my study will help engineers find answers for a different future because engineers
involved in making medical devices know their efforts save lives everyday, something of
which they are very proud.
One of my goals was to pose the engineering role in such a way that engineers
understand the impact that professional requirements have on their career. In the case
of engineers making medical devices, requirements come from three principal sources,
professional engineering, regulatory agencies, and their own organization. Engineering
requires an application of knowledge in technology, mathematics and science; and also
very importantly, the application of “gut judgment”. When knowledge and judgment
come together in their practice engineers achieve “artistry”. Regulatory requirements
from FDA or ISO are mandated by law and must be fulfilled and for practicing engineers
involved in making medical devices observance of the quality system is imperative.
Finally, organizational requirements must also be met, for it is to the organization that
engineers contract their labor to receive payment for their work.
When fulfilling the requirements from all three sources, engineers follow an
honorable way of making a living, and importantly they get to enact on a regular basis,
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within their organization, the key points of what it is to be an engineer. This is how
engineers gather a “moral career”.
My hope is that by posing engineering in this manner, it will help engineers and
future engineers make better decisions about their career. It is important for people to
do their “due diligence” when contemplating working for an organization. It becomes
important for people to ask about the life stage of the product(s) they will be working
with. It is important to understand the organization’s commitment in allowing engineers
make the difficult call on technical and science matters, and to inquire about how the
organization allows the engineering professional to use their judgment. It is through
knowledge that engineers learn how not to be a victim. In many organizations,
engineers are often “thrown to the dogs” because they are untrained on how to think as
the leaders of the organization do and become easy victims, and we often hear them
say, “it felt like a violation of my professional self”.
The research that I conducted and reported in this dissertation was an opportunity
to look at the moral career, a term conceptualized and described by Erving Goffman, of
engineers working in manufacturing of medical devices. Additionally, I used the term
professional/reflective practice, as described by Donald Schön, to present the salient
features of the practicing professional engineers.
B. Core findings and sub-plots found in the data
Figure 15 is a graphic representation summary of the first core perspective found
in the study. I superimposed best case and worst case, firm’s names, and added
corporate main conditions of culture, profit, and treatment of engineers and tied this to
the product’s life stages, i.e., introduction, growth, maturity and decline.
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The two sub-plots are also summarized for ready reference and completeness.
My review of the data revealed the principal finding of the connection between a
product’s life history stages and the state of the work of engineers involved in
manufacturing operations. Two other sub-plots emerged, first (1) the relationship
between a firm’s strategy (i.e. product design, marketing and profit margin) and the
increasing hegemony of management over engineering. The second sub-plot (2) was
the relationship between a firm’s strategy and the everyday work experience of
engineers. The work of the engineers is influenced by many factors and the results are
sometimes good and sometimes not. A detailed discussion follows.
(1) Connection between a product’s life history stages and the state of the work
of engineers involved in manufacturing operations
My data and analysis mirror other research literature on the relationship between
product design, market patterns, and profit margin, but it is elongated over four case
organizations. As a result, the experiential patterns of the work conditions of the
engineers, evidenced by the data collected, are fleshed out. Also, the fact that one of
the engineers was there “since the beginning” provides a useful triangulation of patterns
across engineers who were not involved with the device the entire time.
During my work with the imager, I felt first-hand the deleterious effects of the
deteriorating market conditions affecting the product. From other engineers some with
over 20 years of imager experiences, I learned how good conditions had been during
the imager’s introduction and growth stages. However, after reaching maturity
competition and technology changes altered the imager’s playing field, and its decline
started.
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My data showed the direct connection between the initial stages and a high
degree of satisfaction and autonomy engineers had in their practice. As the imager
moved towards maturity and decline, my data also shows a connection of how
engineering ranks diminished in number, how their dissatisfaction increased, and how
their autonomy was substantially curtailed.
The imager, like many products, had a life cycle that started with a development
stage, followed by a rise in sales, and throughout its successful years evolved along
with the advancing technology. The imager showed a decline due to the changes in
data handling from analog to digital. It did not disappear, and may never do so because
printed media as a technological advance has had a great and wide appeal for
centuries, one that will be very difficult to replace entirely. We see the imager’s business
model move towards lower volumes with simpler and less expensive machines.
(2) Sub-plot 1: Firm strategy and the increasing hegemony over engineering
The engineers throughout my study came from various disciplines: industrial,
electrical, manufacturing and mechanical. The imager was mostly a mechanical product
and the quality engineers were from engineering disciplines with affinity to the product.
The engineering disciplines of the design engineers involved with the imager
product corresponded directly to the product component they were responsible.
Mechanical engineers did the mechanical components and electrical engineers did the
electrical/electronic. Other engineering support came in as needed to fulfill the product
design required roles. All of the persons in design engineering roles had college
degrees aligned with their component design work. The design engineers of the
imagers were not involved in the day-to-day manufacturing activities because they were
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at a separate location, and therefore did not have real-time involvement with the
manufacturing support engineers and missed-out on many of the performance product
issues and manufacturing problems. In their own words, they explained it was their
responsibility to develop the product, and someone else’s to make it. After turning over
the product to manufacturing, they were required to refocus their attention on the next
product in the development pipeline.
A clear perspective in the data shows that the engineers and others involved in
the imager case got more frustrated and disgruntled as the product transitioned to low
volume production and low cost. The transition to low cost seemed coupled to a change
from an organization with high morale and motivation, to an organization with low
morale and incidents of unethical behavior. For the engineers, this resulted in a change
in their professional activities where they appeared to be in control of their
responsibilities and acted accordingly, to simply reacting in order to keep the product
moving. This is evident from the comments by the design engineers where they explain
the lack of time and resources to complete the tasks that to them, from a professional
engineer’s standpoint, were necessary. This came up many times during my interviews
and observations. We sometimes explain this as the firm having management
shortcomings, but we are never sure if it is that or the demands imposed by low cost.
The engineers, the same as other professionals, reflect on their behavior, and ask
themselves if they have sufficiently explored and produced an adequate solution. I have
mentioned this before in my phrase of “good enough”.
It is very hard to compete in a low cost business arena. In medical devices
manufacturing, as I have previously mentioned, firms operate a mandatory quality
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system. One of the safeguards built-in as part of the quality system is redundancy. As
shown by Perrow, certain amount of risk is always present, and redundancy, along with
aggressive regulatory oversight has proven effective in having a reasonably effective
and safe medical device industry. Yet, as shown in the imager case, the transition to low
cost resulted in the elimination of some of the quality system redundancy. The firms
involved believed there was no choice but eliminate some of the redundancy because
the resources were not available. The effect to the engineers was changes to their
professional practice. Changes they had no opportunity to prepare for or to ideate
possible solutions; the changes were mandated and implemented without recourse or
opinion. The engineers saw this coming, and they did their best to perform
professionally, but they were unprepared and disenfranchised. Low cost operations
force low cost solutions. To engineers on the inside, the quality system looks incomplete
when compared with firms with higher margins. The difference is that with additional
resources solutions to issues that take time to resolve get the needed resources and
are resolved. For engineers, it got increasingly difficult to operate as the businesses
moved into the low cost environment due to the limited resources available.
(3) Sub-plot 2: Firm strategy and its impact on the everyday work experience of
engineers
The engineers directly in support of the production activities, overall, spent the
most time with the product. The manufacturing support engineers, including the quality
engineers, as mentioned, were mechanical, manufacturing, and industrial engineers
and, of the product performance and parts issues, they became the most
knowledgeable of all the engineers. The manufacturing support engineers really
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became the product experts because of the length of time of their involvement. The
manufacturing support engineers handled dozens of issues daily that involved form, fit,
and function, and the success of the product was directly attributable to their knowledge
and dedication. The design engineers were the ones initially involved in the creation of
the product, and eventually turned to manufacturing for the product to be made. Once
the product was transferred to manufacturing, the design engineers took on a
supporting role assisting manufacturing support engineers.
The quality engineers in firms making medical devices have the additional
responsibility to monitor compliance to the quality system. I do not mean they have the
sole responsibility for the quality system but in most cases, the QEs play a very direct
role in making sure the processes follow the quality system. In medical device firms,
everyone must be trained to understand and follow the quality system regulation, but
QEs usually get more quality system training especially in firms that manufacture Class
III products. In many cases, the QEs in critical medical device companies also get
training in internal auditing, and the QEs perform the vital service of reviewing
processes and procedures for compliance to the regulatory standards. For supplier
quality engineers (SQE) in medical device firms, the SQEs have the additional task of
monitoring and auditing suppliers to insure they comply with their own established
quality system, and that the components they produce are made per the quality system.
As shown in the imager case, the SQEs had the responsibility for coordinating
with suppliers when parts or components had conformance issues. This included a
broad range of issues, such as dimensional, form, fit, function, and in some cases
cosmetic; in all cases the SQEs were tasked with identifying the problem with clarity,
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and rapidly communicating with the appropriate supplier. In a machine as complex as
the imager, with hundreds of parts and components, issues had to be resolved quickly
to insure continued production. On many occasions, we had suppliers switch parts lots
to isolate deviations at the supplier, deviations usually due to minor process changes.
The medical device regulation mandates monitoring of a supplier’s performance and we
used various statistical tools. All issues with a supplier were tracked via a
nonconformance tracking system, and a supplier’s corrective action response was
evaluated for appropriateness. A trending report was prepared and evaluated, and
feedback was given to the supplier to insure the supplier knew the performance
information. This statistical analysis also a regulatory requirement was the responsibility
of the SQEs.
My data shows that overall engineers enjoyed their work and felt good about
working in making medical devices that benefitted patients. The design engineers
admitted to wanting or needing more time to resolve issues that came up during the
design phase. The issues were passed on to the manufacturing support engineers and
in time were all resolved. The manufacturing support engineers initially felt blind-sided,
for they had no choice but address the pending design issues unresolved during design.
All changes, called Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), which involved form, fit, or
function had to be validated and approved by both engineering groups prior to
implementation. On some occasions, even with a validation, the changes brought on
more issues; the changes seldom transitioned smoothly. Some internecine friction was
always present between design engineers and manufacturing support engineers
because of the perceptions each group had of the other’s roles. The design engineers
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believed that once the design phase was completed they “threw it over the fence” to
manufacturing for production. The manufacturing support engineers felt they were
receiving incomplete designs, and that they were required to always “fine tune the
design” without getting the recognition. Schön covers some of this in his explanation
about academia’s and professional practice’s struggle; those closest to pure theory
dominate professional hierarchy. In reality, design engineers were told by management
when to release the designs to manufacturing, and probably got a bad rap for
something they were forced into.
(4) Life-cycle changes and engineer’s moral career changes
The moral career of an engineer, in Goffman’s terminology, changes often
dramatically over time and these changes are directly influenced by the “life-cycle”
changes of a product and by the culture of the different corporate organizations where
they work. The “life-cycle” changes of a technological product as it goes through its “life”
stages impact engineer’s work and practice conditions. When corporate conditions allow
an abundance of resources engineers have an easier time at fulfilling their requirements
and gathering a “moral career”. In times of plenty, their practice achieves artistry and
fulfillment. However, when corporations struggle and times become leaner, engineers
do not achieve fulfillment of requirements and they suffer.
The favorite public perception and even of engineers themselves is an “ideal
type” that is exacting, meticulous, and brainy, with limited social skills. My research
revealed that engineers are highly motivated and caring persons that try their best to
create solutions to complex issues with the expectation of serving society in fact driven
ways. Engineers often find themselves in confusing situations and although they try for
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better and improved solutions, these are mostly thwarted by their leaders. Most often,
engineers are not seen nor do they perceive themselves as accomplices in the
deterioration of certain industries. Professional engineers show they are a key group
prepared to confront our rocky future and to contribute to a better tomorrow. This
exemplar moral career is full of dedication and concern for the improvement of others,
and is especially apparent of all the professional engineers in the medical device
industry.
C. Recommendations for further research
Other researchers may elect to look at Goffman’s concept of moral career within
their own profession to present how it differs in the occupations not yet studied.
Research on a professional’s pragmatic course of their practice over time, focused on
revealing and analyzing particular historical events may provide some valuable lessons
for others in the same profession. Goffman’s concepts of interactive rituals, the building
of self and the composing of work roles within particular organizations is worth further
research.
A look into engineering education may reveal a lack of coverage of the
contextualization between a product’s life-stage and an engineer’s work. It would be
appropriate to introduce to the curriculum, if lacking, that work satisfaction and
autonomy for engineers is connected to a product’s life-stage. In addition, this may be
used as segue for discussions about the professional code of conduct and about
situations involving ethical dilemmas.
A possible study would look at licensed engineers in the medical device industry
to get a better understanding of their activities and their experiences with issues of
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professional accountability. In this study, I was able to include only two licensed
professional engineers and the data was insufficient to allow comparing licensed
engineers and non-licensed engineers. Yet, looking at my own behavior, I suspect that
licensed engineers demonstrate a greater concern for issues of engineering
professional code of conduct more so than non-licensed engineers do. The literature
shows this and it is attributed to the potential loss of livelihood if a licensed engineer
loses the license to practice for unethical behavior. In firms engaged in manufacturing of
medical devices, engineers are usually not required to have a professional engineer’s
license; many firms consider licensure a desirable thing to have but not a requirement.
Engineers in firms engaged in making medical devices are not held to the same
personal professional accountability that lawyers and medical doctors working for firms
do. Lawyers and medical doctors are held personally accountable for their own work
even though they may work for a firm, instead of private practice. Within medical device
manufacturing firms, engineers have the responsibility to perform professionally but
management has the last word on distributing a product or not and assumes the
professional’s practice liability. In the metro area where I live, we often read of defective
medical devices, such as pacemakers, artificial hips, and heart valves, causing a
patient’s death. These cases later we find had causes involving poor design control
procedures, ineffective quality systems, or a management focus on meeting a profit goal
instead of a quality goal. I believe it is appropriate to hold engineers accountable for
their professional work, especially when lives are at stake.
Another possible study would be one to establish a connection between
continuing ethical training and a reduction in mortal or serious product incidents. In all of
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my interviews, I asked the engineers open-ended questions about the role of ethics in
their engineering practice, and about their recollection of how the subject of engineering
ethics was covered in college. The data I collected was insufficient for analysis but no
engineer reported an ethics related follow-up sponsored at his or her work, and none
had a clear recollection of what had transpired during their college ethics training. Yet it
was clear in my data that the interviewed engineers had concerns about the
appropriateness of their actions at work, and about business leaders’ instructions. One
commented that business decisions were made to support profit instead of quality. This
seems to indicate that engineers often encounter situations in their practice that involve
serious ethical dilemmas, and that they are aware of the conflict these situations
present. This is not unique to the engineering profession, but engineers are in a unique
position to exert their influence to affect directly the safety of the products they design
and produce. Safety is a primary concern in the field of medical device manufacturing.
I feel that firms should have a program to discuss ethics in what they do as a
deterrent to shoddy professional practice. In addition, I believe that active ethics training
may create a competitive advantage to help differentiate a firm from its competitors. A
firm could gain an edge by fomenting ethics in the professional practice of their
engineers instead of treating simply as hired hands. This path could lead to safer and
effective products, a path that would stand out in the market. Often we read of medical
devices harming patients, and then about companies pulling out their damage control
plans to stem negative public opinion. In many cases, this results in additional ethics
reviews with outside experts with the purpose of riding out the storm of public criticism
and the ensuing review from the regulators. We know from information presented in the
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included literature review that risk cannot be entirely eliminated. Yet, in many extreme
cases, life can only be prolonged with a risky device. This and many other similar
scenarios should be openly discussed with the patients, family, health care
professionals, regulators, and the maker’s engineers and management, to present all
pertinent information about a risky device. News stories often reveal gaps in the
information available, gaps that affect the decisions of health care professionals, and
gaps that affect decisions even within the firm that makes them. In a recent highly
publicized case, there were six failures in about one-half million devices sold. Any
device failure resulting in the death of a patient should be intolerable, but determining if
this is a good record or not must be made ultimately by the patient with assistance from
well-informed and ethical professionals.
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